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resumo 
 
 
Controlo de acesso é um desafio para a engenharia de software nas 
aplicações de bases de dados. Atualmente, não há uma solução satisfatória 
para a implementação dinâmica de mecanismos finos e evolutivos de controlo 
de acesso (FGACM) ao nível das camadas de negócio de aplicações de bases 
de dados relacionais. Para solucionar esta lacuna, propomos uma arquitetura, 
aqui referida como Arquitetura Dinâmica de Controlo de Acesso (DACA). 
DACA permite que FGACM sejam dinamicamente construídos e atualizados 
em tempo de execução de acordo com as políticas finas de controlo de acesso   
(FGACP) estabelecidas. DACA explora e utiliza as características das Call 
Level Interfaces (CLI) para implementar FGACM ao nível das camadas de 
negócio. De entre as características das CLI, destacamos o seu desempenho 
e os diversos modos para acesso a dados armazenados em bases de dados 
relacionais. Na DACA, os diversos modos de acesso das CLI são envolvidos 
por objetos tipados derivados de FGACM, que são construídos e atualizados 
em tempo de execução. Os programadores prescindem dos modos 
tradicionais de acesso das CLI e passam a utilizar os dinamicamente 
construídos e atualizados. DACA compreende três componentes principais: 
Policy Server (repositório de meta-data dos FGACM), Dynamic Access Control 
Component (componente da camada de negócio que é responsável pela 
implementação dos FGACM) e Policy Manager (broker entre DACC e Policy 
Server). Ao contrário das soluções atuais, DACA não é dependente de 
qualquer modelo de controlo de acesso ou de qualquer política de controlo de 
acesso, promovendo assim a sua aplicabilidade a muitas e diversificadas 
situações. Com o intuito de validar DACA, foi concebida e desenvolvida uma 
solução baseada em Java, Java Database Connectivity (JDBC) e SQL Server. 
Foram efetuadas duas avaliações. A primeira avalia DACA quanto à sua 
capacidade para dinamicamente, em tempo de execução, implementar e 
atualizar FGACM e, a segunda, avalia o desempenho de DACA contra uma 
solução sem FGACM que utiliza o JDBC normalizado. Os resultados 
recolhidos mostram que DACA é uma solução válida para implementar 
FGACM evolutivos em camadas de negócio baseadas em CLI. 
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abstract 
 
Access control is a software engineering challenge in database applications. 
Currently, there is no satisfactory solution to dynamically implement evolving 
fine-grained access control mechanisms (FGACM) on business tiers of 
relational database applications. To tackle this access control gap, we propose 
an architecture, herein referred to as Dynamic Access Control Architecture 
(DACA). DACA allows FGACM to be dynamically built and updated at runtime 
in accordance with the established fine-grained access control policies 
(FGACP). DACA explores and makes use of Call Level Interfaces (CLI) 
features to implement FGACM on business tiers. Among the features, we 
emphasize their performance and their multiple access modes to data residing 
on relational databases. The different access modes of CLI are wrapped by 
typed objects driven by FGACM, which are built and updated at runtime. 
Programmers prescind of traditional access modes of CLI and start using the 
ones dynamically implemented and updated. DACA comprises three main 
components: Policy Server (repository of metadata for FGACM), Dynamic 
Access Control Component (DACC) (business tier component responsible for 
implementing FGACM) and Policy Manager (broker between DACC and Policy 
Server). Unlike current approaches, DACA is not dependent on any particular 
access control model or on any access control policy, this way promoting its 
applicability to a wide range of different situations. In order to validate DACA, a 
solution based on Java, Java Database Connectivity (JDBC) and SQL Server 
was devised and implemented. Two evaluations were carried out. The first one 
evaluates DACA capability to implement and update FGACM dynamically, at 
runtime, and, the second one assesses DACA performance against a standard 
use of JDBC without any FGACM. The collected results show that DACA is an 
effective approach for implementing evolving FGACM on business tiers based 
on Call Level Interfaces, in this case JDBC. 
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1 Introduction 
Fine-grained access control (FGAC) is a critical security issue in many software systems, mainly 
when policies evolve over time. Software systems are increasingly involved in all dimensions of our 
existence as humans. When operating in critical organizations, such as airports, hospitals, banks 
and power plants, they need to be available 24 hours a day and always operating under a high level 
of security. They manage data from which all day decisions are taken, many of them critical. To 
prevent any security violation, several security measures are taken such as user authentication, 
data encryption and secure connections. Another relevant security concern is access control 
[Samarati, '01b; Vimercati, '08], which “is concerned with limiting the activity of legitimate users.” 
[Sandhu, '94]. Basically, access control is a process to supervise every request to access a protected 
resource, in our case data residing inside relational database management systems (RDBMS), by 
determining whether the permission should be granted or denied. While access control is enforced 
at the table level, fine-grained access control (FGAC) is enforced at the column and row level. 
Currently, there isn´t any known solution to automatically build and keep updated, at runtime, fine-
grained access control mechanisms (FGACM) on business tiers of relational database applications 
and in accordance with the established fine-grained access control policies (FGACP). 
 
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 1.1 describes the problem being addressed. 
Section 1.2 briefly presents a solution to overcome the identified problem. Section 1.3 states the 
research questions to be addressed in this thesis. Section 1.4 enumerates and describes the 
contributions of this thesis. Section 1.5 presents the tools and infra-structured used during the 
thesis development process and, finally, section 1.6 presents the thesis organization. 
1.1 Problem Definition 
Critical data are mostly kept and managed by database management systems. Among the several 
paradigms, the relational paradigm continues to be one of the most successful to manage data and, 
therefore, to build database applications. To be useful, data need to be stored, updated and 
retrieved from databases. To this end, software architects use software tools to ease the 
development process of business tiers. Two groups of software tools are widely accepted in 
commercial and academic forums: O/RM tools (Java Persistent API [Yang, '10], LINQ [Erik, '06], 
Hibernate [Christian, '04] and Ruby on Rails [Vohra, '07]) and  Call Level Interfaces (CLI) [ISO, '03] 
(JDBC [Parsian, '05], ODBC [Microsoft, '92], ADO.NET [Mead, '11]). Unfortunately, none of these 
tools addresses access control, much less when the policies evolve over time. These tools were 
mainly devised and designed to tackle the impedance mismatch issue [David, '90].  
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We now leverage the importance of CLI as the perfect choice for building business tiers 
whenever performance is considered a key requirement [Cook, '05] in detriment of other 
requirements such as productivity, usability and maintainability. Some of the features that 
contribute positively for a high performance of CLI are: 
 
Fine tune control 
CLI are low level API (Application Programming Interface)  that provide programmers with a 
fine tune control to manage and optimize the environment in which Create, Read, Update and 
Delete (CRUD) expressions are executed.  
 
Use of the native SQL language 
Native SQL statements are encoded  inside strings, this  way keeping the performance and the  
full expressiveness of the SQL language. 
 
Multi-access mode to data 
CLI support several modes to access to data residing on relational databases. In each situation 
programmers are free to choose the access mode that better addresses their needs. Among the 
several access modes the use of the native SQL language is the most well-known. Chapter 2  
thoroughly describes the access modes used by the DACA. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Typical usage of CLI (JDBC). 
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In spite of these key advantages, CLI (as other software tools) do not address access control. 
Figure 1 presents a typical usage of CLI in this case based on JDBC. From this example we see that 
there is no sign of any FGACP or any FGACM. Programmers are free to write any CRUD expression 
encoded inside strings (Figure 1: line 46) and execute them (Figure 1: line 47-50). The presented 
CRUD expression is a Select expression and, therefore, it returns a relation. CLI provide protocols 
from which programmers read the retrieved data (Figure 1: line 54-55), update the returned data 
(Figure 1: line 58-60), insert new data (Figure 1: line 63-66) and delete returned data 
 (Figure 1: line 69). There is no possibility to prevent programmers from writing this type of 
source-code and therefore there is no possibility to guide programmers to write source code in 
accordance with any established FGACP. 
To overcome this lack of access control of current software tools, several approaches are 
proposed by the commercial and the academic communities. Security experts, instead of exploiting 
the advantages of CLI to implement FGACM, build additional security layers specially crafted to 
control the access to protected data. These security layers are responsible for evaluating 
authorization to perform actions on database objects and also to execute them if permission is 
granted. These security layers convey several drawbacks, among them four are emphasized:  
 
Awareness gap about the policies and about the mechanisms 
Programmers of business tiers and application tiers are expected  to master the established 
access control policies at development time. This mastering process is very difficult to be 
sustained when the complexity of access control policies increases. Programmers do only get 
aware of any security violation after having written the source code. Awareness of any violation 
may take place at compile time but in most of the cases it is only obtained at runtime. Before 
compiling the source or running the database application, there is no possibility to statically 
validate the authorized actions during the development process of business tiers. 
 
Security gap 
The SQL language is characterized by its endless expressiveness capacity and programmers of 
business tiers and application tiers are not restricted to write any CRUD expression. This 
freedom opens the possibility for the existence of security gaps.  Current techniques can hardly 
guarantee safety for all CRUD expressions [Shi, '09; Wang, '07]. Even if safety is guaranteed, 
programmers are always before additional techniques with increased complexity to express the 
policies to be enforced [Caires, '11; Chaudhuri, '07; Chlipala, '10; Corcoran, '09; Fischer, '09; 
Gary, '07; Hicks, '10; LeFevre, '04; Rizvi, '04; Wang, '07; Yang, '12]. Additional techniques and, 
above all, increased complexity frequently leads to the possibility of opening unwanted security 
gaps. 
 
Wastage of CLI features 
Architecture of current security layers is not based on architecture of CLI, this way preventing 
the use of their advantages by business and application tiers. 
 
Maintenance activities 
Currently, any modification in the policies implying modifications in the access control 
mechanisms forces a maintenance activity on the security layers and/or on the business logic to 
be carried out in advance. Currently, there is no way to translate access control policies 
automatically into access control mechanisms and/or into the business logic. Maintenance is 
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very often a critical activity when modifications are necessary at the client-side of database 
applications with a great amount and distant equipment. 
1.2 Solution Proposal 
To tackle the aforementioned drawbacks of current security layers, we propose a new architecture 
herein referred to as Dynamic Access Control Architecture (DACA). Security layers relying on the 
DACA are dynamically built at their instantiation time on the client-side of database applications 
and are continuously updated to enforce any modification in the established access control policies. 
The dynamic adaptation of business tiers may leverage security systems based on 
models@run.time [Blair, '09] to continuously keep security layers aligned with the policies they 
must enforce. To take advantage of CLI features, the implemented access control mechanisms are 
closely aligned with the architecture of CLI and with the services they provide. Among the services 
provided by CLI, the DACA makes use of two access modes as it will be described in chapter 4. To 
overcome possible security gaps of current solutions, users are restricted to use only the 
permissions provided by the FGACM. Among the restrictions, users can only use CRUD expressions 
made available by the implemented FGACM. Finally, the DACA provides programmers of business 
tiers with a complete awareness about the implemented FGACM this way relieving them from 
mastering FGACM while writing source code. 
To unveil the proposed architecture, Figure 2 presents a simplified block diagram, though 
incomplete, of the DACA. The overall operation is as follows: 
 A security layer (business tier relying on CLI – it is a client-side layer) is dynamically built 
and kept updated (from an architectural model based on CLI and from the policies kept in a 
server) to implement access control mechanisms in accordance with the established 
policies. The security layer is composed by typed objects driven by FGACM; 
 Client applications access database objects through the security layer;  
 Security layer uses standard CLI to interact with database objects. 
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Figure 2. Simplified block diagram of the DACA. 
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There is no reference to FGACP. The DACA is focused on FGACM only. The DACA uses metadata 
derived from FGACP relying on any security model. This issue will be thoroughly addressed in 
chapter 4. 
In order to validate the DACA, a solution based on Java, Java Database Connectivity (JDBC) and 
SQL Server was devised, designed and implemented. Two evaluations were carried out. The first 
one evaluates the DACA capability to address the announced drawbacks of current solutions, 
including the capacity to implement evolving FGACM dynamically, at runtime. The second 
evaluation is aimed at assessing its performance against a standard use of JDBC where no policies 
are enforced. The collected results show that the DACA is an effective solution to implement 
evolving FGACM on business tiers, of relational database applications, based on CLI, in this case 
JDBC.  
 
1.3 Research questions 
This thesis aims at answering several research questions related to the implementation of dynamic 
FGACM on business tiers of relational database applications. The research questions are derived 
from the issues described and emphasized in the previous sections. 
 
The main question to be answered by this thesis is: is it possible to implement FGACM on 
business tiers dynamically, at runtime, and keep them updated when the policies evolve over time? 
If yes, the second level questions are: 
 
Security 
Current approaches allow users to write their own CRUD expressions freely. In an unsupervised 
context this opens possibilities to security violations. Is there any possibility to supervise the 
use of CRUD expressions effectively when protected data is being accessed? 
 
 
Mastering of FGACP 
Current security layers do not give any guidance on the established FGACP neither on the 
implemented FGACM. Is it possible to overcome this difficulty by providing programmers with a 
complete awareness about the established FGACM? 
 
Use of CLI 
The use of CLI to build business tiers presents several advantages. Is it possible to keep those 
advantages on the proposed solution to implement FGACM? 
 
To answer these research questions, several steps need to be taken. In a first step, an 
architectural model is necessary aimed at addressing the main question of this thesis: the dynamic 
implementation of FGACM at runtime. In a second step, the use of CLI needs to be analyzed in order 
to implement FGACM. In a third step, a solution is necessary to convey a complete awareness to 
programmers about the implemented FGACM. Finally, in a fourth step, the proposed solution is 
evaluated to check its compliance with the research questions. 
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1.4 Contributions 
The Dynamic Access Control Architecture is the main contribution of this thesis, exploiting CLI as 
the main standard API to be used. CLI are fundamental for the development process of business 
tiers whenever both a fine-tune control on the interactions with RDBMS and performance are 
considered key requirements. However, CLI do not provide any support for several software 
engineering challenges, such as how to implement dynamic FGACM on business tiers.  
 
CLI are low level API and, as such, they convey some additional drawbacks when used for the 
building process of business tiers. Two of the most relevant drawbacks are: 
 
CLI are agnostic regarding schemas of database objects 
CLI do not incorporate or provide any guidance about schemas of database objects. 
Programmers need to completely master schemas of database objects to be able to use CLI. This 
drawback deeply affects productivity of programmers during the development process and 
during the maintenance process of database applications. This drawback also hampers the 
enforcement of access control policies. 
 
CLI do not promote the reuse of software 
Inefficiency of CLI to build reusable software is complete. Every business need impels 
programmers to write similar source-code to manage each CRUD expression. This drawback 
also hampers the development of reusable software for security layers. 
 
Thus, these drawbacks have also a negative impact if security layers based on CLI are needed to 
enforce FGACP. FGACM control the access to database objects (formalized by schemas) and the 
DACA seeks to provide FGACM continuously updated and aligned with evolving FGACP. To address 
both drawbacks of CLI, some research was carried out. In a first step, the research was focused on 
defining a model to integrate schemas of relational databases with object-oriented applications 
using CLI. In a second step, the research was focused on defining an architecture for reusing 
adaptable business tier components relying on CLI. The dynamic implementation of FGACM was 
only addressed after the conclusion of these two lines of work. As such, in spite of not being 
considered as main contributions, the modelization process of business tiers and the 
componentization process of business tiers based on CLI are two cornerstones of the main 
contribution of this thesis. 
 
Modelization of business tiers 
This research was focused on defining a model to integrate schemas of relational database 
objects with object-oriented applications  when  CLI  are  used  to  build  business  tiers  
[Pereira, '10b; Pereira, '11b]. The model defines typed objects aimed at managing the execution 
of CRUD expressions. A tool was also presented to ease the development process of typed 
objects from native CRUD expressions. Source-code of typed objects is automatically generated 
to be used on business tiers. In [Gomes, '11; Pereira, '10a]  some research has also been carried 
out to evaluate the possibility of devising a high-performance version of the model, based on a 
thread-safe implementation. 
Modelization of business tiers was the continuation of an earlier research focused on easing 
the development process of business tiers based on CLI but using stored procedures instead of 
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CRUD expressions [Óscar Mortágua Pereira, '05; Pereira, '06; Pereira, '07a; Óscar Narciso 
Mortágua Pereira, '05a; Óscar Narciso Mortágua Pereira, '05b]. 
 
Componentization of business tiers 
Componentization addressed a key issue of defining an architecture for developing reusable 
and adaptable business tier components based on CLI. Several techniques were devised to 
address reusability and adaptation of business tier components. Among them, a technique was 
devised to deploy CRUD expressions at runtime which is one of the techniques used by the 
DACA to address evolving access control policies. The combination between the several 
techniques, next presented, led to the possibility of adopting several approaches for the 
building process of business tier components. 
In [Pereira, '12d; Pereira, '11c; Pereira, '13f] a proposal based on a wide typed object is 
presented to support one specific business area at a time. Basically, a component is statically 
customized to support a business area, such as accountability, relying on a unique wide typed 
object.  Then CRUD expressions are deployed at runtime in accordance with users’ needs 
(eventually by access control policies). The typed object is said to be wide because it supports a 
schema for: 
 All foreseen attributes to be returned from the database; 
 All runtime values for column lists of all Update and Insert expressions; 
 All runtime values for clause conditions of all CRUD expressions. 
 
In [Pereira, '11a; Pereira, '13a] a component is also statically customized to support a 
business area but now relying on several typed objects. Each typed object addresses a specific 
business need such as implementing the reading process of attributes of a database object.  
CRUD expressions are also deployed at runtime in accordance with users’ needs (eventually by 
access control policies). Each typed object supports all CRUD expressions whose schemas are in 
accordance with its own schema. 
In [Pereira, '12b] a new customization process of business tiers is proposed. Here, 
customization is dynamically implemented at runtime, unlike the two previous approaches. 
Typed objects are dynamically created at runtime, following any of the two previous 
approaches. CRUD expressions are also deployed at runtime. 
In [Pereira, '13b] an integrated perspective is given for multi-propose components based 
on CLI. 
 
Access control 
The security perspective is centered on access control and it is closely linked to the previous 
researches. In reality, the process to support evolving access control policies also includes the 
reusability and adaptability perspectives of business tiers components, which, by their side, 
include models. 
[Pereira, '12d] presents an approach to address static implementation of FGACM based on 
CLI. In [Pereira, '12c] the previous approach was improved to address runtime adaptation of 
business tiers to implement FGACM. In [Pereira, '12a; Pereira, '13d] a complete and final 
perspective is given for an architecture to implement and keep FGACM updated on business 
tiers based on CLI. Additionally, to evaluate the impact of the enforcement mechanisms at the 
client side, a performance assessment was carried out. A scenario was defined and 
implemented to validate the approach. It is available through the Windows “Remote Desktop 
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Connection” at:  url: ned.av.it.pt, username: DACA; password: guest (only one user at a time is 
allowed to login). 
1.5 Computational Tools and Infrastructure 
Several computational tools and infrastructures were used since the first research on using stored 
procedures and CLI. Publications involving stored procedures, between 2005 and 2007, were based 
on the .NET framework and the following tools/technologies were used: Visual Studio 2005 (C#, 
ADO.NET, ASP.NET, Web Services), IIS (Internet Information Server) and SQL Server 2005. 
Publications since 2010 were based on the NetBeans (Java SE, Java EE, JPA, JDBC), Visual Studio 
2010 (C#, ADO.NET, LINQ) and SQL Server 2008.  Microsoft Northwind database was used in 
several works including the proof of concept of the DACA. 
1.6 Thesis Organization 
The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows.  
 
Chapter 2 is divided in four main sections. The first, second and third sections provide the 
necessary background for a complete understanding of the technical aspects herein addressed.  The 
fourth section is focused on the state of the art and presents some of the current approaches, 
commercial and academic, used to support access control.  
 
Chapter 3 describes the evolution from CLI till the final DACA. It presents the modelization and 
the componentization approaches for CLI as key steps towards the DACA. Access control is also 
superficially addressed and a very concise presentation is made for the approach that has been 
followed. 
 
Chapter 4 is dedicated to the DACA. It presents the methodology followed in this thesis to 
devise and design the DACA. It thoroughly presents and describes how the research was conducted. 
Beyond the information to convey the believability of the obtained results, this chapter provides the 
necessary information to allow other researchers replicate and design accurately solutions based 
on the DACA. 
 
In Chapter 5, a scenario based on the DACA is defined and implemented to evaluate the DACA 
against the announced research questions. This chapter is divided in three sections. The first 
section is aimed at implementing a scenario based on the DACA. The second section is aimed at 
assessing the DACA performance against a standard use of CLI but without any FGACM. The third 
section is aimed at analyzing the collected results to evaluate if the DACA answers the research 
questions of this thesis positively. 
 
Chapter 6, the final chapter, is organized in four sections. The first section is focused on 
presenting an overview of this work. The second section is focused on presenting the contributions 
of this work. The third section concisely discusses some important issues closely related to this 
thesis but out of its scope. Finally, the fourth section presents the future work to be conducted to 
continue the work here presented. 
DACA: Architecture to Implement Dynamic Access Control Mechanisms on Business Tier Components 
 
9 | P a g e  
 
2 Background and State of the Art 
This chapter is focused on presenting the necessary background and the state of the art in the area 
of access control to promote a good understanding on this thesis contents and to make it a self-
contained document for most of the readers. It comprises five sections each one addressing a 
particular subject: section 1 presents the basic access control concepts; section 2 presents current 
tools for building relational business tiers; section 3 presents JDBC; section 4 presents current 
approaches to access control, general techniques and related work and, final, section 5 summarizes 
to contents of this chapter. 
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.1 presents the basic access control concepts. 
Section 2.2 presents the current tools that are used for building business tiers. Section 2.3 
introduces the JDBC which is the a key API of the DACA. Section 2.4 presents the state of the art and, 
finally, section 2.5 summarizes the content of this chapter. 
2.1 Basic Access Control Concepts 
This section provides the required background to completely understand the fundamental concepts 
and techniques of access control and also the one used on the DACA. 
Access control is a concept used in several applications and several contexts. It is focused on 
preventing unauthorized accesses to protected resources. Access control is enforced by security 
layers, which mediates every attempt to access to protected resources. Access control has been 
used on several situations, such as to control the access to: XML documents [Bertino, '00; Damiani, 
'02; Fundulaki, '04; Iwaihara, '05; Luo, '04], Web Services [Bhatti, '05; Koshutanski, '03; Mecella, 
'06; Paci, '11; Sharifi, '09; Wonohoesodo, '04], publish/subscribe systems [Belokosztolszki, '03], 
social networks [Anwar, '12; Carminati, '09a; Carminati, '06; Carminati, '09b], pervasive computing 
systems [José, '09; Kim, '09; Kulkarni, '08; Vagts, '11; Zhang, '03], content shared in the web 
[Tootoonchian, '08], collaborative environments [He, '09; Hildmann, '99; Raje, '12; Tolone, '05], grid 
computing system [Oo, '07; Wang, '06; Zhang, '03], cloud computing systems [Zhu, '12], sensor 
networks [Garcia-Morchon, '10; Hur, '11; Liu, '10; Vuran, '06; Ye, '04] and mobile communications 
[Lawson, '12]. In this thesis we are focused on protecting data residing inside and managed by 
RDBMS. In this context, access control is aimed at limiting the activities of legitimate users 
(legitimate at the database level) to access sensitive data residing in RDBMS. Authentication and 
access control concepts must not be confused. The authentication process is responsible for 
identifying database users while access control assumes that a previous authentication of users has 
been accomplished before enforcing any security policy. Access control has a specialized branch 
dedicated to privacy protection [Shi, '09; Wang, '07], which is generally known as fine-grained 
access control (FGAC). Unlike general access control, which is concerned on providing protection to 
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data at the table and view level, FGAC is concerned with providing ways to control the access to 
protected data at the row and even at the cell level.  
2.1.1 Access Control Strategies 
Security policies define rules through which access control is governed. Three of the main 
strategies for regulating access control policies are [Samarati, '01a; Vimercati, '08]: discretionary 
access control (DAC) [Sandhu, '94], mandatory access control (MAC) and Role-based access control 
(RBAC) [Ferraiolo, '01; Sandhu, '00]. There are other strategies for regulating access control, such 
as attribute-based access control (ABAC) [Kuhn, '10], credential-based access control (CBAC) [Li, 
'05; Yu, '03], content driven [Moffett, '91; Staddon, '08], location driven [Decker, '08], public key 
driven [Wang, '11] and certificate driven [Samarati, '01b]. Each one addresses specific security 
needs for the system under protection. Next follows a description for the three main policies: DAC, 
MAC and RBAC. 
2.1.1.1 Discretionary Access Control Policies 
DAC [Vimercati, '08] is based on the identity of users and on the access rules stating what users are 
and are not allowed to do when they request access to a protected resource. DAC is based on a set 
of rules, known as authorizations, which state which user can perform which action on which 
resource. In the most basic form, an authorization is a triple (s, a, r), stating that subject (user) s can 
execute action a on a resource r. The first discretionary access control model proposed in the 
literature is the access matrix model [Graham, '72; Harrison, '76; Lampson, '74]. Table 1 shows an 
adaptation of the standard access matrix concept assigning an access matrix to two users to access 
a database table. This access matrix defines granted and denied permissions for two users (A and 
B) to execute actions (Read, Update, Insert and Delete) on a database table with attributes a, b, c 
and d. This access matrix defines, for each table attribute (resource) and for each user, which 
actions (read, update and insert) each user is authorized and is denied to perform. Delete action is 
authorized in a tuple basis and, therefore, it is executed as an atomic action on all attributes as 
shown in Table 1. 
 
 
User Action a b c d 
A 
Read yes no yes yes 
Update no yes no yes 
Insert yes yes no no 
Delete yes 
B 
Read no no yes yes 
Update yes yes no yes 
Insert yes yes no no 
Delete no 
Table 1. Access matrix to a table with attributes a, b, c and d. 
DAC presents several security vulnerabilities. DAC does not separate the concept of User from 
the concept of Subject. When using DAC policies, Users are actors authorized to run a system and to 
whom permissions are granted. To run any system, processes (subjects) are created on behalf of 
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users. As DAC policies do not consider the distinction between Users and Subjects, DAC policies 
evaluate permissions of subjects according to permissions of their users. This security gap is used 
by malicious programs to exploit the legitimate permissions of users, as it happens with Trojan 
Horses [Samarati, '01b]. 
2.1.1.2 Mandatory Access Control Policies 
MAC [Samarati, '01b; Vimercati, '08] enforces access control on the basis of regulations mandated 
by a central authority. The access to protected resources is governed on the basis of classification of 
subjects and resources on the system where each one has an assigned security level. The security 
level assigned to a resource measures its sensitivity. The security level assigned to a user, called 
clearance, measures its reliability to access protected resources. The most common form of 
mandatory policy is the multilevel security policy. Unlike DAC, MAC policies distinguish users from 
subjects and the access control is enforced on processes operating on behalf of users. Each subject 
and resource is associated with an access class, usually composed of a security level and a set of 
categories. Security levels in the system are characterized by a total order relation, while categories 
form an unordered set. As a consequence, the set of access classes is characterized by a partial 
order relation, denoted ≥ and called dominance. Given two access classes c1 and c2, class c1 
dominates class c2, denoted c1 ≥ c2, if and only if the security level of class c1 is greater than or 
equal to the security level of class c2 and the set of categories of class c1 includes the set of 
categories of class c2. Access classes together with their partial order dominance relationship form 
a lattice [Sandhu, '93]. 
2.1.1.3 Role-Based Access Control Policies 
RBAC is the most popular access control policy to protect data residing in relational databases. As 
such, RBAC is described in more detail than DAC and MAC. 
RBAC [Ferraiolo, '92; Sandhu, '96] decisions are based on the roles that individual users play on 
an organization such as hospital administrator, doctor and nurse. RBAC is attracting increasing 
interest particularly of vendors of database management systems, and a standardization was 
proposed by NIST (National Institute of Standards and Technology) [Sandhu, '00].  A role is defined 
as a set of permissions associated with the subjects (users) playing that role. When accessing the 
system, each subject has to specify the role he/she wishes to play and, if he/she is granted to play 
that role, he/she can exploit the corresponding permissions. A permission is an authorization to 
execute an operation in a protected resource.  Thus, permissions are assigned to roles and roles are 
assigned to subjects. The access control policy is then defined through two different steps: firstly, 
the administrator defines roles and the permissions related to each of them; secondly, each subject 
is assigned with the set of roles he/she can play. Roles can be hierarchically organized to exploit the 
propagation of access control privileges along the hierarchy. This approach is a natural means for 
organizing roles to reflect lines of responsibilities in organizations.  Each user may be allowed to 
play more than one role simultaneously and more users may play the same role simultaneously, 
even if restrictions on their number may be imposed by the security administrator. It is important 
to note that roles and groups of users are two different concepts. A group is a named collection of 
users and possibly other groups. A role is both a named collection of users on one side and 
collection of permissions on the other side. Roles serve as linking entities to bring permissions and 
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users together. Furthermore, while roles can be activated and deactivated directly by users at their 
discretion, the membership in a group cannot be deactivated. The main advantage of RBAC, 
regarding to DAC and MAC, is that it better suits commercial environments. In fact, in a company, 
the identity of a person is not important for his/her access to the system, but his/her 
responsibilities are. Also, the role-based policy tries to organize privileges mapping the 
organization’s structure on the roles hierarchy used for access control.  
RBAC is commonly ruled by three security principles: least privilege, separation of duties and 
data abstraction. Next follows a description for each security principle. 
 
Least Privilege 
The least  privilege  principle  requires that a  subject be given no  more privilege than  
necessary.  
Least privilege is used to ensure that only those permissions required to accomplish a task 
carried out by subjects of a role are effectively assigned to that role. 
 
Separation of Duties 
The separation of duties principle requires that mutually exclusive roles must not be granted to 
the same subjects to complete sensitive tasks. For example, the authorization to complete a 
task should not be given by who is requesting the authorization to complete the requested task. 
Separation of duties is accomplished statically or dynamically. Static separation of duties is 
enforced through constraints on the assignment of users to roles. Dynamic separation of duties 
is enforced by placing constraints on the roles that can be activated within a user’s session. 
 
Data Abstraction 
The data abstraction principle is supported by means of abstract permissions such as credit 
and debit for an account rather than the usual low level permissions such as read and write 
permissions. 
 
In spite of its importance, RBAC does not solve all access control issues. In situations where 
access control is required to deal with sequences of operations, additional access control 
mechanisms are often required. For example a purchase requisition may require several 
intermediate steps before being a purchase order. 
 
Some of the vendors offering RBAC security environments on their products are: Microsoft, 
Cisco Systems, IBM, Siemens, Symantec, Sybase and Oracle. 
2.1.2 Architectures for Access Control Mechanisms 
Access control is usually implemented in a three phase approach [Samarati, '01b]: security policy 
definition, security model to be followed and security enforcement mechanisms. This thesis is 
focused on access control mechanisms and, therefore, an overview of the architectures for their 
implementation is presented and described in this sub-section. 
Access control mechanisms implement the security policy formalized by the security model. In 
this thesis we are focused on providing access control to data residing in RDBMS and specially 
FGAC. Several architectural approaches are available to implement FGACM to protect data in 
RDBMS. Some are provided by the vendors of RDBMS and others have been proposed by the 
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research community. Very often, access control mechanisms comprise a runtime procedure, known 
as decision evaluation, to evaluate if permissions are granted or denied.  Basically there are three 
main architectural approaches: 
 
Centralized approach 
In  the  centralized  approach  decisions  about granting  or  denying  access, and access   control 
 mechanisms are both managed by centralized entities. This is the approach used by vendors of 
RDBMS. 
 
Distributed approach 
In  the  distributed  approach  decisions about granting  or denying access, and access control  
mechanisms  are both locally managed on  the client-side applications. The DACA is based on  
this approach. 
 
Mixed approach 
In the mixed approach decisions about granting or denying access are managed by a 
centralized entity but the access control mechanisms are managed on the client-side 
applications. The most well-known example is the eXtensible Access Control MarkUp Language 
(XACML) [OASIS, '12] where policies are enforced in the client-side by Policy Enforcement 
Points (PEP) of database applications but the decision whether to grant or deny access is taken 
by centralized Policy Decision Points (PDP). 
 
The following sub-sections present a more detailed description for each architectural approach 
just described. 
2.1.2.1 Centralized Approach 
The centralized approach is based on a security layer developed by security experts and usually 
using RDBMS tools and based on RBAC policies. Access control policies vary from RDBMS to RDBMS 
but comprise several entities, such as users, roles, database schemas and permissions. They are 
directly managed by RDBMS and are completely transparent for software applications. Their 
presence is only noticed if some unauthorized access is detected by the security layer. Figure 3 
presents a simplified block diagram for the centralized approach. Basically, SQL statements are sent 
to the RDBMS (Figure 3: 1) and before being executed they are evaluated by a security layer to 
check their compliance with the established access control policies. If any violation is detected, SQL 
statements are rejected and an exception is raised, otherwise they are executed (Figure 3: 2).  
 
 
Business Logic RDBMS
…
executeCRUD
...
Security
Layer
1
2
 
Figure 3. Centralized access control mechanism. 
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The centralized approach presents advantages and disadvantages. Among the advantages, the 
following are emphasized: 
  
Maintenance 
Whenever a  maintenance  activity is  necessary, it is  restricted to the entity  responsible for the  
decisions and the mechanisms. The centralized approach clearly avoids the need to carry out 
maintenance activities in several equipment. 
 
Reliable security 
If security is correctly defined and implemented, any attempt to violate the system security is 
always evaluated against the enforced access control policies. 
 
Among the disadvantages [Lopez, '02b; Valle, '02], the following are emphasized: 
 
Scalability 
Access control always conveys an additional processing overhead and, in case of complex 
decisions and mechanisms, there may be scalability problems. 
 
Increased latency 
Requests to access to data, and the decisions and mechanisms to control those accesses reside 
in different computer devices leading to an increased latency when the access is not granted. On 
the distributed architectures, decisions and mechanisms are local and, therefore, the latency is 
minimized. 
 
Single point of failure  
As any centralized architecture the single point of failure may lead to undesirable security 
failures. In this unwanted security failure, every request to access protected data may exploit 
the security gap. 
2.1.2.2 Distributed Architecture 
A distributed approach can be characterized by the distributed character of the decisions making 
and also on the distributed character of the enforcement mechanisms. Decisions and mechanisms 
are implemented and placed in each running client-side application. Not only the mechanisms are 
distributed but also the decisions are locally taken. Such distributed architecture approach conveys 
some advantages and some disadvantages. Among them, the following advantages are to be 
emphasized: 
 
Scalability 
The rational to decide upon granting or denying access and the mechanisms are deployed in 
each client-side application. This approach clearly delegates in each client the total 
responsibility to ensure and to comply with the established access control policies. When the 
number of client-side applications increase, there is no effect on the performance and on the 
responsiveness of the extended system. If complexity of the decisions and/or mechanisms 
increases, the additional power computation that is needed is not cumulative in any centralized 
equipment but distributed in each client-side equipment. Therefore, each client-side equipment 
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has the responsibility to provide the eventual necessary additional computational power to 
avoid any security violation. This issue has an increased relevancy because very often database 
servers are bottlenecks in intensive database applications. If beyond the access to data they are 
also required to provide access control, then very probably the bottleneck will be more 
noticeable. The distributed architecture clearly relieves database servers from the 
responsibility of providing access control. 
 
Minimum latency 
In the distributed architecture decisions and mechanism are deployed in each client application 
and, therefore, the latency for any request to access protected data is minimized. In non-
distributed architectures, latency may be significant when requests to access to data are denied. 
While in distributed architectures the decision is made locally, in non-distributed architectures 
there is the unavoidable latency for the communication process between client applications and 
the centralized security equipment. 
 
Among the disadvantages the following are next emphasized: 
 
Maintainability  
Whenever a maintenance activity is carried out on the access control policies, it is potentially 
necessary to extend the maintenance activities to all equipment running client-side 
applications. If the maintenance activity is not automated then it may convey a huge effort in 
systems comprising many and faraway client equipment. However, this potential disadvantage 
is not applicable to the DACA as it has already been mentioned. The DACA has an automated 
process to keep FGACM updated in all client-side equipment. 
 
Security gap 
If policies are not coordinated from a central point, the probability of deploying security gaps is 
increased. This potential disadvantage is not applicable to the DACA because the DACA 
comprises central systems responsible for ensuring that the implementation of FGACM in all 
client-side equipment is in accordance with the established FGACP. 
2.1.2.3 Mixed Architecture 
A mixed approach splits the responsibilities for the access control between a centralized server and 
client-side equipment. The best well-known standard is the XACML. XACML is an access control 
language based on XML and defined by the Organization for the Advancement of Structured 
Information Standards (OASIS). The basic design of an XACML system has four main components: 
PAP (Policy Administration Point), PEP (Policy Enforcement Point), PIP (Policy Information Point) 
and PDP (Policy Decision Point). We will be mainly focused on the PEP and PDP components but 
PAP and PIP will also be described. 
The XACML approach consists in a security software layer with two main functionalities: the 
PDP and the PEP, as defined in XACML [OASIS, '12] and used in [Corcoran, '09], see Figure 4.  The 
PEP are locally inserted in-line with the client-side source code to intercept users requests for 
accessing a resource protected by an access control policy (Figure 4: 1) and enforces the decision to 
be evaluated by a remote PDP on this access authorization. PDP evaluates requests to access a 
resource against the access control policies to decide whether to grant or to deny the access  
DACA: Architecture to Implement Dynamic Access Control Mechanisms on Business Tier Components 
 
16 | P a g e  
 
(Figure 4: 2). If authorization is granted, PEP uses business logic to perform the authorized action 
(Figure 4: 3) and, if no other restriction exists, the action is executed by the RDBMS (Figure 4: 4). 
PEP are intentionally inserted in key points of the source code to enforce PDP decisions.  PEP-PDP 
approach  is  a  mixed  approach  involving  the  centralized  approach  and  the  distributed 
approach. Beyond PEP and PDP components, the basic design of an  XACML  system  has  two  more  
main  components: PAP and PIP. PAP is where administration of policies is carried out. PIP is where 
information is collected for the PDP to make up decisions. The advantages and disadvantages of the 
mixed architecture emanates from the advantages and disadvantages of the centralized and 
distributed architectures. Anyway, latency deserves a closer attention. In the centralized approach, 
when compared with the distributed approach, the latency is only noticeable if permission to access 
the protected resource is not granted. In the mixed approach, the latency is permanent and 
independent from the decision process. This means that every request to a protected resource 
entails a latency to evaluate if permission is or is not granted. 
 
 
...
accessGranted = 
If (accessGranted) {
  ...
PEP PDP
1 2
3
Business Logic
RDBMS
Optional 
RDBMS
Security
Layer
4
 
Figure 4. Mixed architecture.based on PEP and PDP. 
2.1.3 Dimensions of Access Control Mechanisms 
In this sub-section a survey is made about the main dimensions that may influence the 
implementation of access control mechanisms.  
The enforcement of access control policies comprises five orthogonal dimensions: architecture, 
granularity, awareability, contextuality and adaptability. The architectural dimension, because of its 
visibility and notoriety, has been already presented separately in sub-section 2.1.2. The remaining 
four dimensions are now jointly presented and described in this sub-section. Granularity is focused 
on characterizing the granularity of the data to be disclosed and also the authorized actions on it. 
Awareability is focused on evaluating if access control mechanisms are or are not made available to 
programmers while they write source code for client-side applications. Contextuality is focused on 
evaluating if access control uses runtime context to decide upon the data to be made available and 
the authorized actions. Adaptability is focused on evaluating if access control mechanisms are or 
are not automatically updated when access control policies evolve over time. Next follows a 
detailed description for each dimension. 
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2.1.3.1 Granularity 
Currently, most of the RDBMS provide access control mechanisms driven by fixed relations 
between users, operations and tables leading to a maximum protection of resources at the column-
level [Caires, '11]. This level of protection may be satisfactory in many situations but in many 
others it is far from being satisfactory. In situations where the access to data is not controlled at the 
column level but is also controlled at the row level, it is considered as being a FGACP. Some RDBMS 
vendors support FGACP using different approaches, such as query rewriting in INGRES, Virtual 
Private Database [Oracle] in Oracle and label-based in DB2 [Bond, '07]. Very often these features of 
RDBMS are not enough and there is the need to provide an increased level of protection. This need 
for an increased level of protection has been the motivation for the researches that have been 
conducted and also one of the key motivations of this thesis.  
2.1.3.2 Awarability 
Programmers of client applications can hardly master established access control policies in 
database applications with many and complex policies. As such, it is convenient to follow an 
approach where the policies are statically checked at development time or at compile time of 
applications tiers. This awarability relieves programmers from mastering FGACP and, additionally, 
conveys a swift feedback about any policy violation. This approach conveys two important 
advantages: 
 
Productivity 
The obligation to evaluate the correctness of source-code at runtime induces and additional 
overhead at the development process, this way leading to a decrease in productivity. Therefore, 
productivity is improved if programmers are relieved from running applications to become 
aware of any disconformity with the established access control policies; 
 
Security 
Due to the endless SQL expressiveness, difficulties arise to ensure a complete secure access 
control. To overcome this fragility, a possible approach is by implementing a fine control on the 
set of CRUD expressions that are allowed to be executed to improve the overall security. 
Ultimately, CRUD expressions are provided by database administrators and are statically made 
available to programmers, this way avoiding the free writing process of CRUD expressions by 
programmers of business tiers and application tiers. 
 
The awareness of access control policies follows two approaches, the typed approach and the 
untyped approach: 
 
Typed approach 
The typed approach is based on typed objects to enforce access control policies so that 
programmers become aware of their existence at development time. The awareness at 
development time is the approach that improves productivity more. Programmers become 
aware of any disconformity while writing the source code, this way avoiding the waste of time 
for writing erroneous source code and the waste of time for compiling and re-writing the 
source code. 
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Untyped approach 
The untyped approach is based on data structures used by the compiler to check if the accesses 
to data are in conformity with the established access control policies. Programmers become 
aware of any unconformity only after writing and compiling the source code, which, obviously, 
leads to a lower productivity than the typed approach. 
 
The typed approach has the enormous advantage of guiding programmers in the correct 
direction while editing source-code. This guidance is automatically provided in current Integrated 
Development Environments (IDE), such as NetBeans [Oracle, '12e], Eclipse [Eclipse, '12] and Visual 
Studio [Microsoft, '10], through the auto-completion facility.  Awareness at compile-time does not 
guide programmers during the editing process and postpones the feedback about any unconformity 
until the compilation process of source-code is completed. 
2.1.3.3 Contextuality 
There are situations where access control is governed by contextual information. In these 
situations, there is no possibility to know at development time or even at compile time the values to 
be used to protect the access to sensitive data. Typical situations are health care organizations and 
social networks. In health care organizations, patient data is disclosed only to the people who need 
them and have the correspondent authorization. For example, a doctor can access the data only of 
those patients he is treating. In social networks, only current friends have access to some data. In 
such cases, before being executed, CRUD expressions must comprise the required predicates to 
avoid the access to unauthorized data. The predicates may be originally written with CRUD 
expressions or later added using any query rewriting technique. The query rewriting technique is 
presented and described in sub-section 2.4.1. A concrete case of this approach is the Reflective 
Access Control [Olson, '08]. A “…a policy is defined as reflective when it depends on data contained in 
other parts of the database” [Olson, '09]. 
2.1.3.4 Adaptability 
Access control policies define which actions each user is authorized to execute on database objects. 
Nothing prevents the policies established during a certain period to evolve to a different state. 
When this happens, users are allowed to do things they were not allowed to do before, or users are 
not allowed to do anymore things they were allowed to do before or users are allowed to do what 
they were allowed to do before but in a different way. To guarantee that this process of evolving 
policies is supported, it is necessary to guarantee that the associated mechanisms and decisions are 
also updated. If we recall the architectural dimension we can see that very probably some 
difficulties arise. The centralized architecture requires maintenance activity in the central system, 
which does not raise any special concern in a first glance. But the distributed and mixed 
architectures entail a maintenance activity in all client equipment where the policies are enforced, 
which may raise justified concerns. Two approaches are followed to implement access control 
mechanisms, the static approach and the dynamic approach. 
 
Static approach 
In the static  approach,  mechanisms  and/or  decisions  are  hard  coded  and  there  is  no way  to 
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 automatically modify them in accordance with new policies. Therefore, whenever modifications 
are needed, they have to be edited, compiled and manually deployed. This updating process is 
not scalable leading to a huge effort when database applications have many client-side 
equipment. 
 
Dynamic approach 
In the dynamic approach, mechanisms and/or decisions have the ability to be adapted to 
evolving policies. While mechanisms are traditionally hard coded, the decisions may also resort 
to a database to become adapted more easily. The adaptation process of hard coded components 
of mechanisms and decisions may rely on different strategies but always entails two automated 
procedures: building/adaptation of source-code and a deployment process. The combination of 
these two procedures opens the possibility to opt for two different implementations: 1) policies 
are deployed and adapted in each server (decisions) and each client-side system (decisions 
and/or mechanisms) or 2) mechanisms and decisions are adapted and then deployed into each 
security sever (decisions) and each client-side system (decisions and/or mechanisms). Unlike 
the static approach, the dynamic approach follows an automated process for adapting policies, 
this way promoting scalability, maintainability and productivity. 
2.2 Current tools for Building Business Tiers 
Several tools have been devised to improve the development process of business tiers mainly for 
tackling the impedance mismatch issue [David, '90]. From them, two categories have had a wide 
acceptance in the academic and commercial forums: Object-to-Relational Mapping tools (O/RM) 
and CLI. Other solutions, such as  embedded SQL [Moore, '91] (SQLJ [Eisenberg, '99]), have 
achieved some acceptance in the past but failed to be generally accepted by the research and 
commercial communities. Others were proposed but without any general known acceptance: Safe 
Query Objects [William, '05] and SQL DOM [Russell, '05]. These tools were all devised mainly to 
tackle the impedance mismatch issue not addressing the concept of access control at all. Access 
control, whenever implemented, is based on additional security layers. Some examples based on 
current tools are shown to demonstrate their inability to deal with access control. Firstly, O/RM 
tools are presented because of their importance and their wide acceptance. Then, CLI will be 
presented and described because of their undeniable relevance in the DACA. 
2.2.1 O/RM tools and ADO.NET 
O/RM tools [Keller, '97; Lammel, '06], such as LINQ [Erik, '06], Hibernate [Christian, '04], Java 
Persistent API (JPA) [Yang, '10], Oracle TopLink [Oracle], CRUD on Rails [Vohra, '07], and ADO.NET 
were designed to create, in the object-oriented paradigm, static representation models of relational 
database schemas. The static model is built in a first stage, eventually by a database administrator, 
and then programmers start the development process. The basic artifacts of the static 
representation models are classes (entities), each one representing a database table. Through these 
entities programmers may read data from tables, update data, insert new data and, finally, delete 
existing data. To support explicit CRUD expressions, O/RM tools provide proprietary SQL 
languages. Despite these advantages, O/RM do not address access control at any level. Additionally, 
O/RM tools   lead   to   some   drawbacks, such  as:  1) they   induce   an  additional   overhead   when 
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Figure 5. Example based on ADO.NET. 
 
Figure 6. Example based on JPA. 
 
Figure 7. Example based on LINQ. 
compared to CLI; 2) they were not devised having in mind the frequent use of complex CRUD 
expressions and, finally, 3) they rely on static models, this way not promoting an easy process for a 
dynamic   adaptation  at   runtime.  Moreover, O/RM  tools  do  not  promote  a  clear   separation   of 
application  tier  developer   role from   business   tier  developer   role. For example, programmers 
may use embedded language extensions and other embedded functionalities to extend pre-built 
static models, this way opening possible security gaps. Figure 5, Figure 6 and Figure 7 present a 
simplified version of the example presented in Figure 1 but written in ADO.NET, JPA and LINQ, 
respectively. Akin to JDBC, programmers are free to write any CRUD expression (Figure 5: line 28, 
Figure 6: line 34, Figure 7: line 17)     and    to    execute   them. Then,    they    have     no     
restrictions to read the attribute productName (Figure 5: line 35, Figure 6: line 37, Figure 7: line 20) 
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not even to update it (Figure 5: line 37-39, Figure 6: line 39-40, Figure 7: line 20-21). Beyond 
reading and updating the attribute productName, it is also possible to read and update all the 
remaining attributes, even to insert new rows and delete existent rows. There is no possibility to 
prevent programmers from issuing these accesses. This example clearly shows the unpreparedness 
of current O/RM tools to deal with access control policies at any security level. 
2.2.2 Call Level Interfaces 
CLI are the main API to model one of the most important components of the DACA. The component 
is responsible for the implementation of the dynamic FGACM at the client-side of database 
applications. As such, a detailed knowledge about the architecture and features of CLI is considered 
essential to understand the DACA and also the options made for the implementation of FGACM. 
2.2.2.1 Overview of Call Level Interfaces 
CLI are an ISO/IEC standard [ISO, '03] for the interaction between RDBMS and client applications. 
Two API were initially devised for the C and COBOL programming languages. The most well-known 
implementation of CLI is the Open Database Connectivity (ODBC) [Microsoft, '92] specification. 
ODBC is a C programming language interface providing a standard for client applications access 
data from a variety of RDBMS. “ODBC is a low-level, high-performance interface that is designed 
specifically for relational data stores.” [Microsoft, '92]. In this document, the term CLI is used with a 
wider scope that the one defined by ISO/IEC. Herein, CLI are used to refer to any API/standard with 
identical features and characteristics to the standard emanated from ISO/IEC. In this context, other 
related CLI have also been devised, such as JDBC. Other tools/frameworks have also been devised 
to ease the development process of business tiers, which, in most of the situations, use CLI as the 
underlying technology to interact with RDBMS, such as ADO.NET [Mead, '11], JPA [Yang, '10] and 
Hibernate [Bauer, '07]. Some of the main features of CLI that are important for the DACA are now 
briefly described: 
 
Building process of CRUD expressions 
CRUD expressions are the main entities used by programmers to interact with data residing in 
RDBMS. Thus, the key issue of any tool devised to develop business tiers is the definition of how 
client applications build and use CRUD expressions. CLI allow CRUD expressions to be written 
in the native SQL language and encoded inside strings. There is no layer between the native SQL 
language and the services provided by CLI. 
 
Access Modes 
CLI provide several access modes to data residing in RDBMS. Programmers are free to select at 
any moment the access modes that more effectively address their needs.  
 
Results of CRUD expressions 
From the application’s perspective, every CRUD expression has a final result. Insert, Update and 
Delete expressions modify the state of databases by affecting a certain number of rows. Select 
expressions create a set of rows that must be made available to client applications. 
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Performance optimization 
CLI provide several performance contexts in which CRUD expressions may be executed. Client 
applications are called to choose in each situation the context most appropriated. 
2.2.2.2 Functionalities 
CLI are considered important options for building business tiers whenever a fine tune control on 
the interactions with RDBMS is necessary and also when performance is considered a key 
requirement [Cook, '05]. This is confirmed in several functionalities of CLI, being the diversity of 
access modes just one example. CLI provide several access modes to data residing on RDBMS 
among them the possibility to encode CRUD expressions inside strings, this way easily 
incorporating the power and the full expressiveness of the SQL language. JDBC [Parsian, '05], for 
Java environments, and ODBC [Microsoft, '92], for Windows environments, are two representatives 
of CLI. CRUD expressions are executed against the host database and the possible results they 
produce (only for Select expressions) are locally managed by local memory structures (LMS) – 
(ResultSet [Oracle, '13] for JDBC, RecordSet [Microsoft, '13] for ODBC). CLI provide two main and 
key functionalities to access data: 
 
Use of the native SQL language 
This functionality has been already described. CLI are suited to the use of the native SQL 
language. This way, they are prepared to exploit the performance and the full expressiveness of 
the SQL language. 
 
Use of LMS 
LMS are containers prepared to help client application to interact with data returned by Select 
expressions. They provide services to allow applications to read, insert, update and delete data 
from the LMS. 
 
Only services of CLI directly related to the execution of CRUD expressions will be addressed in 
this thesis. Services such as those for managing connections to host databases are not here 
addressed. Main services of CLI are organized in four main categories: execution, scrollability, 
updatability and transactions. 
 
Execution 
Execution comprises services related to the execution of native CRUD expressions. Native CRUD 
expressions are executed as compiled-on-the-fly or pre-compiled (when they are to be reused). 
Pre-compiled CRUD expressions are stored in the database by RDBMS while being used and, 
therefore, very often provide a much better performance execution than those compiled-on-
the-fly. Additionally, CLI deal differently with Select expressions from the other three types of 
CRUD expressions. Select expressions instantiate LMS, while the other types do not. These latter 
types (Insert, Update and Delete) generate a value indicating the number of affected rows in the 
database. 
 
Scrollability 
Scrollability   comprises  services  related  to  the  scrolling  process  on  LMS. There  are  several 
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different implementations but two are emphasized. They are mutual-exclusive and are herein 
known as forward-only and scrollable. 
 
Forward-only  
Forward-only LMS restrict the possibility to move cursors one row forward at a time. 
Forward-only LMS are used when  rows are  accessed in a  sequential way, one by one, from 
 the first one till the last one. 
 
Scrollable 
Scrollable LMS do not restrict the movement of cursors. Unlike the forward-only LMS, 
programmers are free to select rows not placed next and after the active selected row. 
Programmers are free to write source code to jump several rows at a time and in any 
direction, forward or backward. 
 
 The choice between forward-only and scrollable LMS not only affects the functionalities of LMS 
but also their performance. This issue will be addressed during the performance assessment. 
 
Updatability 
Updatability comprises services organized in protocols to interact with data contained in LMS. 
There are several implementations but two are herein emphasized. They are mutual-exclusive 
and are known as read-only and updatable LMS. 
 
Read-only LMS 
Read-only LMS restrict the access to their in-memory data to read operations only. 
Applications are prevented from inserting new rows, from updating existent rows and also 
from deleting existent rows on LMS. 
 
Updatable LMS 
Updatable LMS do not restrict any operation on their in-memory data. Applications are 
allowed to read existent rows, insert new rows, update existent rows and to delete existent 
rows. The important aspect in these actions is that CLI, internally, create CRUD expressions 
to execute the actions performed at the LMS level. Thus, when an update protocol is 
committed, CLI create an Update expression to update the updated attributes. Similarly, 
when a row is inserted or deleted at the LMS level, CLI create Insert and Delete expressions 
to materialize the requested actions, respectively. These additional actions at the LMS level 
avoid the need to write native CRUD expressions to perform the equivalent actions on host 
databases. 
 
The choice between read-only and updatable LMS not only affects the functionalities of LMS 
but also their performance as it will be shown. 
 
Transactions 
Transactions comprise a set of services to manage database transactions such as save points, 
rollback transactions and commit transactions. CLI provide two mutual-exclusive modes to 
manage database transactions: auto-commit mode and normal mode. 
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Auto-commit mode 
The auto-commit mode is used when there is the need to execute each CRUD expression 
 atomically and, as such, ruled by an individual transaction. This mode avoids the need to 
precede and follow each CRUD expression by a transaction initiation process and by a 
transaction commit process. 
 
Normal mode 
The normal mode is used when there is the need to process several CRUD expressions as a 
single transaction. In this case, the first CRUD expression is preceded by the beginning of a 
transaction and the last CRUD expression is followed by the correspondent transaction 
commit. 
 
By default, the work mode is the auto-commit mode on which each CRUD expression is 
automatically committed when it is completed successfully. Therefore, in this mode, no other 
transaction management functions are required. In the normal mode there are functions to deal 
with traditional transaction actions, such as begin transactions, commit transactions and 
rollback transactions. 
2.2.2.3 Local Memory Structures 
LMS have been loosely presented and some properties have also been already described. Next 
follows a more detailed description about the operation of LMS. 
 
LMS are instantiated to manage the data returned by Select expressions. As such, at this point it 
is advisable to discuss some LMS features that are relevant to this research. Figure 8 presents a 
general LMS containing 5 tuples (rows, 1 to 5) and 6 attributes (a, b, c, d, e, f). This LMS could have 
been instantiated to manage the data returned by the following CRUD expression: Select a, b, c, d, e, f 
from Table Where …. In this case, the CRUD expression has returned 5 tuples and the current 
selected tuple is tuple number 2. Two  representatives of LMS are ResultSet [Oracle, '13] (JDBC) and 
RecordSet [Microsoft, '13] (ODBC).  
 
1
2
3
4
5
a b c d e f
Selected tuple
 
Figure 8. LMS with 5 tuples (rows) and 6 attributes (a till f). 
The access to LMS attributes is accomplished by selecting a tuple and then, through an index or 
through a label (usually the attribute name), by selecting one attribute at a time. For example, to 
execute an action action (read, insert or update) on attribute c of tuple 2: 
 Select tuple 2; 
 Execute action(index of attribute c) or action(label of attribute c). 
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CLI are responsible for providing services to allow applications to scroll on LMS, to read their 
contents and to modify (insert, update, delete) their internal contents (other services are also 
available but they are not relevant at this point). Services may be split in two categories: basic 
services and advanced services. Basic services comprise two groups of protocols: the scrolling 
protocols are aimed at scrolling on tuples and the read protocol is aimed at reading the tuples’ 
attributes. Advanced services are available only if LMS are updatable. In this case applications are 
allowed to change the internal state of LMS. Advanced services comprise three protocols: insert 
protocol to add new tuples, update protocol to update an existent in-memory tuples and, finally, 
delete protocol to delete existent tuples. After being committed, new LMS states are automatically 
committed in the host database. To execute any of the previous services it is necessary to know that 
the access to LMS is simultaneously tuple oriented and protocol oriented. This has two main 
implications. First, at any time only one tuple may be selected as the target tuple. Second, if a 
protocol is being executed, applications should not start any other protocol. If this rule is not 
fulfilled, LMS may lose their previous states. For example, if an advanced service is being executed 
and another protocol is triggered, LMS discard all changes made during the first protocol. Table 2 
concisely presents four of the five main LMS protocols. Scroll is not presented because only the 
presented protocols are used to interact with data managed by LMS and, therefore, managed by 
RDBMS. Additionally, the scroll protocol is orthogonal to the remaining four protocols. 
 
Read Protocol 
During the read action, attributes are individually read one by one and always from the current 
selected tuple. If a different tuple is selected, the next attribute value will be retrieved from the 
new selected tuple. 
 
Update Protocol 
During the update action, attributes are individually updated one by one on the current selected 
tuple. The protocol may or may not be triggered by invoking a specific method. It ends when a 
specific method is invoked to commit the updated attributes. If another tuple or protocol 
(except the read protocol) is selected while it is being executed, all previous changes will be 
discarded. 
 
Insert Protocol 
The insert protocol is triggered by invoking a specific method. Then, each attribute is 
individually inserted one by one. After all attributes have been inserted, the protocol ends when 
a specific method is invoked to commit the inserted tuple. If another tuple or protocol (except 
the read protocol) is selected while it is being executed, all previous changes will be discarded. 
 
Delete Protocol 
The delete protocol comprises a single method that removes the current selected tuple from the 
LMS. The delete action is also committed in accordance with the established policy. 
 
 
Table 2 presents the main protocols of LMS and the logic associated with each one. 
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ID Protocol Id Protocol 
1 
Point to a tuple 
Read attributes 
2 
Point to a tuple 
Start update protocol 
Update attributes 
Commit update 
3 
Start insert protocol 
Insert attributes 
Commit insert 
4 
Point to a tuple 
Delete tuple 
Table 2. Main protocols of LMS. 
2.2.2.4 Access Modes of CLI to RDBMS 
CLI are used, among other purposes, to access data residing in RDBMS. From the descriptions 
previously presented in 2.2.2.2 and 2.2.2.3, it is possible to infer that CLI provide two different 
modes to access data residing in RDBMS, which are herein referred to as the Direct Access Mode 
and the Indirect Access Mode. 
 
Direct Access Mode 
The Direct Access Mode is useful when programmers use native SQL to write CRUD expressions 
encoded inside strings and then delegate the remaining process to CLI to execute them against 
the RDBMS. CRUD expressions are of any type (Insert, Read, Update and Delete). 
 
Indirect Access Mode 
The Indirect Access Mode is only available after the execution of a Select expression (using the 
Direct Access Mode). CLI instantiate LMS and provide protocols (read, update, insert and 
delete) through which programmers are allowed to interact with the in-memory data of LMS. 
These protocols belong and constitute the Indirect Access Mode. Whenever an update, insert or 
delete protocol is committed, CLI internally create the correspondent CRUD expression to 
commit the changes.  The read protocol is also included in the Indirect Access Mode. 
 
Current approaches to enforce access control are only based on the Direct Access Mode. But, 
unlike current approaches, the DACA implements FGACM at the level of CLI and, as such, it must 
implement FGACM not only on the Direct Access Mode but  also on  the Indirect Access Mode for  all 
 
CLI
Direct Access Mode
Indirect Access Mode
DACA FGACM
 
Figure 9. CLI and DACA access mechanisms. 
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protocols (read, update, insert and delete). Figure 9 shows a simplified block diagram to slightly 
unveil the approach to be followed by the DACA to implement FGACM on CLI. The diagram shows 
that the two access modes of CLI are wrapped and hidden by the DACA to support data access ruled 
by FGACM only. 
2.2.2.5  Performance 
Very often, performance is a key requirement and frequently a bottleneck of database applications 
when scalability limitations arise. As such, an overview about the issues that influence performance 
is an unavoidable aspect of CLI and it must comprise the two described access modes of CLI. 
 
Direct Access Mode 
Native CRUD expressions are edited and executed through the Direct Access Mode. The 
execution context has two mutual-exclusive possibilities: CRUD expressions are compiled-on-
the-fly or CRUD expressions are pre-compiled. As already explained the pre-compiled approach 
compiles and stores CRUD expressions on the RDBMS. Whenever needed, CRUD expressions are 
already compiled and their execution plans have been already evaluated. The performance 
improvement is mostly noticeable when CRUD expressions use complex execution plans. 
 
Indirect Access Mode 
The Indirect Access Mode is available whenever a Select expression is executed. When a Select  
expression is executed using a scrollable or an updatable LMS, RDBMS create a server cursor 
with all the selected tuples. These tuples are dynamically transferred in blocks, from the server, 
to the LMS whenever necessary. This means that at any time LMS may not have all the tuples 
but only a sub-set of all selected tuples. When users point to a tuple that is not present in the 
LMS, the current content of LMS is discarded and a new set of tuples containing the desired 
tuple is transferred to the LMS. This has a deep implication. If threads are always requesting 
tuples that are not present in the LMS, RDBMS have to transfer the correspondent block for 
each request. In an extreme scenario, each individual action over the LMS could imply a new 
transference of tuples. From the previous statements, it is expected that the number of blocks to 
be transferred will increase when the number of tuples (inside server cursors) increases and 
also when the dispersion of the used policy to select tuples (contained by LMS) increases. Thus, 
to optimize the performance two strategies need to be followed [Pereira, '10b; Pereira, '11b; 
Pereira, '13c]. The first one and simplest one is to avoid the use of scrollable and/or updatable 
LMS. If it is not possible to avoid the use of scrollable or updatable LMS, then access to LMS 
should follow a policy aimed at minimizing the transferences of block of tuples. 
2.2.3 Other proposals 
Beyond O/RM and CLI, several other tools have been launched by the research community and the 
commercial community. In his sub-section an overview of the most relevant tools is made. 
Embedded SQL [Moore, '91] is a method for writing CRUD expressions in-line with regular 
source code of the host programming language inside source files. The CRUD expressions provide 
the database interface while the host programming language provides the remaining support 
needed for the application to execute. The files are then pre-processed (pre-compiled) in order to 
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check the correctness of CRUD expressions namely against the database schema, host language data 
type and SQL data type checking, and finally syntax checking of the SQL constructions. SQLJ 
[Eisenberg, '99] is an example of an Embedded SQL standard, which provides language extensions 
for embedding CRUD expressions in regular Java source files. Some SQLJ disadvantages, which are 
common to most Embedded SQL technologies: 1) SQLJ relies on an extra standard; 2) SQLJ does not 
decouple CRUD expressions from regular source code; 3) SQLJ does not provide a clean object-
oriented interface to the assisted application; 4) SQLJ does not provide assistance regarding the 
maintenance of CRUD expressions; 5) SQLJ requires a JVM (Java Virtual Machine) built in the 
database. In practice, embedded SQL has never been widely adopted by end users. Examples of 
other languages that support embedded SQL are: C, C++, COBOL and Fortran. Despite the 
aforementioned general disadvantages, some embedded SQL features may be considered as 
advantages such as: it is based on a single development environment with a strong interconnection 
between the two paradigms; unlike other solutions, embedded SQL does not need to be executed to 
check the correctness of the SQL syntax. This task is executed by the pre-compiler. 
Safe Query Objects [William, '05] combine object-relational mapping with object-oriented 
languages to specify queries using strongly-typed objects and methods. They rely on Java Data 
Objects to provide strongly-typed objects and also to provide data persistence. Safe Query Objects 
are a promising technique to express queries but share most of the aforementioned drawbacks of 
O/RM, namely regarding performance and SQL expressiveness. 
SQL DOM [Russell, '05] generates a Dynamic Link Library containing classes that are strongly-
typed to a database schema. These classes are used to construct dynamic CRUD expressions 
without manipulating any strings. As Safe Query Objects, SQL DOM does not take the full advantage 
of SQL expressiveness and also exhibits very poor results regarding its performance. 
Static Checking of Dynamically Generated Queries [Gary, '07] presents a solution based on 
static string analysis of Java programs to find out where CRUD expressions are being constructed. 
The main idea is to find out all possible combinations of distinct CRUD expressions and then 
analyze them regarding their syntax and their type mismatch errors. This approach does not affect 
system performance but exhibits some drawbacks as: 1) all source code is hand written from string 
concatenation till JDBC execution context; 2) it does not provide any object-oriented view of the 
CRUD expression execution context.  
In [Schmoelzer, '06] Schmoelzer et al. do not present a tool but present a concept for model-
typed interfaces relying on generic interface parameters that may be used to transfer data. The 
parameters are characterized as Model-defined Types whose schema is defined by a Data Model. 
The authors claim that by this way, complex data structures (based on Data Models) may be 
transferred between components in a single method invocation avoiding successive calls to 
accomplish the same task. This methodology is very useful when two conditions occur 
simultaneously: 1) the involved components do not share the same working address space; 2) the 
component playing the client role has full control and knowledge about the amount of data being 
transferred. In our case, Business tiers based on the DACA and client applications share the same 
address space. Then, the best access method to the returned data (from Select expressions) is 
implemented in attribute by attribute and tuple by tuple basis. The DACA could profit from  
[Schmoelzer, '06] if systems based on the DACA and client applications ran in different address 
spaces.  
Data Transfer Objects [Flower, '02] is another concept for the transference of data. It proposes 
a design pattern to be used whenever an entity gathers a group of attributes that must be accessed 
in a swift way. Accessing those attributes one by one through a remote interface raises several 
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disadvantages such as the increase of the network traffic, latency is increased, performance is 
negatively affected, demand on server and client processing is increased. Data Transfer Objects are 
tailored to address these situations. They are organized in serializable classes gathering the related 
attributes and forming a composite value. An entire instance of the serialized object is transferred 
from the server to the client. This approach, in its essence, is quite similar to the previous conveying 
the same advantages and disadvantages.  
Aspect-oriented programming [Gregor Kiczales, '97] community considers persistence as a 
crosscutting concern [Laddad, '03]. Several works have been presented but none addresses the 
point here under consideration. The following works are emphasized: [Fabry, '06] is focused on 
separating scattered and tangled code in advanced transaction management; [Laddad, '03] 
addresses persistence relying on AspectJ; [Dinkelaker, '11] presents AO4Sql as an aspect-oriented 
extension for SQL aimed at addressing logging, profiling and runtime schema evolution. It would be 
interesting to see an aspect-oriented approach for the points herein under discussion. 
2.3 JDBC 
JDBC is the CLI used in the DACA proof of concept. To provide the necessary background to 
completely understand the DACA, JDBC is now presented and described as the representative of 
CLI. 
2.3.1 JDBC Overview 
JDBC is a CLI version for a standard Java specification for database-independent connectivity. There 
are four styles of drivers, see Figure 10: 
 JDBC-ODBC Bridge plus ODBC Driver – type 1 
 native API partly Java technology-enabled driver – type 2 
 Pure Java driver for database middleware – type 3; 
 Direct-to-database pure Java driver – type 4.  
 
 
Type 1 Type  2 Type 3 Type 4 
JDBC API
JDBC Driver Manager
Or
Databsource object
ODBC Driver
DB Client library
JDBC API
JDBC Driver Manager
Or
Databsource object
Partial JDBC Driver
DB Client library
JDBC-ODBC Bridge
JDBC API
JDBC Driver Manager
Or
Databsource object
Pure JDBC Driver
DB Middleware
JDBC API
JDBC Driver Manager
Or
Databsource object
Pure JDBC Driver
 
Figure 10. Types of JDBC drivers and their dependency on other components. 
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JDBC Type 1 driver uses ODBC driver to connect to the database. A database client library is 
also necessary if ODBC is not a native driver to the RDBMS.  
JDBC Type 2 driver converts JDBC calls into calls on the client side vendor’s API to connect to 
the database. 
JDBC Type 3 driver converts JDBC calls directly or indirectly into the middleware client side 
libraries of the database. 
JDBC Type 4 driver converts JDBC calls into the network protocol used to connect to the 
database and, as such, is considered the best choice when performance is considered a key 
requirement. The proof of concept of DACA uses a Type 4 driver for SQL Server: sqljdbc4.jar. 
2.3.2 JDBC Approach to Call Level Interfaces Functionalities 
As previously explained, main functionalities of CLI are organized in four main categories: 
execution, scrollability, updatability and transactions. Figure 11, Figure 12, Figure 13, Figure 14, 
Figure 15 and Figure 16 present typical JDBC usage of the four main functionalities. These figures 
will be referred during the next explanations. Figure 11 presents the declaration of the main 
variables used in these examples: Statement is an object aimed at executing compiled-on-the-fly 
CRUD expressions, PreparedStatement is an object aimed at executing pre-compiled CRUD 
expressions and ResultSet is an object responsible for managing LMS. The line numbers in all 
figures are not repeated between them, thus, whenever dispensable we will not refer the figures 
being used in this sub-section. 
 
Execution 
Execution comprises services related to the execution of CRUD expressions. JDBC uses 
PreparedStatement [Oracle, '12b] and Statement [Oracle, '12c] for pre-compiled and compiled-
on-the-fly SQL statements, respectively. 
 
Pre-compiled CRUD expressions 
Figure 13 and Figure 15 show the usage of pre-compiled CRUD expressions 
(PreparedStatement ps). CRUD expressions are written (line 49, 84) and compiled (line 50-
52, 85). This is done only once and then CRUD expressions are re-executed whenever 
necessary (line 56, 90). 
 
CRUD expressions compiled-on-the-fly 
Figure 12 and Figure 14 show the usage of compiled-on-the-fly CRUD expressions 
(Statement st). CRUD expressions are written (line 36, 66), then the context is prepared 
(line 37, 67) and finally CRUD expressions are executed (line 39, 69). This process is 
repeated from the very beginning whenever any of the CRUD expressions is required to be 
executed.  
 
 
 
Figure 11. Declaration of variables. 
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Figure 12. Use of forward-only and read-only statement. 
 
 
Figure 13. Use of forward-only and read-only prepared statement. 
 
 
Figure 14. Use of scrollable and updatable statement. 
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Figure 15. Insert a row using a prepared statement. 
 
Figure 16. Examples of transaction with JDBC. 
 
Additionally, CLI deal differently with Select expressions from the other three types of 
CRUD expressions. Select statements instantiate an LMS (line 39, 56, 69), while the other types 
do not. These latter types generate a value indicating the number of affected rows in the 
database (line 90). 
 
Scrollablity 
Scrollability comprises services related to the scrolling process on LMS. There are two mutual-
exclusive possibilities: forward-only (line 37, 51) – in this case it is only possible to move 
forward one row at a time, (line 40, 57); scrollable (line 67) – in this case it is possible to move 
in any direction and jump several rows at a time (line 79). There are several other methods as 
shown in Figure 17. Additional detail can be found in [Oracle, '12c]. 
 
 
+isAfterLast() : bool
+isBeforeFirst() : bool
+isFirst() : bool
+isLast() : bool
+next() : bool
«interface»
ForwardOnly
+absolute(in position : int) : bool
+afterLast()
+beforeFirst()
+first() : bool
+isAfterLast() : bool
+isBeforeFirst() : bool
+isFirst() : bool
+isLast() : bool
+last() : bool
+next() : bool
+previous() : bool
+relative(in rows : int) : bool
«interface»
Scrollable
 
Figure 17. Methods to scroll on LMS. 
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Updatability 
Updatability comprises services organized in protocols to interact with data contained in LMS. 
There are two mutual-exclusive possibilities: read-only (line 38, 52) – the content of the LMS is 
read-only and no changes are allowed; updatable (line 68) – changes may be performed on LMS 
(insert new rows, update rows (line 75-76) and delete rows). CLI commit these changes into the 
host database. The important aspect in these actions is that CLI, internally, create CRUD 
expressions to execute the actions performed at the LMS level. Thus, when line 76 is executed 
JDBC creates an Update expression to update the modified attribute. Similarly, when a tuple is 
inserted or deleted at the LMS level, JDBC creates Insert and Delete expressions to materialize 
the requested actions.  
 
Transactions 
Transactions comprise a set of services to manage database transactions such as save points, 
rollbacks and commits. Figure 16 presents a scenario where the auto-commit mode is changed 
into the normal mode (line 110), some CRUD expressions are executed (line 112) and 
committed (line 113). If an SQLException is caught, the transaction is rolled back (line 115). 
Finally, the auto-commit mode is replaced (line 117). 
 
2.3.3 JDBC Class Diagram 
Main functionalities of JDBC are organized around four interfaces: Connection [Oracle, '12a], 
Statement [Oracle, '12c], PreparedStatement [Oracle, '12b] and ResultSet [Oracle, '13] as shown in 
Figure 18. 
 
«interface»
Connection
«interface»
PrepareStatement
«interface»
Statement
* 1
*
1
«interface»
ResultSet
«interface»
ResultSet
*
1
1 *
 
Figure 18. JDBC class diagram. 
Connection 
The  root  interface  is  the  Connection  interface  which  manages  a  connection  to  a  database. 
 
+createStatement() : Statement
+createStatement(in scrollability : int, in updatability : int) : Statement
+prepareStatement(in sql : string) : PreparedStatement
+prepareStatement(in sql, in scrollability : int, in updatability : int) : PreparedStatement
+commit()
+rollBack()
+setAutoCommit(in autoCommit : bool) : bool
«interface»
Connection
 
Figure 19. Connection interface. 
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Among others, it provides services for transactions management and for creating Statement 
and PreparedStatement objects, see Figure 19. Additional detail about the Connection interface 
is here provided [Oracle, '12a] 
 
Statement 
The Statement interface manages the execution of compiled-on-the-fly CRUD expressions, see 
Figure 20. Among others, it provides the following two main services: 
 executeQuery: to execute Select expressions, which returns a ResultSet (LMS in JDBC); 
  executeUpdate: to execute Update, Insert and Delete expressions, which returns an 
integer to indicate the number of affected rows. 
 
 
+executeQuery(in sql : string) : ResultSet
+executeUpdate(in sql : string) : int
«interface»
Statement
 
Figure 20. Statement interface. 
Additional details about the Statement interface can be found in [Oracle, '12c]. 
 
PrepareStatement 
The PreparedStatement interface manages the execution of pre-compiled CRUD expressions, 
see Figure 21. Among others, it provides the following services: 
 executeQuery and executeUpdate: same as in Statement interface; 
 others: the remaining services are used to set the runtime values for the parameters of 
CRUD expressions. There is one method for each data type. 
 
 
+executeQuery() : ResultSet
+executeUpdate() : int
+setInt(in parameterIndex : int, in value : int)
+setLong(in parameterIndex : int, in value : long)
+...()
+setString(in parameterIndex : int, in value : string)
«interface»
PrepareStatement
 
Figure 21. PrepareStatement interface. 
Additional details about the PreparedStatement interface is here provided [Oracle, '12b]. 
 
ResultSet 
The ResultSet interface is the JDBC implementation of LMS, see Figure 22. ResultSet is a plane 
interface comprising all services independently from its instantiation context: forward only or 
scrollable and, read-only or updatable. This means that programmers must remember the 
context in which a ResultSet was instantiated to only use the valid and active services. 
Otherwise, exceptions will be raised. One important aspect, as it will be shown, is that 
programmers need to master the schema of the returned relation to be able to access the data 
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managed by ResultSet. This does not happen with O/RM tools, such as Hibernate, JPA and LINQ. 
This is indeed a drawback of CLI regarding their usability. The DACA overcomes this CLI 
drawback by providing type safe and database schema-driven methods. Among others, 
ResultSet interface provides the following methods, as shown in Figure 22: 
 
+getInt(in colIndex : int) : int
+getInt(in colLabel : string) : int
+...()
+updateInt(in colIndex : int, in value : int)
+updateInt(in colLabel : string, in value : int)
+...()
+updateRow()
+insertRow()
+moveToInsertRow()
+moveToCurrentRow()
+deleteRow()
+next() : bool
+absolute(in position : int) : bool
+previous() : bool
+isFirst() : bool
+...()
«interface»
ResultSet
 
Figure 22. ResultSet interface. 
getInt 
The getInt method is used to read data of type integer returned by Select expressions. There 
are two methods for each data type. One method uses the column index and the other uses 
the column label (example - Figure 12: line 42, 43) to  read the  data. Only  the  methods  for  
the  
integer data type are here presented and described. As previously mentioned, programmers 
need to master the schema of the returned relation. 
 
updateInt 
The updateInt method is used to update columns of data type integer and also to insert 
values in columns of data type integer. There are two methods for each data type. One 
method uses the column index and the other uses the column label (example - Figure 14: 
line 75). Only the methods for the integer data type are here presented. As previously 
mentioned, programmers need to master the schema of the returned relation. 
 
updateRow 
The updateRow method is used to confirm previously updated values; if operating in auto-
commit mode, the updated columns are committed. 
 
insertRow 
The insertRow method  is used to confirm previous inserted values; if operating in auto-
commit mode, the updated columns are committed. 
 
moveToInsertRow 
The moveToInsertRow method  is used  to set the  cursor used by ResultSet  to  point  to  the 
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tuple where new tuples are inserted. Thus, this method has to be invoked to start the insert 
protocol. 
 
moveToCurrentRow 
The moveToCurrentRow method is used to restore set the previous cursor position (before 
moveToInsertRow). 
 
deleteRow 
The deleteRow method deletes the current selected tuple; if operating in auto-commit 
mode, the deleted tuples are committed; 
 
remaining nethods 
The remaining  methods are used to scroll on the ResultSet to select one of the tuples. 
 
Additional detail about the ResultSet interface can be found in [Oracle, '13]. 
2.4 Current Approaches to Implement Access Control 
In the context of RDBMS, access control is focused on protecting sensitive data managed by RDBMS 
from legitimate users. Legitimate users are entities identified with username and password to 
access databases. In order to control the access to data, several approaches have been presented 
each one with its own characteristics and goals. The diversity of the approaches does not ease their 
classification in major groups even if the classification follows the previous presented and 
described dimensions of access control: architecture, granularity, awareability, contextuality and 
adaptability. As such, the presentation of current approaches is split in two sub-sections. In the first 
sub-section current approaches are organized and presented by technological aspects and in the 
second sub-section the major research approaches are individually described and presented, and 
not grouped under any classification. 
As far as we know, no previous work has addressed the key aspects of this thesis. Two of those 
key aspects are 1) the implementation of FGACM at the business tier level, built at runtime, and 
kept updated when policies evolve and 2) business tiers driven by FGACM and based and exploiting 
CLI features such as their multi-access mode: Direct Access Mode and Indirect Access Mode. The 
only aspect that has been addressed by some researches is awareness about the established FGACP.  
2.4.1 Current Techniques  
Several techniques have been devised and used to implement access control. This sub-section 
presents and describes some of the most used technical solutions for access control.  
 
 
Views 
Database views may be used as the basis for FGAC. Views are standard database entities that 
aggregate selected and filtered data. Then, these data are used to evaluate the disclosing policy 
to legitimate users in accordance with the established FGACP. Next follows an example of a view 
restricting the access to rows of a table with ids < 100. 
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 Create view myTable as 
   Select * from table 
    Where id < 100 
 
From now on, authorization is evaluated against the view and not against the original table. The 
most usual implementations prohibits users from issuing the CRUD expression 
 
Select * from table where id < 100 
 
and, instead, they issue the following CRUD expression  
 
  Select * from myTable 
 
Albeit being an easy technique, the use of views presents some disadvantages. For example, the 
use of views is not scalable. The number of views increases with the number of policies. 
Moreover, users accessing the same table but with different authorizations need different 
views. While from the database schema point of view this means an unbounded number of 
views, from the business tier point of view this means an unbounded number of CRUD 
expressions. These disadvantages may be unsustainable in large databases with complex 
schemas and many and complex access control policies. In order to minimize this scalability 
drawback, [Rizvi, '04] proposes an approach where users always issue CRUD expressions 
against the original tables but the authorizations are evaluated against security views.  
  Anyway, views also present one significant advantage. Views are relational entities 
supported by the standard SQL language this way avoiding the need to additional tools or 
additional techniques. As relational entities, they are kept together with database tables this 
way conveying a single point for their development, deployment and maintenance.  
 
 
Parameterized Views 
A parameterized view is an SQL view definition which makes use of runtime parameters like 
user-id, time and user-location. The next example shows a simple parameterized view. 
 
 Create view myTable as 
    Select * from table 
        Where id=SYSTEM_USER 
 
 
This parameterized view lets the legitimate user to see all rows from table Table where the id 
matches his/her user identification. Parameterized views are used to create different 
authorization accesses based on a single view and a single CRUD expression, which is a different 
and more efficient than the traditional views just presented. Thus, parameterized views convey 
the same advantages and disadvantages as traditional views, but positively contribute to 
minimize the lack of scalability of traditional views. 
Parameterized views is also the approach proposed in [Roichman, '07] to implement FGAC 
in Web databases. Basically, each user is identified as belonging to a group to which a set of 
parameterized views is assigned. 
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Query Rewriting 
Query rewriting is a technique used to rewrite CRUD expressions before their execution to 
avoid unauthorized access to protected data. The rewriting process is usually conducted in a 
central server and several techniques have been proposed. Next follows the presentation of 
some of the most used techniques. 
 
Addition of predicates 
Appending predicates to where clauses is one of the used techniques to rewrite CRUD 
expressions. Predicates are used to filter the data to be disclosed, in accordance with the 
established FGACP. For example, the CRUD expression 
 
 Select * from table 
 
is replaced by the CRUD expression at runtime 
 
  Select * from table 
       Where (some condition) 
 
 
Tables replaced by views 
This technique is used to replace names of tables by names of views representing the 
authorized data. For example, the CRUD expression 
 
 Select * from table 
 
is replaced by  
 
 Select * from myTable 
 
where myTable is a view of table Table containing the authorized data. 
 
Masking cells 
Masking cells technique rewrites CRUD expressions to mask protected data that is returned 
by Select expressions. For example, the CRUD expression 
 
 Select column from … 
 
is replaced by the CRUD expression 
 
 Select column = CASE somePolicy 
     When hide 
       Then HiddedValue 
       Else column 
 
The rewritten CRUD expression uses at runtime a policy, somePolicy, to decide upon 
disclosing attitude for the protected column. There are two main approaches to mask cells. 
One uses named variables to represent protected data. The other uses the standard SQL 
NULL values. Named variable are by far the best choice but named variables are not 
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supported by all RDBMS. The NULL value is the alternative and it is easily implemented. The 
drawback is that the use of NULL values to protect data prevents the distinction between 
real SQL NULL values and a hidden protected value. 
 
Column removal 
The column removal technique removes all protected columns from the select list 
(projected attributes). For example, if the data contained in column col_B of CRUD 
expression 
 
 Select col_A, col_B, col_C from table 
 
is not authorized to be disclosed, the CRUD expression is rewritten as 
 
 Select col_A, col_C from table 
 
This technique effectively hides the protected data but exceptions are raised if client-side 
applications try to use the hidden column col_B. Moreover, the same CRUD expression when 
used by users with different authorizations returns relations with different schemas. This 
situation inevitably raises several difficulties not only during the development process of 
client-applications but also during maintenance activities, which are both significantly 
hampered.  
 
Query rewriting technique has advantages and disadvantages. Among them, the following 
advantages are emphasized: 
 
Transparency 
Query rewriting has the advantage of being transparent to database users. Database users 
write CRUD expressions as if no security policy is implemented. Then, CRUD expressions 
are rewritten in accordance with the established policies. 
 
Scalability 
From application tiers point of view there is no need to extend the number of CRUD 
expressions to conform with the established FGACP. CRUD expressions are written as if no 
policy was defined and then, at runtime, they are automatically rewritten. 
 
Thus, query rewriting overcomes the main disadvantages of views and parameterized 
views. Meanwhile, query rewriting conveys some disadvantages and threats. Among them the 
following are emphasized: 
 
Unawareness  
The query rewriting process is an independent process out of the scope of database users. 
Queries violating any security policy are rejected and users are pushed to deal with 
corrective activities, very often with no feedback about the causes of the rejection. 
 
Performance decay 
The query rewriting process is usually processed by a centralized system and requires a 
certain amount of computational resources. In spite of not being mandatory, in most of the 
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cases the systems responsible for the query rewriting process are the RDBMS themselves. 
Additionally, after being rewritten, the performance of original CRUD expressions very 
probably has decay in performance.  
 
Dead lock 
Dead locks may occur if policies use data from the tables being queried. These undesirable 
situations are caused by non-terminating loops when policies recursively invoke 
themselves when the table is queried. To prevent such dead locks additional expressive 
power is needed [Olson, '08]. 
The query rewriting technique is widely used and proposed as solution to address FGACP. 
Among them, the following proposals are emphasized: Oracle [Oracle], [LeFevre, '04], [Rizvi, 
'04], [Wang, '07] and [Barker, '08]. 
 
 
Extensions to SQL 
Currently, the standard SQL only permits limited forms of access control. Some of the forms are 
the GRANT, REVOKE and DENY commands. These commands are far from coping with current 
security needs. Extensions to the standard SQL have been proposed by several authors to tackle 
the current security gap of the standard SQL language. Some contributions have been proposed 
to extend the SQL standard, such as in [Chlipala, '10] through the known predicate and 
[Chaudhuri, '07] by the generalization for the current SQL authorization mechanisms. Even if 
the SQL standard was extended to deal with all security requirements, it would rely in a 
centralized architecture conveying all the described advantages and disadvantages. 
 
 
Language extensions, security languages and tools 
Language extensions, security programming languages and tools have been proposed to 
address FGACP. Current programming languages are extended and specialized functionalities 
are included to address access control. Several researches have been conducted in this 
direction. Among them the following are emphasized: SELINKS [Corcoran, '09] extends LINKS to 
build secure multi-tier web applications; Jif [Zhang, '12] is a Java extension which uses labels in-
line with the source code to express access control policies; [Fischer, '09] introduces objects-
sensitive types driven by RBAC policies to overcome Java EE @RolesAllowed annotation 
approach to RBAC. New programming languages have also been devised. In [Caires, '11], Caires 
et al. present a new programming language named as λDB for verifying and for expressing 
FGACP. In [Ribeiro, '01], Ribeiro et al. present a security programming language aimed at 
integrating heterogeneous security policies. Some tools have also been devised. In [Chlipala, 
'10], Chlipala et al. present a tool, Ur/Web, that allows programmers to write statically-
checkable FGACP as SQL queries. 
 
 
PEP-PDP 
Solutions based on PEP-PDP approach are based on the mixed architecture. Basically, PEPs are 
included in-line with the source code of client applications to enforce the policies decided by a 
PDP placed in a remote server. If authorization is granted, PEP executes the requested action 
otherwise the requested action is refused. The best well-known proposal is the XACML [OASIS, 
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'12] standard from OASIS but other research proposals have also been presented and based on 
this architecture. SELINKS [Corcoran, '09] has also proposed a PEP-PDP approach for multi-tier 
web database applications. 
 
 
Semantic Access Control 
Semantic access control (SAC) uses Semantic Web [Berners-Lee, '01] concepts to the access 
control area. The main difference to the remainder approaches is that decisions are based on 
the semantic of attributes, such as resources and users, and not on stored or hard coded 
information. It has been used in several domains such as: to integrate access control between 
heterogeneous data repositories [Hu, '11; Pan, '06; Warner, '07], to provide secure content 
access and distribution [Lopez, '02a; Valle, '02] and to extend semantic web concepts to RBAC 
models [Ao, '04; Kim, '10]. 
 
 
RDBMS Vendors 
Access control has been a permanent worry of RDBMS vendors. RDBMS vendors have been 
providing embedded tools from which security experts build and maintain access control to the 
data to be protected. Granularity of access control in RDBMS started to be at the database object 
(tables and views) level. This granularity became inadequate when the claim for more security 
increased. To cope with this increased demanding, RDBMS vendors started to support finer-grained 
access control. Different approaches were followed. INGRES and Oracle uses a query rewriting 
technique while DB2 [Bond, '07]  uses a label-based technique. In spite of the diversity of policies, 
RDBMS vendors have elected the RBAC as the preferred choice.  Each RDBMS vendor provides its 
proprietary approach leading to a situation where access control is far from being standardized. 
Very often the security features of RDBMS are not enough and there is the need to provide a 
different approach to access control. This need has been the motivation for the researches that have 
been conducted and also one of the motivations of this thesis. A radical approach is the one 
provided by Hippocratic databases [Agrawal, '02; LeFevre, '04].  
2.4.2 Related Work 
In this sub-section follows the presentation of work related with the enforcement of ACP (Access 
Control Policies) and FGACP. 
 
 
Virtual Private Database 
Oracle addressed FGACP by introducing the Virtual Private Database [Oracle] technology. This 
technology is based on rewriting CRUD expressions before their execution and in accordance 
with the established FGACP. The authorization policy is encoded into functions defined for each 
relation, which are used to return where clauses predicates to be appended to CRUD 
expressions to limit data access at the row level. This approach provides a per-user view of each 
database object (called Truman model in [Rizvi, '04]). Next follows an example based on two 
tables: 
 
Doc_Doctor {doc_id doc_name,…} 
DACA: Architecture to Implement Dynamic Access Control Mechanisms on Business Tier Components 
 
42 | P a g e  
 
Pat_Patient {Pat_id,PatDoc_id,Pat_name,…}.  
 
If doctors are restricted to see only their patients, if the following CRUD expression is issued by 
a doctor  
 
Select * from Pat_Patient 
 
it will be automatically rewritten to 
 
Select * from Pat_Patient where PatDoc_id=<id of the doctor logged in> 
 
To set-up the access control, a function is written to compute the predicate to be added to 
the CRUD expression and a policy is placed on the table Pat_Patient. The function needs to 
select Doc_id from Doc_Doctor for the doctor logged in and then constructs the predicate 
automatically. 
It is also possible to use Virtual Private Database at the column level to prevent disclosure 
of protected data. There are two alternatives: column removal (default behavior) - all cells 
containing sensitive data are removed; cell masking - content of cells containing sensitive data 
is replaced by NULL value. 
Virtual Privacy Database is an alternative to views by avoiding some of their drawbacks 
such as the need for an additional view for each policy. With the Virtual Private Database 
technique, the same CRUD expression is shared by all users and automatically modified in 
accordance with the permission of each user. 
 
 
Hippocratic databases 
In 1974 the United States Privacy Act defined a set of rules for limiting the collection, use and 
dissemination of personal data held by Federal Agencies [Agrawal, '02]. The defined concepts 
are generally known as Fair Information Practices [Systems, '73] and have been used to develop 
important international guidelines for privacy protection [Agrawal, '02]. From these guidelines, 
[Agrawal, '02] announces ten principles to characterize Hippocratic databases. Hippocratic 
databases aim at integrating privacy policies into database architectures. The ten principles are: 
purpose specification (for which the information has been collected), consent (purpose must be 
consented by the donor), limited collection (minimum necessary for accomplishing the 
specified purpose), limited use (run only those queries that are consistent with the purpose for 
which the information has been collected), limited disclosure (information shall not be 
communicated outside the RDBMS for purposes other than those consented), limited retention 
(only until the fulfillment of the purpose), accuracy (information must be accurate and up-to-
date), safety (information must be protected by security mechanisms), openness (a donor is 
able to access to its own information) and compliance (a donor is able to verify compliance with 
the principles) [Agrawal, '02; Kirchberg, '10; LeFevre, '04]. Some efforts have been made to 
bring those principles into practice, among which the ones of IBM [IBM, '07] and PostgreSQL 
[Padma, '09] are emphasized. The following example is based on Hippocratic PostgreSQL 
 
  Select p.productName, p.unitsInStock, p.unitsOnOrder, p.reorderLevel 
   From Products p 
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   Purpose stockControl 
   Recipient stockManager 
 
The result of this Select will be restricted to include only the columns that the combination of 
purpose and recipient is allowed to access according to the policy specification. It will be 
further restricted to include only data of products to be shared with stockControl. From this 
simple example it is clearly seen that databases addressing Hippocratic principles diverge from 
traditional RDBMS. Additionally, Hippocratic databases also address data privacy which is a 
distinct form of access control. While privacy is concerned with the right of individuals to 
determine for themselves when, how and to what extent information about them is 
communicated to others, access control is concerned with controlling which legitimate users 
are allowed to access protected data. 
 
 
[LeFevre, '04] 
In [LeFevre, '04] LeFevre et al. propose a technique to control the disclosing data process in 
Hippocratic databases. The disclosing process is based on the premise that the subject has 
control over who is allowed to see its protected data and for what purpose. It is based on the 
query rewriting technique. Policies are defined using P3P [W3C, '02] or EPAL [W3C, '03] and 
comprise a set of rules that describe to whom the data may be disclosed and how the data may 
be used. Two disclosure models are supported for cells: at the table level - each purpose-
recipient pair is assigned a view over each table in the database and prohibited cells are 
replaced with null values; at the CRUD expressions level - protected data are removed from the 
returned relations of Select expressions, in accordance with the purpose-recipient constraints. 
Rules are stored as meta-data in the database. CRUD expressions must be associated with a 
purpose and a recipient, and are rewritten to reflect the ACP. 
 
 
SESAME [Zhang, '03] 
SESAME [Zhang, '03] is a dynamic context-aware access control mechanism for pervasive GRID 
applications. It relies on a dynamic role based access control model (DRBAC) which extends the 
classic RBAC model. Basically, DRBAC assigns default role hierarchies when subjects log in. 
Afterwards, context of subjects are monitored and roles are dynamically delegated. SESAME 
and DRBAC model have been implemented as part of the Discover [Bhat, '03; Mann, '01] 
computational laboratory. Two types of context are considered: object context and subject 
context. Object context is concerned about things related to users such as user’s location, time, 
local resource and link state. Subject context is concerned with things related to systems, such 
as the current load, availability and connectivity for a resource. 
An experimental evaluation was carried out in the Discover [Mann, '01; Mann, '02] 
computational laboratory to measure the induced overheads. SESAME follows a traditional 
approach to enforce access control policies in a central system, conveying all the drawbacks 
previously presented.  
 
 
SELINKS [Corcoran, '09] 
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SELINKS [Corcoran, '09] is a programming language in the type of LINQ and Ruby on Rails which 
extends LINKS [Cooper, '07] to build secure multi-tier web applications. LINKS aims to reduce the 
impedance mismatch between the three tiers. The programmer writes a single LINKS program 
and the compiler creates the byte-code for each tier and also for the security policies (coded as 
user-defined functions on RDBMS). Through a type system object named as Fable [Swamy, '08], 
it is assured that sensitive data is never accessed directly without first consulting the 
appropriate policy enforcement function. Policy functions, running in a remote server, check at 
runtime what type of actions users are granted to perform. Programmers define security 
metadata (termed labels) using algebraic and structured types and then write enforcement 
policy functions that applications call explicitly to mediate the access to labeled data. Some of 
the security strengths of SELINKS are: 
 
Security 
SELINKS is a cross-tier security technique this way ensuring an integrated security context 
for the three tiers. Additionally, it uses Fable to ensure that security policies cannot be 
avoided, to ensure that security policies are correctly enforced and correctly called 
whenever a user tries to access protected data.  
 
Integrated environment 
SELINKS is  cross-tier security  technique relying on a single tool. This  environment clearly  
eases the development process of database applications based on multi-tier architectures. 
Programmers do not need to master several tools and, above all, ensure their integration 
and coordination to reach a high level of security. 
 
Optimized latency 
User defined functions run on database servers and not on web servers, avoiding the 
overhead of needlessly transferring data between the web server and the database server. 
 
Flexibility 
Beyond access control, SELINKS allows other variety of security policies to be expressed: 
information flow [Denning, '76], provenance [Buneman, '06] and automaton-based policies. 
 
Some of the security weaknesses of SELINKS are: 
 
Additional technique 
In spite of its advantage of relying on a single tool, programmers need to master a new tool, 
SELINKS, to develop secure applications. 
 
Scope 
Security labels specify a group-based access control policy, with separate access restrictions 
only for readers and writers of a record. There is no way to separate access restrictions by 
identifying inserts, updates and delete operations. 
 
Jif [Zhang, '12] 
Jif [Zhang, '12] is a security-typed programming  language  that  extends  Java  with  support  for 
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 information access control and also for information flow control [Denning, '76]. The access 
control is assured by adding labels in-line with the Java source code to express access control 
policies. The policy language supports: principals and labels, principal hierarchy, confidentiality 
and integrity constraints, robust declassification and endorsement and some language features 
such as polymorphism. Jif addresses some relevant aspects such as the enforcement of security 
policies at compile time and at runtime. Anyway, at development time, programmers will only 
be aware of inconsistencies after running the Jif compiler. In spite of its valuable contribution, 
Jif is not tailored to be an end-to-end access control tool to data residing in databases. It is 
mostly used to enforce security policies at the application level. As such, whenever used, JIF 
needs to be complemented with other techniques to manage the access control to data residing 
in RDBMS. 
 
 
[Olson, '08] 
In [Olson, '08], Olson et al. describe a model for Reflective Database Access Control (RDBAC) 
based on the semantics of Transaction Datalog [Bonner, '97]. Privileges in the RDBAC model are 
expressed as CRUD expressions rather than as static privileges contained in access control lists. 
CRUD expressions use current state of databases to decide upon the accesses to be carried out. 
In [Olson, '09] a concrete implementation is provided. At the present moment, there is a model 
to define RDBAC policies and the CRUD expressions emanated from the policies. This result may 
be used as an input to the Direct Access Mode. 
 
 
[Rizvi, '04] 
Rizvi et al. [Rizvi, '04] present a query rewriting technique to determine if a CRUD expression is 
authorized but without changing the CRUD expression. It uses security views to filter contents 
of tables and simultaneously to infer and check at runtime the appropriate authorization to 
execute any CRUD expression issued against the unfiltered table. The user is responsible to 
formulate the CRUD expression properly. They call this approach the Non-Truman model. Non-
Truman models, unlike Truman models, do not change the original CRUD expression. The 
process is transparent for users and CRUD expressions are rejected if they do not have the 
appropriate authorization. The transparency of this technique is not always desirable 
particularly when it is important to understand why authorization is not granted so that 
programmers can revise their CRUD expressions more easily. This approach has some 
disadvantages: 
 
Performance 
The inference rules to check at runtime the appropriate authorization are complex and time 
consuming. 
 
Productivity 
Authorizations are checked against security views and not against original data. The 
process is transparent, so programmers do not know that their CRUD expressions are 
running against security views. If any syntax error or security violation occurs, the 
transparent process turns the debugging process more difficult. 
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Awareness 
Programmers cannot statically check the correctness of CRUD expressions because the 
policies and the mechanisms are centralized in a server. Programmers need to write, 
compile and run the source code to become aware of any security violation. 
 
Incompleteness 
The inference rules are complex and their completeness is not assured by the authors. 
 
 
[Dwork, '08] 
Differential-privacy [Dwork, '08] has had significant attention from the research community. It 
is mainly focused on preserving privacy from statistical databases. It really it does not directly 
address the point here under discussion. The interesting aspect is Frank McSherry’s [McSherry, 
'10] approach to address differential-privacy: PINQ - a LINQ extension. The key aspect is that 
the privacy guarantees are provided by PINQ itself not requiring any expertise to enforce 
privacy policies. PINQ provides the integrated declarative language (SQL like, from LINQ) and 
simultaneously provides native support for  differential-privacy  for  the  queries  being  
written. 
 
 
[Morin, '10] 
Morin et al. [Morin, '10] use a security-driven model-based dynamic adaptation process to 
address access control and software evolution simultaneously. The approach begins by 
composing security meta-models (to describe access control policies) and architecture meta-
models (to describe the application architecture). They also show how to map (statically and 
dynamically) security concepts into architectural concepts. This approach is mainly focused on 
how to dynamically establish bindings between components from different layers to enforce 
security policies. They did not address the key issue of how to statically implement dynamic 
security mechanisms in software artifacts, in our case business tiers based on CLI. 
 
 
[Roichman, '07] 
[Roichman, '07] argues that Web databases are particularly vulnerable to SQL injection attacks 
[Gregory, '05].  To overcome this security gap, authors propose an access control based on 
databases’ built-in access control mechanisms: parameterized views [Eder, '96]. To address 
users’ identification, a Parameter method is presented. Basically, users’ identities are known (or 
automatically assigned using one of the proposed methods) and used to dynamically create 
parameterized views which gather the relevant data to the user, this way avoiding the access to 
unauthorized data. This approach is mainly focused on tackling SQL injection attacks and also 
on preventing users of Web databases to access databases without being previously identified. 
Users’ identification may be considered a key aspect of access control but insufficient to address 
all aspects of access control. The authors themselves recognize that the proposed methodology 
is restrictive because it does not address every situations: “The proposed access control 
mechanism is capable to prevent many kinds of attacks…”. 
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[Chlipala, '10] 
[Chlipala, '10] presents a tool, Ur/Web, that allows programmers to write statically-checkable 
ACP as SQL queries. Basically, each policy determines which data is accessible. Then, programs 
are written and checked to assure that data involved in queries is accessible through some 
policy. To allow policies to vary by user, queries use actual data and a new extension to the 
standard SQL to capture ‘which secrets the user knows’. This extension is based on a predicate 
referred to as ´known’ used to model which information users are already aware of to decide 
upon the information to be disclosed. 
Listing 1 presents a table user and its definition in Ur/Web. The policy expressed in Listing 
2, named as sendClient, prevents users from reading data from other users. The predicate 
known models the information the user is already aware of. In this case, the user may read data 
about any row whose password he knows. 
Ur/Web is a promising solution, but beyond introducing a new programming technique, it 
presents a key drawback of not checking access control to data of where clauses, allowing 
queries to implicitly leak protected data. 
 
 
Table user: { Id: Int, Name: string, Pass: string } 
Listing 1. Definition of table user in Ur/Web. 
policy sendClient { 
     Select * 
         From user 
         Where 
known(user.pass) 
} 
Listing 2. Policy definition in Ur/Web. 
  
[Caires, '11] 
[Caires, '11] presents a programming language, known as  λDB, for expressing and verifying ACP 
by means of static type checking. λDB introduces programming structures known as entities 
which define database tables and the associated ACP. Then CRUD expressions are validated 
against the established ACP (at compile time) and also taking into account contextual 
information. Each permission is composed by: 
 The granted action (either read or write); 
 The list of attributes (entity fields); 
 A condition expressed as a logical formula. 
 
Listing 3 shows an entity named as Person. It comprises four attributes. Then ACP are defined 
for each attribute: 
 Public: is readable in any condition as its associated condition (true) always hold; 
 Secret: the content of this attribute in a row is readable only if the current user is the 
user identified in that row (userid) and the user is authenticated in the system; 
 The write permission applies to all fields. 
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entity Person [userid: string; public: string; photo: picture; secret: 
string] 
 read public where true; 
 … 
       read secret where Auth(uid) and uid=userid; 
 … 
 write where Auth(userid); 
Listing 3. Policy definition in λDB. 
Beyond introducing a new programming technique this approach provides a unique action 
(write) to authorize update, insert and delete operations on attributes. This limitation clearly 
prevents a FGAC at the type of actions being executed. Unlike [Chlipala, '10], this approach 
provides access control to data of where clauses. 
 
 
[Wang, '07] 
In [Wang, '07] three criteria are defined for enforcing FGACP. The algorithm should be sound, 
secure and maximum. “An algorithm is sound if the answer returned by it is consistent with the 
answer when there is no fine-grained access control policy. The algorithm is secure if the returned 
answer does not leak information not allowed by the policy. The algorithm is maximum if it 
returns as much information as possible, while satisfying the first two properties.” The rational is 
presented and the work presented in [LeFevre, '04] is evaluated to conclude that it fails to 
satisfy the correctness criteria for FGACP. Authors use a labeling mechanism for cell-level 
disclosure policies to specify FGACP. Basically a policy determines whether a cell is viewable or 
not. This approach has also been used to work on privacy-centered database systems [Emilin 
Shyni, '10; LeFevre, '04]. Additionally, Wang argues that when one conceptual entity is split in 
two or more relations linked through foreign keys then the attributes involved in the linking 
process should be allowed even if the values of the keys cannot be released for privacy concern. 
In order to preserve useful information for query evaluation, two types of variables are defined 
to label unauthorized cells, this way avoiding the use of NULL value for protected cells. To prove 
the soundness of the algorithm, a query rewriting approach is presented to modify CRUD 
expressions in accordance with the established policies. Listing 4 presents a simple case to 
demonstrate the approach. The first CRUD expression is ruled by a policy where for each tuple 
in Employees, the value of attributes FirstName and HomePhone can be disclosed only when 
the disclosure conditions DCFirstName and DCHomePhone do not return 0 (zero), respectively. The 
rewritten CRUD expression employs the Case-Statement modification to mask unauthorized 
cells. Authors claim the soundness of the technique but some aspects need a further attention: 
 
Applicability 
The technique was applied to Select expressions. There is no evidence of its applicability to 
the three types of expressions: Insert, Update and Delete. 
 
Performance 
Authors   conducted  a  performance  evaluation   with  simple   Select  expressions   and  the 
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collected results suggest that scalability is compromised when the number of tuples is not 
small and efficiency is not a major concern. 
 
 
-- original CRUD expression 
Select FirstName, HomePhone 
   from Employees 
 
-- rewritten CRUD expression 
Select FirstName =  
          case DCFirstName 
             when 0 
               then NULL 
               else FirstName 
          end, 
        HomePhone = 
           case DCHomePhone 
             when 0 
               then NULL 
               else HomePhone 
           end 
   From Employees 
Listing 4. Query rewritten in T-SQL. 
 
 
[Barker, '08] 
In [Barker, '08], Barker et al. provide support for representing, in SQL (DDL), dynamic fine-
grained meta-level access control (DFMAC) policies. Meta-level policy is used to define different 
facts of ACP such as open and closed access control. DFMAC policies are presented as being 
important when goal-oriented access control requirements need to be represented. In goal-
oriented access control, organizational and individual roles change as a consequence of the 
occurrence of events. Policies are represented in four tables: 
 Category - to define to which categories users are assigned to; 
 Policy – to store meta-level access control to be used by the query rewrite procedure;  
 PCA – for permission category assignment and DCA – for denial category assignment. 
 From the data contained in these tables, and also from users’ identification, queries are 
rewritten to enforce the established ACP.  
This approach has the advantage of relying on SQL. Nevertheless, the work lacks of a deep 
performance evaluation because the presented examples suggest that the added predicates may 
have a significant impact on performance. Authors conducted some performance evaluations 
(not sufficiently described) and the collected results have shown an additional overhead of 10-
15%, up to 26% and even “pushed towards a bound of unacceptability”. 
 
[Chaudhuri, '07] 
In [Chaudhuri, '07], Chaudhuri et al. propose a generalization for the current SQL authorization 
mechanism. The model is based on adding predicates to authorization grants and also on 
extending current SQL authorization model to support fine-grained authorization. Next follows 
a simple example 
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  grant select on Employees 
   where (employeeID=userId()) 
   to public 
 
This authorization specifies that each employee is granted access to its own employee record. 
The model also supports nullification to control access at the cell level as shown in next 
example 
 
  grant select on Employees (address) 
   where (some predicate)  
    else nullify to public 
 
This authorization specifies that access to the address attribute of Employees is granted only if 
the predicate is satisfied, otherwise a null value is returned. 
The model also incorporates other features such as query for user groups and 
authorization groups to simplify administration activities. 
 
 The model addresses the following aspects: 
 Predicates can be applied on any form of grant: CRUD expressions, functions and stored 
procedures; 
 Nullification of values based on predicates to allow cell-level security [LeFevre, '04]; 
 Authorization on aggregates while limiting the access to raw data; 
 Mechanisms to ease the administration of large number of application users. 
 
To avoid large number of database users, the notion of user is defined at the application 
user level. As such, users of applications must be authenticated and their identity made 
available to the database. 
 
 
Java EE 
Java EE supports the enforcement of RBAC policies through the @RolesAllowed annotations 
which are placed on methods definitions to control who has permission to invoke them, as 
shown in the example presented in Figure 23. In this example only users with either the Seller 
or Director roles are allowed to call the method getCustomer. Java EE enforces RBAC 
dynamically at runtime by checking if users indeed play one of the specified roles. 
 
 This approach conveys some relevant limitations: 
 
Users identification 
There is no control neither on the identification of who is invoking protected methods nor 
on the identification of who is being instantiated. This means that any Seller and any 
Director are allowed to get access to any Customer. 
 
Awareness 
The checking process is only dynamically verified at runtime. This means that programmers 
cannot statically verify if application code in fact respects the enforced RBAC policies. 
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Figure 23. Enforcement of RBAC in Java EE. 
 
[Fischer, '09] 
In [Fischer, '09], Fisher et al. introduce Object-sensitive RBAC (ORBAC), an extension of RBAC to 
be used with object-oriented programming languages. The goal is to address limitations of 
current RBAC model and associated frameworks as the one provided by Java EE. Instead of 
controlling access at the class level, ORBAC supports access control at the level of individual 
objects, allowing a finer-grained access control than Java EE. Additionally, ORBAC provides a 
type system that statically ensures that a program is in accordance with a specified ORBAC 
policy, preventing programmers from writing application code not aligned with the established 
policies. ORBAC addresses these limitations by allowing roles and privileged operations to be 
parameterized by a set of index values which are used to distinguish users of the same role. 
Figure 24 presents the case of Figure 23 but now based on ORBAC. The RoleParam annotation 
on the cId variable (customer Id) indicates that cId will be used as an index in role annotations 
within the class. Requires annotation is equivalent to Java EE @RolesAllowed annotation but 
uses additional meta-data to statically allow Seller<customerId> or Director<customerId> to 
invoke getCustomer only. @Returns annotation is similar to a post condition asserting that the 
returned Customer object has a cId role parameter variable which is equal in value to the 
customer identification passed to the method. 
 
 
 
Figure 24. Enforcement of RBAC in ORBAC. 
[OASIS, '12] 
XACML [OASIS, '12], as previously described, comprises two main components, PEP and PDP. 
PEP is responsible for enforcing the decisions of PDP. Basically, every PEP comprises some logic 
to communicate with PDP and then uses some business logic to accomplish its task whenever 
authorization is granted. Therefore, whenever a modification in a policy implies a modification 
on the business logic, there is no other solution than update the business logic in advance. 
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XACML does not give any guidance about any aspect of business logics. Not about how to keep 
them updated, not about how to promote the awareness of the implemented mechanisms, etc.  
2.5 Summary 
This chapter is focused on the required background to easy the reading and the understanding of 
this thesis and also on the state of the art. It is organized in four sub-sections, each one addressing a 
different issue. 
The first section presents some basic concepts such as the most relevant access control 
policies, architectures of FGACM and dimensions of FGACM. There are several types of policies but 
RBAC is the most used policy to protect sensitive data of relational database applications. The 
architecture of FGACM may follow one of three possible approaches: centralized, distributed or 
mixed. Each approach presents advantages and disadvantages. Independently from the followed 
architecture, FGACM present four additional dimensions, each one with its implications: 
granularity, awareability, contextuality and adaptability. 
The second section presents current tools that are used to build business tiers. Several tools 
have been devised to develop business tiers but none of them addresses access control. Two types 
of tools were emphasized: O/RM tools and CLI. From these tools, CLI were chosen as the underlying 
middleware to interact with RDBMS. CLI provide powerful features if correctly exploited lead also 
to powerful implementations of FGACM. Performance and several access modes to data are two of 
the most important features of CLI. 
The third section presents JDBC. JDBC is the selected CLI to be used in the proof of concept of 
the DACA. 
The fourth section describes current approaches addressing FGACP. Several approaches are 
presented aimed at providing access control to data residing on RDBMS. Some are provided by 
vendors of RDBMS, others have been provided by the academic community and other has been 
proposed through a standard emanated from OASIS, XACML. The diversity of needs and the 
diversity of possible solutions lead to the current situation where system architects are frequently 
pushed to devise their own and specific security solutions. From the presented background and 
state of the art, there is the evidence that current approaches to deal with access control are based 
on: tools provided by vendors of RDBMS, query rewriting techniques, extensions to the SQL 
standard, new programming languages, language extensions and XACML approach. None of the 
approaches address the dynamic adaptation of FGACM deployed at the client-side applications. As 
previously mentioned, the adaptation of mechanisms is an avoidable activity to be performed in 
advance when mechanisms evolve. Moreover, the current research approaches deal mostly with 
native CRUD expressions only (do not take advantage of other access modes such the ones provided 
by CLI) and some of them do not support other types of CRUD expressions but Select expressions. 
Additionally, the freedom provided by current approaches to use any CRUD expression opens the 
possibility of leaking security gaps. 
The next chapter describes the path that has been followed from the CLI until the DACA. 
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3 From Call Level Interfaces Towards the DACA 
This chapter explains the research that has been conducted to design the DACA from CLI. Basically 
three steps were taken. In the first step, the architecture of CLI has been redesigned to define a 
model able to incorporate schemas of database objects to tackle the impedance mismatch between 
the relational and the object-oriented paradigms [Pereira, '10b; Pereira, '11b]. In the second step, 
the model has been adapted to promote the development of reusable business tier components. 
Finally, in the third step, the outcome of the previous work was used to link access control on 
business tier components. The main outcome of this third step is the Dynamic Access Control 
Architecture. The DACA has been devised to implement dynamic FGACM on business tiers based on 
CLI. Some concepts are common to the three steps and, therefore, they will be presented 
beforehand to avoid unnecessary repetitions of text and descriptions. 
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.1 introduces some fundamental concepts for the 
DACA. Section 3.2 presents the model used to integrate CLI and schemas of relational databases. 
Section 3.3 presents the model used for building reusable business tier components form CLI. 
Section 3.4 briefly describes the approach that has been followed to enforce dynamic access control 
policies at the level of business tiers relying on CLI and, finally, section 3.5 summarizes the present 
chapter. 
3.1 Concepts 
CRUD expressions and LMS are two key entities of CLI. Both are the entities used to access 
databases and, therefore, the entities on which FGACM may rely on. To this end, we introduce three 
concepts to formalize the execution of CRUD expressions: CRUD Schema to formalize CRUD 
expressions, Business Schema to formalize the necessary services to manage the access to data for 
the two access modes (Direct Access Mode and Indirect Access Mode) and, finally Business Entity to 
formalize the software artifact responsible for implementing a Business Schema to execute CRUD 
expressions. These concepts were devised and developed during the two last steps [Pereira, '12d; 
Pereira, '11a; Pereira, '11c; Pereira, '12c; Pereira, '12b; Pereira, '13a; Pereira, '13b; Pereira, '13d; 
Pereira, '13e] . 
3.1.1 CRUD Schema 
There are four types of CRUD expressions (Select, Update, Insert and Delete) each one with its own 
characteristics. Some characteristics are shared among two or more types but others are not 
shared. These observations led to question whether it would be possible to formalize an abstract 
representation for CRUD expressions.  To start the process, we present the  main  characteristics  of 
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 CRUD expressions: 
 
Types of CRUD expressions 
There are four types of CRUD expressions conveying different properties. Analyzing their 
properties, we see that they may be organized in two major groups. One group, known as 
Reading, comprises the Select expression type only and the other group, known as Updating, 
comprises the remaining three types of CRUD expressions. This organization is mainly derived 
from the fact that Select expressions return relations and the other CRUD expressions do not. 
Thus, there is a clear difference on the services to be provided for each group.  
 
Runtime values 
Beyond their types and the syntax of the SQL language, applications use other entities during 
the building process of CRUD expressions. These entities are a sort of variables whose values 
are set at runtime and are used by applications to exchange data with RDBMS. There are three 
types of variables: attribute list, column list and clause list. 
 
Attribute set 
The attribute set is characteristic only of CRUD expressions of type Select. The attribute set 
represents returned values by Select expressions. Attribute set is commonly known as the 
attribute list. Attribute sets are not optional on CRUD expressions of type Select. Every 
Select expression has one attribute set.  
 
Column set 
The column set is characteristic of CRUD expressions of type Insert and Update. They are 
used to dynamically define runtime values for column lists. Column lists contain the values 
to be inserted or updated on database columns. Columns sets are not mandatory. 
 
Clause set 
The clause set is characteristic of CRUD expressions of type Select, Update and Delete. They 
are used to dynamically set runtime values of clause conditions. Clause sets are not 
mandatory. 
 
Result 
Unlike the Select expression, the remaining three types of CRUD expressions modify the state of 
databases. Delete expressions delete rows, Update expressions update rows and Insert 
expressions insert new rows. After being executed and the database state modified, client 
applications are informed about the number of modified rows. 
 
From these characteristics, a simplified formalization for CRUD expressions is now presented. 
There are two types of CRUD expressions. The type Reading is formalized by the attribute set and 
the clause conditions set. The type Updating is formalized by the column set, the clause condition 
set and the number of affected rows, as follows 
 
  Type = {Reading, Updataing} 
  Reading = {Att, CC} 
  Updating = {Col, CC, Result} 
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 Figure 25 shows three CRUD expressions representing the two types of CRUD expressions and 
representing different combinations of runtime values. The first CRUD expression is of type 
Reading and the correspondent CRUD Schema comprises all attributes of table Categories, one 
runtime value for clause conditions. The second CRUD expression is of type Updating and the 
correspondent CRUD Schema comprises three runtime values for the attribute set. The third CRUD 
expression is of type Updating and the correspondent CRUD Schema comprises one runtime value 
for the attribute set and one runtime value for the where clause condition. The relevancy of CRUD 
Schema concept is not restricted on being a formalization method of CRUD expressions. Another 
relevant aspect derives from the fact that the relationship between CRUD Schemas and CRUD 
expressions is 1 to many. An indeterminate number of CRUD expressions may share the same CRUD 
Schema. Figure 26 shows an example of two CRUD expressions: both are Select expressions, both 
share the same attribute set and both have no values defined at runtime. CRUD expressions sharing 
the same CRUD Schema are herein known as sibling CRUD expressions. 
 
 
Figure 25. Three CRUD expressions with different combinations of CRUD Schemas. 
 
Figure 26. Two sibling CRUD expressions. 
The presented concept of CRUD schema confines the scope of CRUD expressions to sibling 
CRUD expressions only. This restriction is acceptable and adequate when a tight binding between 
services to be provided and CRUD expressions is a requirement. In situations in which this tight 
biding is not a key requirement, the CRUD Schema concept is too restrictive preventing the 
grouping of similar CRUD expressions that are not siblings. To overcome this situation, the concept 
of CRUD Schema is extended to support not one but one or more CRUD Schemas. This approach 
may be used in any situation whenever there is the need to optimize the number of CRUD Schemas. 
Jayapandian and Jagadish [Jayapandian, '08] have concluded that a large number of CRUD 
expressions “can potentially be composed from a given set of related schema elements”. Beyond not 
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being CRUD Schemas, Schema elements [Yu, '06] are neither concerned about access control. 
Anyway, their approach may be used to optimize the number of CRUD Schemas. Returning to the 
main point, depending on the needs and requirements, there are two approaches to formalize 
CRUD Schemas, which are herein known as closed approach and open approach. 
 
3.1.1.1.1 Closed approach 
In the closed approach, CRUD Schemas are only used to formalize sibling CRUD expressions. The 
closed CRUD Schema approach has the advantage of conveying a complete schema awareness of 
each CRUD expression. As a disadvantage, each CRUD Schema is not flexible to accommodate CRUD 
expressions with different CRUD Schemas. If a CRUD expression is formalized through a different 
CRUD Schema a new CRUD Schema is needed. 
 
3.1.1.2 Open approach 
Unlike the closed approach, the open approach is designed for managing several CRUD Schemas. 
CRUD Schemas supported by the same open CRUD Schema are herein known as sibling CRUD 
Schemas. Sibling CRUD Schemas are characterized by sharing their types of CRUD expressions and 
their attributes sets. Only runtime parameters may vary from CRUD Schema to CRUD Schema. This 
means that the variations between CRUD Schemas are limited to the parameters whose values are 
defined at runtime: column set and clause set. The open approach has more flexibility than the 
closed approach, this way leading to advantages during the development process of business tiers 
and also after their deployment (at runtime). Next follows a description for each advantage. 
 
Development 
The flexibility of the open approach increases the opportunity to reuse existent CRUD schemas 
when a new CRUD expression is needed. Therefore, the open approach minimizes the number 
of the needed CRUD schemas to support a set of CRUD expressions. 
 
Runtime 
If the architecture of business tiers supports the deployment of CRUD expressions at runtime, 
then the open approach will minimize the maintenance activities at the business tiers level. 
 
In spite of these significant advantages, the open approach also conveys some drawbacks. Among 
them, two are emphasized: 
 
Awareness 
The flexibility of the open approach is obtained by providing services able to support any 
number and any type of runtime parameters. This flexibility requires programmers to master 
schemas of runtime parameters. This need is not necessary if the closed approach is used 
because the schemas for the runtime parameters are tailored to one CRUD schema only. 
 
Security 
The flexibility of the  open  approach  conveys  more  freedom  to  use  more  CRUD  expressions. 
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Whenever security is considered a key aspect, a greater supervision is needed to know which 
CRUD expressions are being used. 
 
Listing 5 shows four CRUD expressions none of which is sibling. When using the closed 
approach, four CRUD Schemas are required: one for each CRUD expression. When using the open 
approach, two CRUD Schemas are required: one for the two first CRUD expressions and another for 
the two remaining CRUD expressions. 
 
-- CRUD expression 1 
Select *  
     from Categories; 
 
-- CRUD expression 2 
Select * 
     from Categories 
     where CategoryId=?; 
 
-- CRUD expression 3 
Insert into Categories 
     values (?, ?); 
 
-- CRUD expression 4 
Insert into Categories 
     values (?, ?, ?, ?); 
Listing 5. Four examples of CRUD expressions. 
Summarizing, a CRUD Schema comprises five independent parts: 
 a mandatory type schema - the CRUD type (Reading or Updating); 
 the attribute set (only for Select expressions); 
 an optional clause set  (open or closed approach) – for setting the runtime values for the 
conditions used inside SQL clauses, such as the “where” and “having” clauses; 
 an optional column set  (open or closed approach) – for setting the runtime values for 
the column list of Insert and Update CRUD expressions; 
 a mandatory result schema for Insert, Update and Delete CRUD expressions – to retrieve 
the number of affected rows whenever CRUD expressions are executed. 
3.1.2 Business Schema 
Business Schema (BS) leverages the CRUD Schema concept to formalize the set of necessary 
services to be provided to manage the execution of CRUD expressions organized by CRUD Schemas. 
It comprises several services among which are emphasized:  1) access to data through the direct 
and indirect access modes and 2)  services to manage the scrolling process on LMS. These services 
are customized to address specific requirements needs. For example, when dealing with access 
control, Business Schemas are driven by access control and, therefore, have to be arranged in order 
to be in accordance with the established FGACP.  
 When dealing with access control, the Direct Access Mode is concerned with the authorized 
CRUD expressions written in the native SQL language and the Indirect Access Mode is concerned 
about the actions on LMS. Table 3 shows a possible definition for the permissions on an LMS 
derived from the CRUD expression Select a, b, c, d from table. This access matrix [Lampson, '74] like 
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representation defines for each attribute of this LMS, which actions (read, update, insert, delete) are 
authorized. delete action is authorized in a tuple basis and, therefore, it is executed as an atomic 
action on all attributes. In situations where access control is not provided, and when LMS are 
updatable, all actions on LMS are available to be used by programmers of application tiers. This 
example is access control oriented but the concept of Business Schema is not tied with any specific 
purpose. The only purpose of Business Schema is to provide a formalization process to reorganize  
the services provided by CLI to access data residing on LMS. 
 
 a b c d 
Read yes no yes yes 
Update no yes no yes 
Insert yes yes no no 
delete yes 
Table 3. Example of a table of permissions in a LMS (Indirect Access Mode). 
3.1.3 Business Entity 
Business Entities (BE) are software artifacts (classes) responsible for managing the execution of  
 
 
 
Figure 27. Partial example of how to implement the permissions of Table 3 on LMS. 
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CRUD expressions through the implementation of Business Schemas. Therefore, Business Entity is a 
general concept to be used for the building process of software classes. As Business Schemas, 
Business Entities are not oriented to address any specific requirement, such as access control. In 
each  particular  context,  Business  Entities, as  Business  Schemas, are  customized   to address   the 
required needs. Instances of Business Entities are herein referred to as Business Workers (BW). 
Figure 27  partially  presents  an  example  based  on  JDBC to show  a  Business  Entity that wraps  a 
ResultSet (rs - LMS) and enforces the permissions defined in Table 3. Only attributes a, c and d are 
readable (line 20-28). Only attributes b and d are updatable (line 31-36). Only attributes a and b are 
insertable (line 39-44). Rows are deletable (line 48). 
3.2 Modelization of Call Level Interfaces 
In spite of their individual successes, the object-oriented and the relational paradigms are simply 
too different to bridge seamlessly, leading to difficulties informally known as impedance mismatch 
[David, '90]. The diverse foundations of the object-oriented and the relational paradigms are a 
major hindrance for their integration, being an open challenge for more than 45 years [Cook, '05]. 
The challenge derives from the  multiplicity of aspects that need to be bridged across both 
paradigms: imperative languages versus declarative languages; compilation and execution 
performance versus search performance;  classes, algorithms and data structures versus relations 
and indexes; transactions versus threads; null pointers versus null for the absence of value [Cook, 
'05], and finally, inheritance versus specialization. The impedance mismatch thus presents several 
challenges for developers of database applications, where often both paradigms are found. These 
challenges are especially noticeable in environments where production code is under strict 
development deadlines, and where (timely) code development efficiency is a major concern. In 
order to cope with the impedance mismatch issue, several solutions have emerged, among them CLI 
are herein emphasized. In spite of their relevancy, CLI present several drawbacks as previously 
described. The modelization of CLI was the first step to overcome some of the drawbacks and it  
was addressed in the following papers [Pereira, '10a; Pereira, '10b; Pereira, '11b; Pereira, '06; Óscar 
Narciso Mortágua Pereira, '05a; Óscar Narciso Mortágua Pereira, '05b]. 
3.2.1 Motivation 
This section aims to emphasize common drawbacks regarding the utilization of CLI. The 
modelization process is not concerned with access control but mainly with the integration process 
of the relational and the object-oriented paradigms.  In this context, the main drawbacks of CLI are 
organized in four categories [Pereira, '10b; Pereira, '11b]: 
 1- The process for editing CRUD expressions; 
 2- The process for reading data from returned relations; 
 3- The process of updating databases through updatable LMS; 
 4- Protocols of LMS regarding their usability. 
 
One again, JDBC is used as a representative of CLI. Figure 28 presents a simple example, which 
comprises some of the drawbacks related to categories 1), 2) and 3). This example is used in the 
following paragraphs to describe JDBC drawbacks: 
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Linkage 
There is no easy way to link CRUD expressions and their results to the application they assist. 
JDBC provides services to ease the integration of object-oriented applications and relational 
databases but relevant issues are not overcome such as string concatenation (Figure 28: line 
22-24) and the conversion between relational and object-oriented paradigms (Figure 28: lines 
27, 28, 30). 
 
 
Edit 
The editing process of CRUD expressions and access to their results is tricky and error-prone.   
 
CRUD expressions are constructed by concatenating strings and access to their results is 
achieved by reading attribute by attribute in a row by row basis. Some of the most usual errors 
are: 
Concatenation errors 
Whenever CRUD expressions are built from concatenated strings there are several types of 
errors that are easily made. The most common and very often very difficult to detect are 
missing spaces between lines (Figure 28: lines 22, 23) and missing spaces between 
substrings as the missing before “and” (Figure 28: line 23). 
 
Type mismatch 
Programmers need to master CRUD Schemas to be able to use the correct data type when 
accessing attributes of LMS. Any type mismatch error is only detected at runtime leading to 
an increased effort to deploy business tiers error free. 
 
Misspelled attribute name 
Programmers need to master CRUD Schemas to be able to use the correct attribute name 
when accessing attributes of LMS. Any type misspelled name is only detected at runtime 
leading to an increased effort to deploy business tiers error free. 
 
Debug 
Previous errors cannot be checked for correctness at compile time, addressed in [Gary, '07]. 
None of the previous errors can be caught at compile time demanding great accuracy while 
editing the source code to prevent additional time on testing, debugging and future 
maintenance. 
 
Maintenance 
CRUD expressions are awkward regarding their maintenance, addressed in [Andy, '08]. CRUD 
expressions (building process and execution) depend on many different entities grouped in 
three classes: SQL syntax, services of CLI and database schemas. While SQL syntax and services 
of CLI can be considered stable, database schemas are dynamic entities. Database schemas 
change for many reasons. Some of the most common reasons are: 
 An initial error on conceptual model or logical model; 
 The emerging of new requirements, which usually happens several times during the 
development process and even also after the deployment process of database 
applications.  
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Any simple change in a database schema may involve a huge work on updating not only the 
strings that encode the affected CRUD expressions but also the schema of the retuned relations 
and, therefore, the name of attributes that are used in the indirect access mode. 
 
SQL injection attacks 
CRUD expressions are vulnerable to SQL injection attacks, addressed in [Gregory, '05]. This 
issue is not addressed in this thesis. 
 
LMS usability 
LMS have dozens of states, dealing with different combinations of LMS instantiations, 
directions, accesses, updates, etc.  The developer is before a huge task to become aware of how 
to use LMS. LMS comprise several distinct protocols not organized in distinct interfaces, 
conveying the idea that everything is possible in anytime. For example, ResultSet interface is 
composed by more than 200 methods and 10 attributes. Each ResultSet state has its own usage 
protocol gathering a subgroup of all methods of the ResultSet interface. While Read and Delete 
protocols do not comprise a start and an end instruction, Update and Insert protocols always 
have a start instruction (implicitly for Update and explicitly for Insert) and an end instruction. 
Besides the starting and the ending instructions, the main issue for Update and Insert protocols 
is that the cursor cannot be moved from the current selected row while the protocol is being 
executed. If the cursor is moved from the selected row while the protocol is being executed, the 
protocol will be aborted and previous changes are discarded from the in-memory of LMS. In 
order to overcome some of these difficulties we will present an approach where each protocol 
is executed through a dedicated interface this way improving ResultSet usability. 
 
 
 
Figure 28. Typical JDBC/CLI drawbacks. 
Some of the aforementioned drawbacks have already been individually addressed by other 
authors as previously cited. The modelization of CLI proposal in this work constitutes an integrated 
and unified alternative to overcome all the aforementioned drawbacks, except for the SQL injection 
attack.  
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3.2.2 Proposed Approach for the Modelization of CLI 
The modelization process does not cover all functionalities of CLI but only those directly related 
with the execution of CRUD expressions such as those related to the access modes of CLI: the Direct 
Access Mode and the Indirect Access Mode. The modelization process aims at tackling the 
aforementioned drawbacks of CLI. The approach is based on a model and on a tool from which 
Business Entities are automatically built. Figure 29 presents the model to represent CLI, herein 
referred to as the CRUD-Model. This model clearly identifies the main sub-functionalities of CLI and 
aggregates them in independent interfaces: IExecute, ILMS, IResult and ISet. Next follows a 
description for each interface: 
 
IExecute 
IExecute interface comprises services to execute CRUD expressions using the Direct Access 
Mode. Beyond the execution of CRUD expressions, this interface is responsible for setting the 
runtime values of clause conditions for all types of CRUD expressions. 
 
ILMS 
ILMS interface is used to access to functionalities of LMS and it is available only when CRUD 
expressions are of type Reading. One of its main functionality is the management of the Indirect 
Access Mode.  ILMS comprises several interfaces: 
 
IReadability 
IReadability interface comprises one interface, IRead, to read data from LMS. This interface 
is used for read-only and updatable LMS. Methods of IRead are driven by the schema of the 
returned relation and, as such, are semantically oriented and type-safe. 
 
IUpdatability 
IUpdatability interface comprises several interfaces to manage updatable LMS: 
 IDelete: comprises all methods associated with the delete protocol; 
 IInsert: comprises all methods that are needed to control the insert protocol; 
 IUpdate: comprises   all  methods  that  are  needed  to  control  the  update  
protocol; 
 IWrite: comprises all the methods associated with the write protocol. These 
methods are driven by the schema of the returned relation and, as such, are 
semantically oriented and type-safe; 
 IRead: comprises all methods associated with the read protocol. These methods are 
driven by the schema of the returned relation and, as such, are semantically 
oriented and type-safe. 
 
IScrollability 
IScrollability interface comprises two interfaces to manage the two possibilities for scrolling 
policies: 
 IScrollable: comprises all methods associated with scrollable LMS. The methods are 
only present if the LMS is scrollable; 
 IForwardOnly: comprises all methods associated with forward-only LMS. The 
methods are only present if the LMS is forward-only. 
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ISet 
ISet interface is used to set the runtime values for the column set of Insert and Update 
expressions. 
 
IResult 
IResult interface is used to retrieve the number of affected rows when a CRUD expression of 
type Updating is executed. 
 
Figure 30 presents a block diagram for the modelization process of CLI. Basically, the architectural  
CRUD-Model accepts  as  input CRUD  expressions  and  some  additional  metadata  to build 
Business Entities responsible for managing CRUD expressions. This implementation is very similar 
to the one presented in [Pereira, '10b; Pereira, '11b]. From CRUD expressions and from 
complementary metadata (for example, Scrollability policy and the Updatability policy to be used), 
the architectural model is responsible for validating the correctness of CRUD expressions, for 
inferring the CRUD Schemas and also for building automatically the source code for Business 
Entities in accordance with the CRUD-Model. 
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Figure 29. Business Schema for the modelization of CLI: CRUD-Model. 
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Figure 30. Block diagram for the modelization process of CLI. 
 
 
Figure 31. Partial view of a Business Entity based on the CRUD-Model. 
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Next follows an example to show a real case to implement a Business Entity. Figure 31 presents 
a partial view of a Business Entity aimed at managing the CRUD expression 
 
Select * from Products 
 Where categoryId=? and unitsInStock<? 
 
The CRUD expression is compiled-on-the-fly (complementary metadata) and LMS is forward-
only and updatable (complementary metadata). To accomplish these requirements, the presented 
Business Entity implements the following interfaces: IExecute, IScrollability (IForwardOnly) and 
IUpdatability (IRead, IUpdate, IInsert and IDelete). 
 
Now that a Business Entity has been presented, we show, from the application tier point of 
view, the use of that Business Entity (see Figure 32). The drawbacks presented in this section for 
CLI are clearly overcome by CRUD-Model. The following aspects are emphasized: 
 
CRUD expressions 
CRUD expressions are now automatically encoded inside strings after being validated by the 
CRUD-Model (Figure 31: line 19-20). Previous errors associated with CRUD expressions are no 
longer a concern. 
 
Source code 
There is no need to write any source code. From CRUD expressions and from selected metadata, 
source code of Business Entities is automatically built in accordance with the CRUD-Model 
(Figure 31). 
 
 
 
Figure 32. Example shown in Figure 28 but based on the CRUD-Model. 
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LMS usability 
Functionalities of LMS  are now organized  around  interfaces  (Figure 32: lines 25-27)   and   
the   access methods are semantically driven and type safe (Figure 32: line 29-32). From the 
open pop-up window on line 34 we see that interface IUpdate provides two methods: 
updateRow and cancelUpdate. 
 
To achieve these results, there is the need to devise a tool similar to the one used in [Pereira, '10b; 
Pereira, '11b]. With this tool, programmers need only to write CRUD expressions and define some 
additional metadata to overcome all the presented drawbacks of CLI. Then, the tool automatically 
builds Business Entities to manage the execution of CRUD expressions. Each Business  
Entity manages its own CRUD expression. 
3.3 Componentization of CLI 
The componentization process of CLI is mainly concerned with the building process of reusable and 
adaptable business tier components. Componentization of CLI was addressed in the following 
papers [Pereira, '11a; Pereira, '11c; Pereira, '12b; Pereira, '13a; Pereira, '13b; Pereira, '13e]. Good 
programming practices advise the development of database applications relying on a multi-tier 
architecture. The three tier architecture is the most widespread one comprising the application tier, 
the database tier and the middle tier known as the business tier. The business tier may provide a 
clear separation (technological, administrative and organizational) between host databases and 
client applications. Database applications of some complexity may comprise hundreds of CRUD 
expressions to deal with business requirements. Very often they cannot be inferred from any data 
model that may eventually be available (database schema).  This leads to situations where the 
development and maintenance processes of business tiers are very tedious and exhaustive. 
Programmers are pushed to write similar source code for each CRUD expression, mainly for Select 
expressions with a long attribute list. There should exist a methodology to relieve programmers 
from these tedious, exhaustive and error-prone processes. To address these gaps, a research has 
been conducted to devise reusable business tier components based on CLI. 
3.3.1 Components 
Component-based development is a key topic in software engineering [Bachmann, '00; Heineman, 
'01; Szyperky, '02]. Component-based development aims to compose software artifacts from other 
pre-built software artifacts [Heineman, '01]. At the end, a final system is not built as a unique block 
but as a composite of software artifacts known as components [Kung-Kiu, '07]. A key aspect for the 
success of any component is its capability of being reused and adapted [Bracciali, '05]. In reality, 
despite the relevancy of the postulates, reutilization and adaptation of components raise several 
technological difficulties and, maybe not least important, easily gathers voices against their 
adoption. For example, component replacement has some disadvantages conveying an impact on 
the overall system. Some of the disadvantages are [Costa, '07]: 
 
Loss state lost 
When  a   component  is    replaced, its  state  may   be    lost. To  avoid   this   situation,  the   new 
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component must be initialized in the state of the replaced component. 
 
System availability 
During the replacement process, the component or even system availability may be affected. To 
avoid component unavailability, components need to be decoupled from client components, 
eventually by using proxies. 
 
Performance decay 
Performance decay usually occurs during the replacement process. Components being replaced  
need to be deactivated and substituent components need to be activated and initialized.  
Performance decay seems to be an unavoidable consequence of the replacement process. An 
effort is necessary to minimize the negative interference of the replacement process of 
components. 
 
In order to avoid component and system unavailability, several approaches may be followed to 
dynamically adapt them at run-time, which is one of the crucial aspects of Component Based 
Software Engineering (CBSE) [Bracciali, '05]. The adaptation of components should comprise not 
only the configuration process but mainly the replacement of old services and also the definition of 
new services in a seamlessly way. Another key issue is the reuse of computation [Elizondo, '10], 
which maximizes the reuse of computation to address different computational needs. Among the 
several proposed approaches, models@run.time [Blair, '09] is emphasized. Models@run.time are 
playing an increased role in software systems of organizations from which critical decisions are 
taken, such as airports, power plants and hospitals. These systems have to be available 24 hours a 
day and 7 days a week and are expected to safely adapt to varying runtime contexts. Software 
models@run.time give the answer to this requirement. In [Blair, '09] says: “Runtime adaptation 
mechanisms that leverages software models extend the applicability of model-driven engineering 
techniques to the runtime environment.”. In Model Driven Engineering models are used to formalize 
and render complex systems in a manageable way for humans and for computers. Software 
models@run.time keep these important features and step forward by incorporating the 
specification of the systems they formalize, Bran Selic in [Blair, '09]. Through the specification and 
through the runtime context software models@run.time support dynamic adaptation. Software 
models@run.time may be seen as an important contribution to the field of autonomic computing 
[Kephart, '03]. 
3.3.2 Adaptation Process 
The adopted adaptation process uses the same model as the one presented for the modelization 
process, CRUD-Model, but with a slight difference. Now CRUD expressions are not statically 
compiled on Business Entities but are dynamically deployed and passed to them through their 
constructors. This will be explained during the next paragraphs. Thus, the similarity between the 
two class diagrams eliminates the need to present a new class diagram. Another difference exists in 
the process used to automatically build source code for Business Entities. While in the modelization 
process, the source code for each Business Entity was built from one CRUD expression and from 
some additional metadata, in the componentization process, the source code for Business Entities is 
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automatically built from metadata only. CRUD expressions are dynamically deployed in a later 
stage, at runtime. 
The differences between the two processes have been described, and now the focus is on the 
componentization process of CLI. The adaptation process of business tier components is basically 
focused on the capability to support new CRUD expressions. To achieve this goal there are basically 
three dimensions to be addressed, which are herein referred to as the Service Allocation, Service 
Composition and Service Scope. Service Allocation is mainly concerned with deploying CRUD 
expressions at runtime to address new business needs. Service Composition is mainly concerned 
about creating Business Entities to address new business needs. Service Scope is mainly concerned 
about the extent of the services to be provided by each Business Entity.  
3.3.2.1 Service Allocation 
Service Allocation proposes the deployment process of CRUD expressions to be accomplished at 
runtime. Unlike the approach used for the modelization process, where CRUD expressions are 
statically allocated to Business Entities at compile time, the Service Allocation allows the 
deployment process of CRUD expressions to be accomplished at runtime this way introducing a 
new dimension in the adaptation process: Service Allocation promotes the deployment of CRUD 
expressions based on policies. Policies may be used to deploy CRUD expressions driven by 
countless possibilities such as users profiles, driven by security policies and driven by the runtime 
context.  
3.3.2.2 Service Composition 
Service Composition is mainly concerned on the building process of Business Entities. Services of 
Business Entities are formalized by Business Schemas, which are mainly based on the CRUD-Model 
presented for the modelization process. Service Composition may be accomplished following two 
different approaches: static approach [Pereira, '11a; Pereira, '11c; Pereira, '13a; Pereira, '13e] and 
the dynamic approach [Pereira, '12b]. 
 
Static Service Composition 
When using the Static Service Composition, Business Entities are statically built before the 
deployment process of business tier components. Business tier components built from the 
Static Service Composition address a business area, such as accountability or sales. Then, at 
runtime, CRUD expressions are deployed following any established policy. Figure 33 presents a 
block    diagram   for   the   Static   Service   Composition. In a) business   tier  components   are 
statically built from Business Schemas and in accordance with an architectural model based on 
the CRUD-Model. In b), after being deployed, the component accepts CRUD expressions in 
accordance with any established policy. To be effective, components relying on the Static 
Service Composition must provide a variety of Business Entities able to manage all the needed 
CRUD expressions in order to minimize or even prevent future maintenance activities. 
 
Dynamic Service Composition 
When using the Dynamic Service Composition, Business Entities are dynamically built at 
runtime to address any runtime business needs. Similarly to the Static Service Composition, 
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CRUD expressions are also deployed at runtime following any established policy. Figure 34 
presents a block diagram for the Dynamic Service Composition. Business Engine is the entity 
responsible for building Business Entities dynamically at runtime from Business Schemas 
deployed by a Monitoring Framework or any other entity skilled to achieve the same result. 
 
 
 
a)
Running Platform
Monitoring 
Framework
CRUD
Expressions
Running database application
Reusable Component
b)
CRUD expressions are
deployed at runtime
+ArchitecturalModel
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Business
Schema
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Figure 33. Block diagram for the static approach: a) service composition and b) service allocation. 
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Figure 34. Block diagram for the dynamic service composition. 
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3.3.2.3 Service Scope 
Service scope concept is based on the CRUD Schema concept to promote two different approaches 
for the scope of Business Schemas: Unique Business Schema (based on the open approach of CRUD 
Schemas) and Multiple Business Schemas (based on the closed approach of CRUD Schemas). The 
Unique Business Schema [Pereira, '11c; Pereira, '13e] is used whenever there is the need to 
minimize the number of CRUD Schemas and the Multiple Business Schema [Pereira, '11a; Pereira, 
'13a] is used when there is the need to keep CRUD Schemas closely aligned with CRUD expressions. 
 
Unique Business Schema 
Business tier components based on the Unique Business Schema approach provide a unique 
and fixed set of Business Entities responsible for managing all the necessary CRUD expressions 
The Unique Business Schema approach is specially effective when CRUD Schemas are only 
known at runtime and the Dynamic Service Composition is not recommended. To address these 
constraints, the Static Service Composition process needs to build three unique Business 
Entities each one wide enough, based on the open CRUD Schema approach, to support any 
foreseen CRUD expression. The three Business Entities to be made available are one for all 
Select expressions, one for all Update and Insert expressions and, finally, one for all Delete 
expressions. 
 
Select expressions 
Each business tier component has its own Business Entity for managing all Select 
expressions. The Business Entity is built to address one or more business areas, such as 
accountability or sales. IRead and IWrite must comprise all the needed attributes to support 
the addressed business area. Thus, the attributes are not proprietary of any Select 
expression but in reality they are shared by all CRUD expressions. Each CRUD expression 
makes use of the attributes formalized by its CRUD schema. Figure 35 schematically shows 
a set of CRUD expressions, each one requesting a subset of the attributes that are made 
available through the IRead and IWrite interfaces. Additionally, to support any number and 
any type of runtime parameters, the open approach is used for the CRUD schema. Thus, the 
method to set the runtime values for clause conditions (IExecute interface) must have as 
argument object[] of type Object to support values of any data type and in any quantity. 
 
Insert and Update expressions 
Unlike the previous Business Entity, the Business Entity responsible for managing all insert 
and update expressions is shared by all business tier components. The CRUD Schema 
follows the open approach and is characterized by two main methods. One method to set 
the runtime values for clause sets (IExecute interface) having as argument object[] of type 
Object to support values of any data type and in any quantity. And another method to set the 
runtime values for column sets of Insert and Update expressions (ISet interface) having 
object[] as argument to support values of any data type and in any quantity.  
 
Delete expressions 
Similarly to the previous Business Entity, the Business Entity responsible for managing all 
delete expressions is shared by all business tier components. The CRUD Schema follows the 
open approach and is characterized by one main method. To set the runtime values for 
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clause conditions (IExecute interface). Similarly to the previous methods, it also has object[] 
of type Object as argument to support values of any data type and in any quantity. 
 
 
IRead/IWrite
attrib 1
attrib 2
attrib 3
attrib 5
attrib 4
attrib (n-2)
attrib (n-1)
attrib n
CRUD
A
CRUD
B
CRUD
?
 
Figure 35. Attributes shared by all CRUD expressions. 
Multiple Business Schemas 
The Multiple Business Schema approach is specially effective when CRUD Schemas are known 
at development time for the Static Service Composition, or at runtime for the Dynamic Service 
Composition. There will be as many Business Schemas as necessary. Each Business Schema 
generates one Business Entity able to manage any CRUD expression whose schema is contained 
by the implemented Business Schema.  Figure 36 shows an example similar to the one shown in 
Figure 35 but following the multiple business schema. Here there are several CRUD Schemas for 
Select expressions  where  each CRUD Schema  owns its particular  Business Entity. Some  CRUD 
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Figure 36. Example of one Multiple Business Schema implementation. 
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Schemas may share some attributes, as CRUD Schema A does with CRUD Schema B, but each one 
has its own IRead and IWrite interfaces. The Multiple Business Schema approach may also be used 
to differentiate other properties of CRUD Schemas, such as runtime values for clause conditions and 
runtime values for column lists avoiding this way the need to use Object[] as argument. 
3.3.2.4 Business Schema 
Business Entities are built from Business Schemas only. As such, Business Schemas need some 
additional attention for the componentization process of CLI. Business Schemas comprise several 
interfaces as shown in Figure 29. In spite of their complexity, Business Schemas are very easy to be 
defined because most of the interfaces are written only once or comprise one method only. For 
example, IScroll, IForwardOnly, IResult, IInsert, IUpdate and IDelete are unique and shared by all 
Business Schemas. Regarding IExecute and ISet, each one contains one method only. The only 
interfaces entailing some complexity are IRead and IWrite. The effort for their definition is required 
during the Service Composition phase. These interfaces comprise the getter and setter methods for 
the attributes of LMS. But the effort is actually significantly less than it might seemed, because the 
methods belonging to each IWrite interface are automatically inferred by the Business Engine from 
the correspondent IRead interface. For example, if an IRead interface comprises methods Integer 
a() and String b() then the correspondent IWrite interface comprises the methods void a(Integer 
value) and void b(String value). Thus, Business Engine relives programmers from the need to write 
the IWrite interface. 
3.4 Access Control 
Modelization and componentization overcome important drawbacks of CLI. Nevertheless, they are 
not enough to address access control let alone the implementation of evolving FGACM. FGACM need 
a fine tune control on the access to data residing on RDBMS. CLI provide two distinct modes to 
access data: the Direct Access Mode and the Indirect Access Mode. Both access modes need to be 
governed by FGACM. Access control on the Direct Access Mode is about controlling the authorized 
CRUD expressions. Access control on the Indirect Access Mode is about controlling the authorized 
actions at the cell level (row – column) of LMS. Access control was mainly addressed in [Pereira, 
'12d; Pereira, '12c; Pereira, '13d]. Basically, the access modes of CLI were wrapped by services 
driven by FGACM. These issues are thoroughly described in the next chapter. 
3.5 Summary 
The evolution from CLI concept till the DACA was presented in a three step approach. Initially, the 
fundamental concepts were introduced: CRUD Schema, Business Schema and Business Entity. 
These concepts are used since the very start till the final definition of the DACA. They define the 
basic entities from which drawbacks of CLI are overcome. Regarding the three step approach 
towards the DACA, during the first step, a model has been defined to bridge the gap between the 
object-oriented and the relational paradigm. During the second step, an architecture has been 
defined for the building process of reusable business tier components. These components are built 
combining three concepts: Service Allocation, Service Composition and Service Scope. These 
concepts, when combined with each other, open several possibilities for the development and 
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adaptation processes of business tier components. Another relevant aspect is that IRead and IWrite 
interfaces are the only interfaces requiring some effort during the Service Composition phase. They 
comprise the getter and setter methods for the attributes of LMS. But the effort is actually 
minimized because the methods belonging to each IWrite interface are automatically inferred by 
the Business Engine from the correspondent IRead interface. A brief introduction was done to the 
access control approach on CLI. Now, the DACA will be main topic of the next chapter. 
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4 DACA: Dynamic Access Control Architecture 
In this chapter a new architecture, herein known as the DACA, is proposed for building business 
tiers, based on Call Level Interface, embedded with FGACM and driven by dynamic adaptation. The 
DACA is only focused on FGACM and it does not address policies or even models. The DACA is an 
architecture for the implementation of dynamic FGACM, which is completely decoupled from 
policies and models. We first introduce an overview of the approach to be followed to implement 
FGACM, then follows the general architecture and finally details are given for each main component 
of the DACA. The DACA leverages all previous researches conducted around CLI, models and 
components, to provide a solution relying on CLI to enforce evolving FGACM on business tier 
components. The DACA also leverages and deeply relies on other previous researches [Pereira, 
'12d; Pereira, '12c; Pereira, '13d]. 
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.1 introduces the approach followed to 
implement FGACM at the level of business tiers. Section 4.2 presents the general architecture of the 
DACA. Section 4.3 presents the main components of the DACA and, finally, section 4.4 summarizes 
this chapter. 
4.1 Fine-grained Access Control Mechanisms 
The DACA relies on CLI and, as such, FGACM are implemented at the level of CLI on business tier 
components. Hence, the implementation of FGACM on business tier components based on CLI 
cannot be disconnected from the services provided by CLI to access data residing in RDBMS. As 
previously presented and described, CLI provide several modes to interact with data residing on 
RDBMS. Among them, two were emphasized and hereafter recalled: 
 
 Direct Access Mode – through this mode, CLI provide services to allow CRUD expressions to 
be encoded inside strings using the native SQL language or eventually the RDBMS SQL 
language; 
 Indirect Access Mode – through this mode, CLI provide services to allow the execution of 
any of the provided protocols at the level of LMS of CLI: read, update, insert and delete 
protocol. 
 
These two access modes are the key points from which FGACM are defined and implemented. 
FGACM use Business Schemas as the key entities to control the access to data. Business Schemas 
wrap and exploit the access modes of CLI to expose a set of access modes driven by FGACM. 
Therefore, the concept of Business Schema is redefined to address requirements of FGACM. 
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4.2 General Architecture 
FGACM in the DACA are implemented at the client-side level and specifically at the level of business 
tiers based on CLI. The implementation process of FGACM need to cope with one main research 
question and three second level research questions previously announced: dynamicity of FGACM, 
security, awareness of FGACM and preservation of CLI advantages. 
 
Dynamicity 
FGACM need to be dynamically  adapted at runtime to  address evolving FGACP. This requires  
that the client-side systems have the ability to be locally adapted in accordance with the 
established FGACP. Moreover, as the FGACM are deployed in each client-system, there is no 
other way but provide a central system from which the directive for the FGACM to be 
implemented on the client-side systems are issued. 
 
Security 
Current tools allow users to write any CRUD expression. Due to the endless expressiveness of 
the SQL language this freedom may lead to security violations. Thus, the DACA needs to ensure 
that all issued CRUD expressions are in accordance with the established FGACP. 
 
Awareness 
FGACM need to be implemented in a way to convey a complete awareness about the established 
FGACM during the development process of application tiers. This awareness relives 
programmers from mastering the established FGACP and the correspondent FGACM. 
 
Preservation of CLI advantages 
To keep CLI advantages, the DACA needs to ensure two aspects. The first one is that the services 
of CLI must be kept and provided by the DACA. The second one is that performance of CLI must 
also be kept. To cope with these requirements services of the DACA need to be closely aligned 
with the services of CLI and, additionally, they must induce a minimum processing overhead. 
 
These requirements will be all addressed in this chapter. 
4.2.1 Phases of the DACA 
The DACA needs to cope with several requirements, among which the awareness of FGACM at 
development time of application tiers and the dynamic implementation of FGACM at runtime are 
emphasized. To address these requirements, the DACA operation is split at least in two phases: one 
responsible for the static representation of FGACM and the other one for the dynamic adaptation 
process of FGACM. The first phase takes place while application tiers are being developed, while the 
second phase takes places at runtime. From these two phases a third phase is inferred, which is 
concurrent and independent from the other two, during which metadata of FGACM are defined and 
updated. 
The general architecture of the DACA is presented as a block diagram in Figure 37. Lines 
connecting components with small circles on their edges represent socket connections and the 
ending arrows identify the components playing the server role. The general architecture may be 
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organized and presented using several distinct perspectives. The perspective presented in Figure 
37 is based on the three main phases just presented: 
 
Configuration phase 
The configuration phase of the DACA is responsible for keeping metadata of FGACM updated in 
accordance with the established FGACP. The metadata of FGACM are the source from which 
FGACM are automatically built and kept updated. 
 
Extraction phase 
During the  extraction phase, the DACA creates  data  structures, which are  used to  convey  to  
programmers of application tiers a complete awareness of the established FGACM. These data 
structures need to be statically represented while programmers write source code to access 
data residing on RDBMS to prevent them from writing source code not aligned with the 
established FGACM. 
 
Running phase 
During the running phase, metadata of FGACM is used to build the correspondent FGACM 
dynamically. Any modification in the metadata leads to an automatic updating process on the 
implemented FGACM. Moreover, CRUD expressions are also deployed at runtime in accordance 
with the established FGACP. This deployment process is important because it will be used to 
relieve programmers from writing CRUD expressions and, therefore, prevent any security 
violation. 
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Figure 37. General architecture of the DACA. 
4.2.1.1 Configuration Phase 
The configuration phase is focused on the configuration and maintenance processes of 
metadata of FGACM, which are stored in a server, in our case in a RDBMS. This RDBMS may or may 
not be the same where the protected data reside. The configuration process may occur at any time 
even when database applications are running, after their deployment. The only constraint is that 
the definition of FGACM needed during the development and maintenance phases of application 
tiers, have to be defined before they are requested and therefore, before the occurrence of the 
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Extraction Phase. Then, during the Runtime Phase metadata of FGACM may evolve to address new 
security needs.  
The configuration process is carried out by using a component  herein referred to as the  Policy 
Configurator. Policy Configurator is used to define and keep metadata of FGACM updated, at any 
time, independently from the other two phases. The metadata is stored in the Policy Server and  has 
its origin on the used policy model (not addressed by this thesis) and on the granted permissions 
organized as Business Schemas and the associated CRUD expressions. Figure 38 represents the 
permission concept in the DACA. Permission is the authorization to use a Business Schema and a set 
of CRUD expressions to be managed by that Business Schema.  
 
Set of
CRUD expressions
Metada
(Business Schema)
 
Figure 38. Concept of permission in the DACA. 
4.2.1.2 Extraction Phase 
The extraction phase is focused on formalizing FGACM as programming data structures so that they 
can be statically represented by IDE and then used during the development process of application 
tiers. These data structures restrict application tier programmers to only use authorized accesses 
to RDBMS. This way, programmers become aware of FGACM at development time of application 
tiers and not at compilation time or at runtime. Basically, the data structures comprise roles (if a 
RBAC policy is used) and the associated permissions. To successfully accomplish this phase, 
metadata of FGACM need to be previously defined in the configuration phase. 
The extraction phase is carried out by using a component herein referred to as the Policy 
Extractor. Policy Extractor is used only during the development process and also on the 
maintenance process of application tiers. 
4.2.1.3 Running Phase 
The running phase is focused on adapting the client-side FGACM in accordance with the established 
FGACP. Any modification in the FGACP during the running phase needs to be translated into 
metadata of FGACM to be then automatically enforced in the client-side components.  
During the running phase, database applications are running. There are two main blocks: a 
client side block and a server side block, see Figure 37. 
 
Client side block 
The client side block comprises a unique component herein known as the Dynamic Access 
Control Component (DACC). The DACC is responsible for providing application tiers with all the 
services they need to access data residing in RDBMS and based on the two following principles: 
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1) the provided services to access to data are driven by FGACM and 2) the provided services are 
closely aligned with the standard services of CLI. 
 
Server side block 
The server side block comprises two main components, herein known as the Policy Manager 
and the Policy Server. The server side block is mainly focused on managing the metadata of 
FGACM and also on making them available to the client side block. 
4.2.2 General Operation of the DACA 
The DACA comprises three main components: the DACC, the Policy Server and the Policy Manager, 
see Figure 37. The DACC is responsible for the adaptation process of business tiers to implement 
FGACM, the Policy Manager is a broker between the Policy Server and the DACC and th Policy 
Server stores metadata of FGACM and keeps the Policy Manager informed (through the Policy 
Watcher) about any modification in the metadata of FGACM. The DACA general operation is as 
follows: 
 The Policy Server and the Policy Watcher are started. The Policy Server and the Policy 
Watcher play server roles and are responsible for managing metadata of the FGACM to be 
enforced. 
 The Policy Manager is started. It establishes a connection with the Policy Server (Figure 37: 
3) and registers itself in the Policy Server. This way, the Policy Server becomes aware of all 
running instances of Policy Managers. This is important because in case the Policy Server 
goes down and after restarting up, there is the need to know the running instances of Policy 
Managers and how to connect to them (see two next points). 
 The Policy Manager closes the connection and waits for a connection to be established by 
the Policy Watcher. 
 The Policy Watcher establishes a connection with the Policy Manager (Figure 37: 9). 
 Application tiers create instances of the DACC (Figure 37: 1) and authentication is provided: 
username, password and application identification. 
 The DACC establishes a connection with the Policy Manager (Figure 37: 2) to become 
registered and closes the connection. 
 The DACC waits for a connection from Policy Manager. 
 The Policy Manager registers the DACC in the Policy Server (Figure 37: 3). 
 The Policy Manager establishes a connection with the Business Manager (Figure 37: 4). 
 The Policy Manager identifies and selects the metadata of FGACM (Figure 37-3) to be 
implemented by the DACC and send them to the DACC (Figure 37: 4). 
 The DACC automatically builds a Business Logic (Figure 37: 5). 
 Application tiers ask the DACC to manage the execution of CRUD expressions on their behalf 
(Figure 37: 6). 
 The Business Manager contacts the Business Logic (Figure 37: 7) to manage application 
tiers requests. The Business Logic sends CRUD expressions to a RDBMS (Figure 37: 8), 
which may be shared or not with the Policy Server, and returns to application tiers the 
results of their execution (Figure 37: 7,6). 
 Any modification in the established metadata of FGACM is internally managed by the Policy 
Server. The Policy Watcher sends them to the Policy Manager (Figure 37: 9) which then 
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sends them to the Business Manager (Figure 37: 5) which, finally, adapts the Business Logic 
to new FGACM (Figure 37: 5). 
4.3 The DACA Components 
In this section a more detailed explanation is given for each constituent component of the DACA. 
4.3.1 The DACC 
To keep advantages of CLI, the DACC relies on and is closely aligned with CLI. It is responsible for 
building and maintaining business tiers driven by evolving FGACP. In reality, the DACC are 
realizations of business tiers and are the only components of the DACA that application tiers use to 
access data residing in RDBMS. As such, the DACC architecture was designed to address two main  
requirements: 
 The DACC provide an environment to developers of application tiers as similar as possible 
to those provided by CLI; 
 The DACC are dynamically and continuously adapted at runtime to be kept aligned with 
evolving FGACP.  
 
These requirements led to an architecture of the DACC based on two entities loosely coupled: 
the Business Manager and the Business Logic. While Business Manager ensures the implementation 
of all services shared by all DACC (it is a static component as all the remaining components of 
DACA, except Business Logic), the Business Logic is dynamically, at runtime, adapted to build 
business tiers driven by FGACP. Basically, the Business Logic comprises a set of Business Entities 
built at runtime and on a set of authorized CRUD expressions to be used on Business Entities. 
Figure 39 presents a simplified block diagram of the DACC. The main characteristics to be 
emphasized are: 
 
DACC
Business Logic
...
Business Manager
BusinessSchema_n
BusinessEntity_n
CRUD 34
CRUD 7
BusinessEntity_2
CRUD 1
CRUD 9
CRUD 29
CRUD 54
BusinessEntity_1
CRUD 12
CRUD 7
CRUD 23
BusinessSchema_2BusinessSchema_1
 
Figure 39. Simplified block diagram of DACC. 
Access to services 
The   DACC  provides  an   interface  through  which   applications  tiers  access   its  services. The 
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Business Manager
-Manager()
+getInstance(in un : string, in pw : string, in urlDB : string, in urlPolicyManager : string, in rebuiltBL : bool) : IManager
Manager
BusinessEngine
+businessEntity(in bs : T, in crudId : int) : T
+releaseBusinessSession()
«interface»
ISession
+getBusinessSession() : ISession
«interface»
IUser
ITransaction
+Session(in un : string, in pwd : string, in url : string)
-conn : DbConn
Session
1
*
«interface»
IManager
+addCRUD(in crudId : int, in crud : string, in bs : IBusinessSchema_i)
+removeCRUD(in crudId : int, in bs : IBusinessSchema_i)
+addBusinessSchema(in bs : IBusinessSchema_i)
+removeBusinessSchema(in bs : IBusinessSchema_i)
«interface»
IAdaptation
Business Logic
#BusinessEntity_1(in conn : DbConn, in crud : string)
BusinessEntity_1
IBusinessSchema_1
#BusinessEntity_n(in conn : DbConn, in crud : string)
BusinessEntity_n
IBusinessSchema_n
...
CRUD expressions
1
*
1
*
 
Figure 40. Class diagram of DACC. 
services include the ones related to the access modes and also the ones related to 
complementary services such as instantiation of Business Entities. 
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Access to Business Logic 
Business Logic is not directly accessed from the DACC outside. The access to entities contained 
in the Business Logic, such as Business Entities, is managed by an entity herein known as 
Manager. 
 
Business Logic 
The Business Logic is a container where Business Entities and CRUD expressions are kept and 
maintained in the client-side of the DACA. Business Entities and CRUD expressions are 
dynamically inserted and removed from Business Logic in accordance with the established 
permissions and, therefore, in accordance with the FGACP. In association with each Business 
Entity there is a set of CRUD expressions that are made available to be executed using the Direct 
Access Mode of CLI. 
 
Figure 40 presents the class diagram of the DACC. The Business Manager is the top component 
and the Business Logic is the bottom component. These components, as we will show, are loosely 
coupled to allow a seamless dynamic adaption process of Business Logic at runtime without raising 
any runtime exception. Hereafter, each component is described. 
4.3.1.1 Business Manager 
The Business Manager, see Figure 40, is a component responsible for providing several services 
organized in two main types of functionalities: 
 a functionality to implement the adaptation process of Business Logic to implement the 
FGACM; 
 a functionality to allow application tiers to order the execution of CRUD expressions on 
their behalf. 
 
 Next follows a thoroughly description for each entity of the Business Manager. 
 
Manager 
From application tiers perspective, the Manager is the entry point of the DACC. The DACC is 
instantiated through the getInstance method. This method has as arguments the user 
authentication, the url to the host RDBMS (Figure 37: 8), the url to the Policy Manager (Figure 
37: 2) and a condition to evaluate if Business Logic is to be rebuilt. This last argument is 
important mainly during the development process of application tiers to avoid unnecessary 
rebuilding processes of the Business Logic. After the initiation of the instantiation process, the 
sequence to be followed is the one described in4.2.2. Manager implements IManager interface, 
which implements the IAdapation and the IUser interfaces 
 
IAdaptation 
The IAdaptation interface provides services for the adaptation process of DACC or, in other 
words, the interface provides services to keep Business Logic aligned with the established 
metadata of FGACM. This interface is implemented as a socket (Figure 37: 4) to allow the 
adaptation process to be carried out by system processes running in different space memories 
even in other computers as shown in Figure 37. addCrud and removeCRUD are used to grant and 
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deny permissions to execute CRUD expressions on Business Entities. addBusinessSchema and 
removeBusinessSchema  are used to build and remove typed objects (Business Entities 
implementing Business Schemas) responsible for enabling the execution of CRUD expressions 
on Business Schemas. 
 
IUser 
The IUser interface provides a single method, getBusinessSession, to create a new session. A 
session is mainly characterized by owning a private database connection represented by the 
Connection interface described in 2.3.3. Then, through sessions, Business Entities may be 
instantiated and CRUD expressions are executed. 
 
ISession 
The ISession interface provides two methods – businessEntity and releaseBusinessSession.  
 
businessEntity 
The businessEntity is a generic method used to create new instances of any Business Entity. 
It is defined as a generic method to promote two important aspects: first, with the 
implemented approach, only one method is needed to instantiate any Business Entity; 
second, the instantiation process is type-safe. These two aspects are important because 
Business Entities are not defined at compile time.  businessEntity accepts a Business 
Schema and a CRUD expression identification as arguments and returns an instance of a 
Business Entity that implements the Business Schema provided as argument. Basically,  the 
businessEntity operation follows the sequence next described: 
 Business Logic is searched to find if there is a Business Entity implementing the 
requested Business Schema; 
 If it there is not, an exception is raised. It means that the user is not authorized to 
use the requested Business Schema; 
 Otherwise; 
o It is checked if the user has permission to use the requested CRUD expression on 
that Business Entity; 
o If it has no permission, an exception is raised; 
o Otherwise: 
 The Business Entity (class) is loaded into memory; 
 Through reflection, an instance of Business Entity is created; 
 An instance is returned to the application tier. 
 
This strategy clearly implements a loosely coupled dependency between Business Manager 
and Business Logic which is an essential issue to allow the dynamic adaptation of Business 
Logic. This approach was used for the first time in [Pereira, '12b] and then reused in 
[Pereira, '13b; Pereira, '13d].  Beyond the dynamic adaptation, this loosely coupled 
dependency also allows the development process of application tiers to be independent 
from the implementation of Business Entities. All programmers need are the data structures 
built from the metadata of FGACM extracted during the Extraction phase. 
 
releaseBusinessSession 
The second method, releaseBusinessSession, is used to release a session being used. There  is 
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no guide to what to do with the connection object. Anyway, the establishment of 
connections with RDBMS is widely known as being non-negligent regarding the time 
consuming and the CPU consuming. As such, it is recommended to use a pool of connections 
to avoid the overhead induced by the waste of resources when connections are activated 
and deactivated. In case of not being possible to develop a manager for the pool of 
connections, there are some API providing this type of service, such as [Oracle, '12d; 
Waldman, '12]. 
 
ITransaction  
ITransaction interface provides all the required services to manage database transactions. The 
interface is defined at the Session level because transactions are managed at the connection 
level. This means that each connection, at any time, may only have one active transaction. 
 
BusinessEngine  
The Business Engine is another key component in the DACC. The Business Engine is responsible 
for managing the contents of Business Logic: Business Entities and CRUD expressions. For 
example, regarding the Business Entities, Business Engine automatically creates the source 
code for them from Business Schemas, compiles the source code and stores them inside the 
Business Logic. The Business Engine is the entity responsible for keeping Business Logic 
updated and in accordance with the established metadata for the FGACM 
4.3.1.2 Business Logic 
The Business Logic is mainly composed by two types of entities: CRUD expressions to be made 
available to application tiers and Business Entities to be made available to application tiers to 
manage the execution of CRUD expressions on their behalf. CRUD expressions and Business Entities 
are dynamically inserted and removed from the Business Logic at runtime to address evolving 
FGACP. The dynamic adaptation and the implementation of FGACM are two fundamental 
dimensions of the DACA each one appealing to different needs. While CRUD expressions are 
basically Strings, Business Entities are classes and, therefore, are more complex entities. Next 
follows a more detailed description of the Business Logic implementation. 
 
4.3.1.2.1 General Approach for the Business Logic 
In chapter 2 a description is given for CLI and also for the functionalities of JDBC. JDBC class 
diagrams are presented in Figure 18, Figure 19, Figure 20, Figure 21 and Figure 22. Architecture of 
JDBC, and CLI in general, clearly does not promote the development of business tiers driven by 
dynamic FGACP. Next follows a detailed explanation for the approach that has been used on the 
Business Logic sub-component to implement dynamic FGACM 
 
Dynamic Adaptation 
When the focus is the implementation of FGACM, dynamic adaptation is about the continuous 
updating process of FGACM in accordance with the established metadata of FGACM for each 
user. This means that the Business Logic is dynamically built from scratch and thereafter 
continuously updated in accordance with the defined FGACM for each user. One of the 
possibilities to address this requirement is the use of complementary components addressing 
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models@run.time. Components based on models@run.time have the ability to be continuously 
adapted at runtime to address evolving needs.  
 
Access modes of CLI 
CLI ar  not  tailored  to  address  any  kind  of  access  control. They  have a fixed  set  of  services  
allowing programmers to freely access data in RDBMS. To tackle this gap, the only possibility to 
implement FGACM on CLI is by wrapping and adapting the two access modes of CLI in 
accordance with the FGACP. 
 
Thus, the dynamic adaptation of the access modes provided by CLI is the key aspect to be 
addressed to promote the implementation of dynamic FGACM. 
 
4.3.1.2.2 Architecture 
Architecture of the Business Logic is now described. It is represented by a model and it and some 
services are configurable to address FGACM. Figure 41 shows the class diagram for Business 
Entities driven by FGACM and Figure 42 shows the class diagram for LMS also driven by FGACM. 
These diagrams are clearly derived from the CRUD-Model previously presented. Some adaptations 
were enforced to allow the implementation of FGACM. 
 
BusinessEntity 
Business Entity is the fundamental software artifact of the Business Logic. Business Entities are 
programming classes responsible for the execution of CRUD expressions. They are formalized 
through a model represented in Figure 41 and are the entities dynamically built at runtime to 
implement FGACM. A Business Entity accepts at instantiation time a connection to the host 
database (DbConn) and the CRUD expression to be executed. Each Business Entity implements 
one Business Schema. Business Schemas are represented by programming interfaces and are 
herein referred to as IBusinessSchema interface. 
 
IBusinessSchema 
IBusinessSchema characterizes the services to be provided by Business Entities. There are 
three facets:  
 one for Select expressions: comprises IExecute and ILMS interfaces; 
 one for Insert and Update expressions: comprises IExecute, ISet (optional) and IResult 
interfaces; 
 one for Delete expressions: comprises IExecute and IResult interfaces. 
 
IExecute 
IExecute has two facets: 
 one for the closed CRUD Schema approach (only one execute method is implemented 
except the last one) 
 another for the open CRUD Schema approach (any number of overloaded execute 
methods).  
 
The execute methods are responsible for the execution of CRUD expressions and therefore to 
control the use of the Direct Access Mode of CLI. The arguments are used for setting the runtime 
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values for clause conditions of all types of CRUD expressions. The last method cannot be used in 
the closed CRUD Schema approach because it behaves as an unbounded overloaded method. A 
method with the signature execute(in params[]: object) allows the caller to pass any number of 
parameters and of any data type, this way being in disagreement with the closed CRUD Schema 
concept. 
 
IResult 
The IResult interface provides a method for retrieving the number of affected rows as a direct 
consequence of an Insert, Update or Delete expression execution through the Direct Access 
Mode. 
 
 
ILMS
IResult
+execute()
+...()
+execute(in param_1,...,param_n)
+execute(in params[] : object)
«interface»
IExecute
closed approach: only one method except the last one.
open approach: any number of overloaded methods.
#BusinessEntity(in conn : DbConn, in crud : string)
BusinessEntity
Only if Select
Only if not Select
«interface»
IBusinessSchema
+set()
+...()
+set(in param_1,...,param_n)
+set(in params[] : object)
«interface»
ISet
Only if Insert
or Update
 
Figure 41. Business Entity class diagram. 
«interface»
ILMS
IDelete
IUpdate
IInsert
IRead
IForwardOnly
Only if LMS is readable and
only readable attributes
Only if  LMS
is deletable
Only if LMS is updatable and
only updatable attributes
Only if LMS is insertable and
only insertable attributes
Only if LMS is
forward-only
IScrollable
Only if LMS
is scrollable
 
Figure 42. ILMS class diagram for LMS. 
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ISet 
ISet has two facets: 
 one for the closed approach (only one set method is implemented except the last one); 
 one for the open approach (any number of overloaded set methods). 
The set methods are used to set the runtime time values for column sets of Insert and Update 
expressions. 
 
 
ILMS 
ILMS interface is used  to  implement  FGACM  on  the  Indirect Access Mode  of  CLI  and  also  to  
 
define the scrolling policy, see Figure 42. Unlike the approach followed in the modelization 
process and in the componentization process of CLI, each action (read, update, insert and 
delete) is individually configured in accordance with the established access control policies, as 
the example shown in Table 3. ILMS comprises 6 sub-interfaces, IRead, IUpdate, IInsert, IDelete, 
IForwardOnly and IScrollable. Next follows a description for each sub-interface. 
 
IRead 
The IRead interface provides methods to only read the authorized attributes. The attributes 
that are not authorized to be read cannot belong to the IRead interface. 
 
IUpdate 
The IUpdate interface is present only if the update protocol is authorized. IUpdate interface 
provides methods to only update the authorized attributes. The attributes that are not 
authorized to be updated cannot belong to the IUpdate interface. Additionally, IUpdate 
interface comprises the required methods for managing the update protocol – start and 
commit updates. 
 
IInsert  
The IInsert interface is present only if the insert protocol is authorized. IInsert interface 
provides methods to only insert the authorized attributes. The attributes that are not 
authorized to be inserted cannot belong to the IInsert interface Additionally, it comprises 
the required methods for managing the insert protocol – start and commit insertions. 
 
IDelete 
The IDelete interface is present only if the delete protocol is authorized. IDelete interface 
provides methods to delete rows of LMS. 
 
IFowardOnly 
The IForwardOnly interface comprises all the methods associated with forward-only LMS. 
 
IScrollable 
The IScrollable interface comprises all the methods associated with scrollable LMS. 
 
This presentation of ILMS and its sub-interfaces clearly shows that the implemented FGACM is 
clearly defined at the attribute level and by each type of operation (read, update, insert and 
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delete). Therefore, the authorization is controlled attribute by attribute and operation by 
operation on each attribute. This is the finest granularity that could be provided at the level of 
LMS. Delete is the only operation that cannot be executed on attribute basis but executed as an 
atomic action on all attributes. 
4.3.1.2.3 Adaptation process 
The   architecture  of  Business  Schemas  is  flexible  to  allow  the  implementation  of customizable 
 FGACM.  The FGACM to be implemented in each Business Entity are inferred by the Business 
Engine from Business Schemas, following the next rules: 
 
LMS 
If any of IForwardOnly, IScrollable, IRead, IUpdate, IInsert or IDelete interface is implemented, 
then  an  LMS  must  be  instantiated. If  IResult or  ISet  is  implemented,  then  LMS   cannot be  
instantiated. 
 
Updatability 
If any of IUpdate, IInsert  IDelete or IResult is implemented, then LMS are instantiated as 
updatable. Otherwise, LMS are instantiated as read-only. 
 
Scrollability 
If the IForwardOnly interface is implemented, then LMS are instantiated as forward-only. If 
IScrollable is implementd, then LMS are instantiated as scrollable. 
 
The adaptation process is accomplished using reflection on Business Schemas to analyze the 
implemented interfaces and the methods to be made available to be used in the Indirect Access 
Mode of CLI. 
4.3.2 Policy Server 
The Policy Server is responsible for storing metadata for FGACM and for informing other 
components about any modification. From DACC description, we see that there is no imposition to 
use any specific security policy. The only imposition is a security policy able to create permissions 
based on CRUD expressions executed on Business Schemas. From the main strategies for regulating 
access control policies, the use of RBAC to manage access control policies in a centralized way is 
widely accepted by RDBMS vendors, such as, for example, Microsoft SQL Server, Oracle and 
PostgreSQL. Thus, the choice for a security policy fell on an approach based on a RBAC policy. To 
that end, a basic security model was devised and is presented in Figure 43. This security model was 
devised to provide the basic mechanisms to support metadata of evolving FGACM. Thereby, 
important security issues for real applications, such as separation of duties and data abstraction are 
not addressed by this model. It may be used in real applications but that is not its goal. The main 
entities are: subjects  (Sub_Subject),    sessions    (Ses_Session),    client  applications   
(App_Application),  roles (Rol_Role),   
Business Schemas (Bus_BusinesSchema), CRUD expressions (Crd_Crud), authorizations 
(Aut_Authorization) and delegations (Del_Delegation). The correspondent logic model is presented 
in Annex A where a detailed description about the logic model is provided. Basically, a subject 
starts an application and a session is created. Then, the subject’s roles are identified and the 
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correspondent granted permissions are identified and metadata of FGACM are sent to DACC. DACC 
dynamically built the FGACM.  A role is activated if and only if: 
 the role is assigned to an application that is also assigned to the subject; 
  the subject has authorization to play the role or the role has been delegated to him. Roles 
are organized in general hierarchies to support the concept of multiple inheritance which 
promotes the ability to inherit permissions from several roles. 
 
 
 
 
*
Sub_Subject
App_Application
Rol_Role
Bus_BusinessSchemaCrd_Crud
Aut_Authorization
Del_Delegation
Ses_Session
*
1
11
11
1
1
*
*
*
*
*
*1
1 1
1
*
*
*
1
1
1
*
 
Figure 43. Access control Meta-model. 
4.3.3 Policy Manager 
The Policy Manager is a broker between the DACC and the Policy Server. Basically, the Policy 
Manager is responsible for sending to the DACC all the required metadata of FGACM to keep 
enforcement mechanisms aligned with the established FGACP. Now we discuss and present the 
methodology used to keep enforcing mechanisms updated with the established metadata, even 
when they evolve. The explanation is mainly based on Figure 37. Basically, the adaptation process 
has two moments: initialization and modification. 
 
Initialization 
Initialization is triggered when DACC start running. When DACC start running Business Logics 
are empty of Business Entities and CRUD expressions. Hence, in a first step, metadata of FGACM 
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need to be deployed to DACC. From them FGACM are automatically built, implemented and kept 
in Business Logic. 
 
Modification 
Modification is related to any modification in the metadata of FGACM kept by Policy Servers. 
Modifications in the metadata are captured by database triggers, which notify the Policy 
Watcher about the occurrence. The Policy Watcher becomes aware of the new state of the 
stored metadata and informs the Policy Manager. The Policy Manager checks all sessions 
(DACC) to be updated and, for each one, sends the correspondent metadata through the 
IAdaptation interface, see Figure 40. As a final note, DACC are dynamically adapted when 
modifications occur on delegations and on authorizations, which are the most frequent cases. If 
modifications occur in Business Schemas or CRUD expressions, they will only be reflected 
thereafter when their roles are assigned again. 
4.4 Summary 
The DACA was presented and described in this chapter. The DACA comprises three main 
components: the Policy Server, the Policy Manager and the DACC. The Policy Server stores 
metadata of FGACM; the DACC is responsible for the dynamic implementation of FGACM in the 
client-side applications and the Policy Manager is a kind of proxy placed between the DACC and the 
Policy Server. Whenever the metadata of FGACM is updated, the DACA ensures that the 
correspondent mechanisms are automatically implemented in all running client-side systems. The 
DACA operation is split in three phases: the configuration phase to keep metadata of FGACM 
updated, the extraction phase to convey to programmers of application tiers a complete awareness 
about the implemented FGACM and, finally, the runtime phase where FGACM are dynamically built 
and kept updated in accordance with the established policies. Additionally, the services provided by 
the DACC are aligned with those provided by CLI conveying this way a similar user experience 
when compared with the CLI one. Another relevant aspect is the deployment process of CRUD 
expressions at runtime to DACC. This deployment process prevents programmers from writing 
CRUD expressions, which is in accordance with the previously announced security preoccupation. 
The next chapter presents a proof of concept for the DACA, based on Java, JDBC, a RBAC model 
and a database relying on SQL Server. 
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5 Proof of Concept  
This chapter presents a proof of concept based on Java, JDBC (sqljdbc4), Microsoft Northwind1 
database and using a RBAC policy. The proof of concept is available from here 2 and it is based on a 
scenario which intends to evaluate DACA against the research questions, identified in section 1.3. 
The main research question to be answered is: does DACA dynamically, at runtime, implement 
FGACM on business tiers and keep them updated when the policies evolve over time? If the answer 
is yes, then there are three additional second level research questions to be answered. The first one 
is related to security issues and stresses the need to evaluate if the DACA effectively controls the 
CRUD expressions being used. The second one is related to the possibility of providing a complete 
awareness about the established FGACM while programmers are writing source code for the 
application tiers of database applications. The third one is related to the possibility of keeping the 
advantages of CLI when they are used to enforce dynamic FGACM. 
 
To answer these research questions some steps need to be accomplished. In a first step, it is 
necessary to build a platform based on DACA. The platform comprises all the basic components of 
the DACA and it is used to develop database applications based on DACA. Then, a database 
application based on the DACA is built. At this stage it is possible to answer the main research 
question and the first and second research questions of the second level. The third research 
question of the second level is partially answered but an additional step is needed to evaluate the 
decay of performance as consequence of the use of FGACM. To accomplish this task, a performance 
assessment is necessary to compare the responsiveness of solutions without access control and the 
responsiveness of the same solutions but now with access control based on the DACA. Both 
solutions must use standard CLI. 
 
This chapter is organized as follows. In section 5.1 a platform based on the DACA is presented 
an the correspondent evaluation is made regarding the main question, the first second level 
question and part of the second question of the second level. In section 5.2, a performance 
assessment is carried out. 
5.1 The DACA Platform 
This section presents a platform based on the DACA. It is organized as follows: a scenario is 
presented to frame the context in which the proof of concept runs, then a proposal is presented for 
                                                          
1
 http://www.microsoft.com/en-us/download/details.aspx?id=23654 
2 Windows remote desktop connection - url: ned.av.it.pt; username: DACA; password: guest 
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the awarability of FGACM, then a proposal is presented for Policy Configurator (divided in two sub-
sections) and then a database application based on the DACA is also presented. 
5.1.1 Scenario 
A scenario based on the DACA, beyond the constituent the DACA components, needs to provide a 
context from which the answers to research questions arise. Thus, beyond the constituent DACA 
components, the scenario also includes a database application. Some configuration is also defined, 
as seen in Figure 44. 
 
 
Policy Configurator
Security Keeper
Policy Server
Policy
Watcher
Policy
Manager
Security Configurator
Policy ExtractorACP
Awareness
DbProof (User_B)
DACC
DbProof (User_A)
DACC
DbProof (User_C)
DACC
Config.
Files
 
Figure 44. Block diagram for the proof of concept. 
Next follows the description of the implemented scenario. 
 
Policy Configurator 
A simple Policy Configurator was built. It is responsible for defining the initial metadata for 
FGACM and also to enforce modifications in the metadata of FGACM while database applications 
are running. These aspects are essential to evaluate the DACA against the main research 
question and against the first research question of the second level. Two components were 
built: Security Configurator, to set the initial metadata, and Security Keeper to enforce 
modifications on metadata of FGACM. 
 
Policy Extractor 
A Policy Extractor was built to extract the necessary metadata for the building process of data 
structures responsible for the awareness context of the implemented FGACM. The collected 
results will answer the second research question of the second level. 
 
Database application 
A database application, herein known as DbProof, relying on Microsoft Northwind database, 
was built. DbProof uses a component based on the DACC to dynamically implement the 
established FGACM. Users are allowed to ask for the execution of CRUD expressions on Business 
Schemas. Whenever a permission is granted, CRUD expressions are executed, otherwise an 
error is raised. In order to visualize the granted permissions, an image similar to Figure 45 is 
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provided. Basically, whenever a modification in the metadata of FGACM is carried out through 
Security Keeper, the image will reflect the new set of permissions. 
 
There are two points from which the main research question may be evaluated: 
interactively and through direct observation. 
 
Interactively 
Users can modify metadata of FGACM and then evaluate if their permissions have been 
updated in the DbProof. The feedback may be obtained by visualizing the state of 
permissions graphically presented on DbProof or users may try to execute CRUD 
expressions on Business Entity.  
 
Direct observation 
Users can modify metadata of FGACM and then visualize the contents of Business Logic. 
When the metadata is modified, the contents of Business Logic need to be in accordance 
with the established metadata. 
 
A scenario was defined and built. It comprises several entities aimed at creating an 
environment where the DACA is evaluated. The main entities are: 
 
Roles 
Five roles were defined and organized in an hierarchical structure, as shown in Figure 45. 
The hierarchical structure is not essential for the thesis but it will provide feedback about 
propagation of permissions. A set of permissions is initially given to each role. This topic is 
described in the next paragraph. 
 
 
 
Role_A
Role_B1 Role_B2
Role_C21 Role_C22
 
Figure 45. Hierarchy of roles. 
Permissions 
Permissions were defined and assigned to roles as shown in Table 4. A permission 
comprises a Business Entity that implements a Business Schema and the associated CRUD 
expressions. From Table 4 we see that there are five permissions each one identified by its 
Business Shema, ICat_i, IPrd_s, IPrdCat_s, ICat_s and ISup_s, and the associated CRUD 
expressions. Each CRUD expression is identified by a unique identification (id) and also by a 
reference (Ref). These references are used to create the data structures for the awareness 
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environment about the implemented FGACM. All LMS, except ICat_s, are read-only. ICat_s is 
readable, insertable, updatable and deletable on all attributes. 
 
Users 
Three users were defined (user_A, user_B and user_C) to evaluate if FGACM are built and 
kept updated by user. As each user may play different roles, FGACM need to be built and 
kept updated by the roles assigned to each user. By default, user_A and user_B play Role_B2, 
Role_C21 and Role_C22. By default, user_C play Role_B1. Moreover, Role_B1 may be 
assigned and unassigned by delegation to User_A and User_B, and may be assigned and 
unassigned to User_C by authorization. Role_B2, Role_C21 and Role_C22 may be assigned 
and unsigned to User_A and User_B by authorization and assigned and unassigned to User_C 
by delegation. 
 
 
Role BS 
CRUD 
Id Ref Expression 
Role_B1 ICat_i 1 all Insert into Categories  
          values(?,?,?) 
Role_B2 IPrd_s 2 all Select * from Products 
  3 byId Select *  
          from Products 
          where productId=? 
  4 bySupplierId Select *  
          from Products 
         where supplierId=? 
 IPrdCat_s 5 byCategoryId Select p.*, c.categoryName,       
           c.Description 
          from Products p, Categories c 
          where p.CategoryID=c.CategoryID 
Role_C21 ICat_s 6 all Select * 
          from Categories 
  7 byId Select * 
          from Categories 
          where categoryId=? 
Role_C22 ISup_s 8 all Select * 
          from Suppliers 
Role: 
BS: 
Id: 
Ref: 
Expression: 
Role reference. 
Business Schema reference. 
CRUD identification. 
CRUD reference. 
CRUD expression. 
Table 4. Roles and the correspondent permissions for the implemented scenario. 
5.1.2 Awareness of FGACM 
In this subsection we discuss and present a solution to create in the Integrated Development 
Environment (IDE - NetBeans in our case) the data structures to convey a complete awareness of 
FGACM to programmers of applications tiers during the development process. The importance of 
this aspect is that programmers of application tiers can hardly master access control policies when 
schemas of databases and access control policies increase in complexity. This knowledge, when 
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integrated in the IDE, eases the development process of application tiers. In a first approach this 
stage seems useless because the DACC could eventually be automatically adapted to support all 
permissions and, therefore, to support all roles. Unfortunately, this approach cannot be followed 
because the DACC is agnostic regarding the adopted access control policy. DACC does not recognize 
the concept of roles. To overcome this difficulty, a tool, herein known as the Policy Extractor (see 
Figure 44), was designed to automatically extract and create data structures organized by roles and 
their permissions for the application under development. There were several options to formalize 
the data structures. Among them two were the favorite candidates: XML representation and object-
oriented model representation. In spite of XML advantages, mainly for its technology independence, 
we chose to use the second option because it is much easier and faster to implement. The meta-data 
is built from the following data retrieved from Policy Servers: 
 The supported roles from Rol_Roles; 
 The granted permissions for each role from Bus_BusinessSchema and Crd_Crud. 
 
Figure 46 shows the data structures for Role_B2. The data structures for Business Schemas are 
not shown but they are pure java interfaces easily inferred from Figure 41 and Figure 42. Basically, 
Role_B2 explicitly provides permissions to use two Business Schemas, IPrd_s and IPrdCat_s and to 
execute CRUD expressions identified by 2, 3 and 4 on IPrd_s and the CRUD expression identified by 
5 on IPrdCat_s.  The names used to name roles, Business Schemas and identifications of CRUD 
expressions are retrieved from Rol_Role, Bus_BusinessService and Crd_Crud, respectively. 
Moreover, inheritance is supported by supporting role hierarchies as foreseen by the RBAC. In case 
of Role_B2, it inherits all permissions from Role_C21 and Role_C22 (Figure 46: line 11 – extends 
Role_C21, Role_C22). Additionally, programmers of business tiers do not have access to CRUD 
expressions, which is a key issue when the schemas of databases are themselves a part of the 
information to be protected. 
 
The meta-data defined in Figure 46, in association with the architecture of the DACC, conveys 
to programmers of application tiers a complete awareness about the granted permissions for each 
role. As an example, Figure 47 shows the source-code for a subject playing the Role_B2. From the 
selected role (Figure 47: line 41 - Role_B2), programmers are statically driven to select one of the 
supported Business Schemas of Role_B2 (Figure 47: line 41 – RoleB2.icat_s). Then, programmers 
are semantically oriented to select one of the CRUD expressions supported by the selected Business 
Schema (Figure 47: line 41 - Role_B2.icat_s_byId). Any security violation at the level of Business 
Schemas is checked at development time and source-code will not compile if some security 
violation is detected. After being deployed, FGACP may evolve and an exception is raised if, for 
some security reason, this role is not assigned anymore. The selected CRUD expression is executed 
and one runtime parameter is used (Figure 47: line 43). If a row has been selected (Figure 47: line 
44), programmers can choose any action supported by the Business Schema to access the contents 
of LMS (pop-up window partially shows all actions, from Figure 47: line 45). This pop-up window 
also conveys to programmers complete and type-safe awareness about the actions supported on 
LMS of ICat_s, independently from the CRUD expression being executed. The pop-window shows 
that subjects playing Role_B2 can read, update and insert all attributes of table Categories. To 
completely separate methods from IRead, IUpdate and IInsert, we suggest the use of a unique 
prefix: ‘r’, ‘u’ and ‘i’, respectively, for each method. 
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Figure 46. Role_B2 definition. 
 
Figure 47. Programmers awareness about FGACM for Role_B2. 
5.1.3 Security Configurator 
In this implementation, the Security Configurator has no GUI. It is a component that reads meta-
data from software artifacts (classes and interfaces) to partially fill the Policy Server with the 
needed metadata for one database application. We have not addressed the configuration process of 
subjects because we consider that the new key concept introduced by the DACA, that deserves 
more attention, is the concept of permission which is based on Business Schemas and on CRUD 
expressions.  Next follows the main software artifacts that were developed for the implemented 
scenario. 
 
IApplication 
 IApplication, see Figure 48, defines the application name and the implemented root roles. In 
this scenario there is only one root role: Role_A.  
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Figure 48. Application definition. 
Role_B2 
IRole_B2, see Figure 49, defines all Business Schemas supported by Role_B2: IPrd_s and 
IPrdCat_s. Additionally, Role_B2 extends Role_C21 (IRole_C21) and Role_C22 (IRole_C22). 
The definition of the remaining roles follows a similar approach. 
 
 
 
Figure 49. Role_B2 definition. 
IPrd_s 
IPrd_s, see Figure 50, defines the Business Schema IPrd_s in terms of the implemented 
interfaces and in terms of the supported CRUD expressions. IPrd_s implements LMS 
(IExecute, IScrollable and IRead) and supports CRUD expressions 2, 3 and 4. The definition 
of the remaining Business Schemas follows a similar approach. 
 
 
Figure 50. Business Schema IPrd_s definition. 
IRead 
IRead, see Figure 51, defines the getter methods to read data from the LMS in accordance 
with the established FGACP for IPrds_s. In this case all attributes are readable. 
 
 
Figure 51. IRead definition. 
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ICrud 
ICrud, see Figure 52,  defines  the  CRUD   expressions   to      be   supported by  all   Business 
 Schemas.  Each CRUD expression is identified by its name (String variable), which has been 
defined in Table 4 as being the references of CRUD expressions. 
 
 
 
Figure 52. Definition of all CRUD expressions. 
Based on this information, Security Configurator automatically fills: App_Application, AppRol, 
Rol_Role, RolBus, Bus_BusinessSchema, BusCrd, Crd_Crud and also Aut_Authorization (set to yes by 
default). AppRol, RolBus, BusCrd are not represented in Figure 43. These tables are used to 
decompose M:N relationships between tables identified by their prefixes. 
5.1.4 Security Keeper 
The Security Keeper (part of Policy Configurator, see Figure 44) was designed to ease the process of 
modifying, at runtime, the granted roles to users which are stored in the Policy Server. To change 
role assignment for each one of the three users, a simple GUI application is used, see Figure 53. 
Basically roles are automatically granted and denied by checking and unchecking, respectively, the 
shown check boxes for each user, in accordance with the established scenario. 
 
 
 
Figure 53. Security keeper. 
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5.1.5 DbProof 
The final component is DbProof, see Figure 54. DbProof is a database application based on the 
DACA. The business logic is dynamically built and updated at runtime from established metadata of 
FGACM. The DbProof and the Security Keeper are simultaneously used to assess if database 
applications based on the DACA effectively, in real situations, keep FGACM aligned with evolving 
FGACP. From the DbProof, we may choose one of the three supported users. Then Business 
Schemas and CRUD expressions are selected to be executed one at a time. If permission is granted, 
the CRUD expression is executed, otherwise an error message is shown. Figure 54 is the default 
context of user A. Green circles (lighter gray for black and white prints) are for granted roles and 
red circles (darker gray for black and white prints) are for denied roles. The colors are updated 
whenever the assignment state of roles is modified. It also shows that Business Schema ICat_s and 
CRUD expression (allFromCategories) are selected and have been already executed. ILMS of ICat_s  
 
 
 
Figure 54. DbProof. 
 
Figure 55. Business Schemas implemented for user User_A. 
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Figure 56. LMS interfaces for Cat_s Business Schema. 
is also updatable, insertable and deletable and, therefore, some additional actions are available at 
the bottom of the GUI. The dynamic enforcement of FGACM is directly observable using a common 
unzip tool to analyze the contents of the files (Business Logic - Jar file) containing the Business 
Entities. Business Entities are inserted and removed in accordance with the granted and denied 
roles to users. Figure 55 partially presents the contents for the Business Logic belonging to User_A 
when roles Role_B2, Role_C21 and Role_C22 are granted. Business Logic contains four folders, each 
one for each Business Schema: ICat_s, IPrdCat_s, ISup_s and IPrd_s. Figure 56 presents the LMS 
interfaces of Business Schema ICat_s and also the correspondent Business Entity, Cat_s. The 
remaining interface, IScrollable, is used from a pool shared by all Business Schemas and, as such, it 
is not present in this folder. 
5.2 Performance Assessment 
The performance assessment is focused on evaluating and comparing the performance of the DACC 
based on the DACA and the performance of solutions based on a standard CLI API and without any 
access control mechanism. Java, JDBC and SQL Server 2008 have been chosen as the basic core 
technologies to support the assessment. The test-bed relies on a PC Asus-P5K-VM, Intel Duo Core 
E6550 @2.33 GHz, 4.00 GB RAM, Windows XP Professional Service Pack 3, Java SE 7 (1.7.0_22-b13), 
JDBC(sqljdbc4) and SQL Server 2008. In order to promote an ideal environment, the following 
actions were taken: 
 The running threads were given the highest priority; 
 All non-essential processes/services were cancelled; 
 A new database was created for the running tests; 
 For each individual measurement a new table with a different name is created from scratch 
to avoid SQL Server to take advantage of any optimization process; 
 Some default SQL Server database properties were changed, such as Auto Update Statistics 
= false and Recovery Model = Simple, to minimize its overhead. 
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5.2.1 Methodology 
The methodology followed to collect the needed measurements was based on measuring how long 
a task takes to execute. To achieve this goal, the method system.nanoTime() was used. In spite of 
being a very easy methodology to collect measurements, it conveys an error during the 
measurement process. To evaluate the impact of the act of measuring, the collected values showed 
that the impact is always under 310ns and that the minimum clock tick is 1ns. From these values, 
and in order to ensure that errors were always below 1%, all measurements associated with the 
performance assessment were collected with a minimum time span of 31,000ns. In several 
situations it was necessary to repeat the same code as often as necessary to get a minimum of 
31,000ns. To avoid additional errors with the repeating process, the code was sequentially 
repeated and not iteratively repeated. Table 5 presents the general strategy followed to collect and 
compute each measurement. 
 
1 repeat 5 rounds 
1.2 get a new container to keep the collected measurements 
1.3 prepare initial conditions 
1.4 repeat: 100 cycles 
1.4.1 start timer 
1.4.2 run scripts (must take at least 31,000ns) 
1.4.3 stop timer 
1.4.4 keep elapsed time if it is one of the 5 best in this cycle 
1.4.5 release all unnecessary objects 
1.4.6 garbage collector activation 
1.4.7 sleep 100ms (other system processes may need to run) 
2 keep the best average time of the 5 rounds 
Table 5. Strategy to collect and compute measurements. 
From the performance assessment point of view, DACC may be split into two main phases: the 
creation phase and the execution phase. The creation phase is related to activities that have no 
equivalent on standard CLI. The execution phase comprises the activities that are shared by 
standard CLI and by DACC. 
 
Creation phase 
This creation phase comprises activities such as the instantiation of DACC, building process of 
Business Entities and instantiation of Business Sessions and Business Entities. All activities, 
except the instantiation of Business Sessions and Business Entities occur only once or very 
sparsely and therefore their impact has not been considered to be evaluated in this research. On 
the other hand, instantiation of Business Sessions and Business Entities occur very frequently 
conveying an overhead the impact of which must be evaluated. The collected measurements 
were obtained using a case study based on a scrollable and updatable LMS. This LMS type is the 
one that comprises more methods and more data structures. IRead, IUpdate and IInsert were 
defined with 25 methods each. In spite of not being a critical aspect, it is expectable that the 
complexity of this Business Schema will be above most of the real Business Schemas. The 
collected time to instantiate a Business Session (TBS) and a Business Entity (TBW) is presented 
in Table 6 a). Instances of Business Entities are herein known as Business Workers. 
 
Execution phase  
The execution phase is mainly focused on evaluating the overhead induced by the invocation of 
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Business Entities’ methods. Two main approaches may be followed to carry out the 
performance assessment: 
 Use a DACC and assess it against a standard JDBC component based on scenarios and 
case studies;  
 Develop a general environment to evaluate the overhead induced by the wrapping 
process implemented by each method of each Business Entity.  
 
After some reflection, it came clear that the latter approach would bring a significant advantage 
over the former approach. Methods of Business Entities are general and not tied to any 
particular use case. Moreover, their use and their functionalities are clearly stated, leading to 
the possibility of developing a mathematical model to express and evaluate its impact on any 
possible scenario: the overhead is only dependent on the additional time to call the wrapping 
method. Thus, if the overhead is known for all methods of Business Entities in a running context 
(CPU, Operating system, etc.), it will be possible to mathematically compute the induced 
overhead for any Business Entity running on that context. 
 
The activities related to the execution phase are basically the invocation of Business Entities 
methods. Each Business Entity method wraps a block of code of the standard CLI. Thus, the 
overhead may be measured by evaluating the time to execute the additional code when using a 
Business Entity method. To this end, we introduce the concept of reduced method signature (RMS). 
RMS derives from the widespread concept of method signature but it does not include the method 
name. All methods of Business Entities are classified in two different groups: methods with a fixed 
RMS and methods with a variable RMS. Methods with a fixed RMS are, by far, the major group. The 
only method that does not have a fixed RMS is execute with parameters. In order to predict the 
overhead induced by every wrapping method, it was decided to measure the finest grain overhead 
induced by each possible variation in RMS. Two examples: measure the induced overhead by each 
additional argument of any data type and measure the induced overhead by returning any data 
type. To achieve this goal, two types of measurements were collected as shown in Table 6 b). TRi 
are the collected measurements for methods with no arguments and returning the data types 
shown in the column Data type. Examples: void m1() and int m2(). TAi are the collected 
measurements for calling a method with 10 arguments of type Data type and returning void. The 
contribution of each individual argument is computed as (collectedMeasurement-TR1)/10. This 
approach was validated by carrying out some additional tests using less than 10 and more than 10 
arguments and with and without a returning value. From Table 6 it is possible to compute the 
absolute overhead induced by any RMS running on the same context and, therefore, of any method 
of each Business Entity. 
In spite of being important, the data shown in Table 6 do not give any insight about their  
 
TBS TBW  Data type TRi TAi I  Data type TRi TAi i 
1023 387  void 14 - 1  string 27 98 6 
a)  byte 26 89 2  float 45 132 7 
   short 26 114 3  double 45 132 8 
   int 26 91 4  boolean 26 89 9 
   long 42 129 5  char 28 103 10 
      b)      
Table 6. Collected measurements for a) TBS, TBW and for b) RAM in ns. 
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S Description Algorithm Typical DACA usage Overheads 
S
S
r(
R
,A
,L
) Assess SSr. All 
attributes from 
all rows are 
read from the 
LMS. 
Create new table(*) 
Insert R rows 
Start timer 
Select all rows 
For each row 
   Read all attributes 
Stop timer 
[SQL: Select * from table] 
// create business session 
// instantiation of business worker a 
a.execute(); 
while ( a.moveNext() ) { 
    id1 = a.id1(); 
    // more attributes 
} 
//release business session 
 
TBS+ 
TBW+ 
TR1+ 
(TR9+ 
 TR4 
    *nAtt) 
*nRows 
S
S
i(
R
,A
,{
F
o
U
p
,S
cU
p
})
 
Assess SSi. All 
attributes of all 
rows are set 
one by one in 
the LMS and 
committed to 
the database. 
Create new table(*) 
Start timer 
Select all(0) rows 
For each new row 
   Insert all attributes 
   Commit 
Stop timer 
[SQL: Select * from table] 
// create business session 
// instantiation of business worker a 
a.execute(); 
while ( a.moveNext() ) { 
    a.beginUpdate(); 
    a.id1(id1); 
    // more attributes 
    a.updateRow(); 
} 
//release business session  
 
TBS+ 
TBW+ 
TR1+ 
(TR9+ 
 TR1+ 
 (TR1+TA4) 
      *nAtt+ 
   TR1) 
*nRows  
S
S
u
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F
o
U
p
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p
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Assess SSu. All 
attributes of all 
rows are 
updated one by 
one in the LMS 
and committed 
to the database. 
Create new table(*) 
Insert R rows 
Start timer 
Select all  rows 
For each row 
   Update all attributes 
   Commit 
Stop timer 
[SQL: Select * from table] 
// create business session 
// instantiation of business worker a 
a.execute(); 
while ( a.moveNext() ) { 
    a.beginInsert(); 
    a.id(id); 
    // more attributes 
    a.insertRow(); 
} 
//release business session  
 
TBS+ 
TBW+ 
TR1+ 
(TR9+ 
 TR1+ 
 (TR1+TA4) 
     *nAtt+ 
  TR1) 
*nRows 
S
S
u
(R
,A
,{
F
o
U
p
,S
cU
p
})
 
Assess SSd. All 
rows are 
deleted one by 
one from the 
LMS and 
committed to 
the database. 
Create new table(*) 
Insert R rows 
Start timer 
Select all rows 
For each row 
   Delete row 
   Commit 
Stop timer 
 
 
[SQL: Select * from table] 
// create business session 
// instantiation of business worker a 
a.execute(); 
while ( a.moveNext() ) { 
    a.deleteRow(); 
} 
//release business session 
 
TBS+ 
TBW+ 
TR1+ 
(TR9+ 
 TR1+) 
*nRows 
Note: (*) in case of join, the second table is also created with 5 attributes and 
with the same number of rows as the main table. 
Table 7. Scenarios for the Select expression: algorithms and typical component usage. 
relative impact on real cases. The impossibility to assess all cases led to a survey to define some 
scenarios that could be representative of common situations and, above all, that could give a 
perspective about DACC  behaviour  regarding its  impact on  the overall  performance. To this end, 
we needed to identify the relevant aspects directly related and controlled by application tiers that 
could influence a business tier performance based on DACA. Based both on empirical experiences 
and on knowledge about DACC, the aspects considered relevant (and confirmed in Figure 57, Figure 
58 and Figure 59) were: types of CRUD expressions (Select, Insert, Update, Delete), types of LMS 
(Forward-Only  and  Read-only  (FR), Forward-only  and  Updatable (FU), Scrollable  and  Read-only 
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 Description Algorithm Typical DACA usage Overheads 
S
I 
Assess SI. 
Rows are 
inserted one by 
one in the 
database 
through the 
execution of a 
parameterized 
Insert 
statement. 
Create a new table 
Start timer 
Create statement 
for each row 
   insert all attributes 
Stop timer 
[SQL: Insert into table values 
(att…)] 
// create business session 
// instantiation of business worker b 
b.execute(att1, att2, …, attn.); 
// more inserts 
//release business session 
 
TBS+ 
TBW+ 
(TR1+TA4)* 
  nAtt*nRows 
S
U
 
Assess SU. 
Rows are 
updated one by 
one in the 
database 
through the 
execution of a 
parameterized 
Update 
statement. 
Create a new table 
Insert R rows 
Start timer 
Create statement 
For each row 
   Update all attributes 
Stop timer 
[SQL: update table set (…) where 
pk=?] 
// create business session 
// instantiation of business worker c 
c.execute(pk,att2,…,attn); 
// more updates 
//release business session 
 
TBS+ 
TBW+ 
(TR1+TA4)* 
  nAtt*nRows 
S
D
 
Assess SD. 
Rows are 
deleted one by 
one through the 
execution of a 
parameterized 
Delete 
statement. 
Create a new table 
Insert R rows 
Start timer 
Create statement 
For each row 
   Delete row 
Stop timer 
[SQL: delete from table where pk=?] 
// create business session 
// instantiation of business work d 
d.execute(pk); 
// more deletes 
//release business session 
 
TBS+ 
TBW+ 
(TR1+TA4) 
         
*nRows 
Table 8. Scenarios for the Insert, Update and Delete expressions: algorithms and typical component usage. 
(SR), Scrollable and Updatable (SU)), the number of rows to be processed, the number of attributes 
of each row and the query complexity. Tests with pre-compiled and compiled-on-the-fly CRUD 
expressions were also carried out. Only measurements relative to the pre-compiled CRUD 
expressions will be presented because the collected results with compiled-on-the-fly CRUD 
expressions were so close that their presentation would not bring any novelty to the final 
conclusions. Exogenous aspects such as hardware architecture, hardware components, operating 
systems,  database  servers, middleware  software  and  communication  infrastructures  were   not  
considered because their impact is not directly or indirectly dependent on DACC. To address all the 
presented aspects, seven main scenarios were defined as presented and described in Table 7: SSr, 
SSi, SSu, SSd, SI, SU and SD. Then, for each main scenario, two facets were created to handle different 
number of rows, R 𝜖 {1, 5, 10, 25, 50, 100, 250, 500, 750, 1000, 1250, 1500, 1750, 2000}, and tables 
with different number of attributes, A 𝜖 {5, 10, 20}. These facets were defined from empirical 
experiences that were carried out to delimit the range of values that could forecast the behaviour of 
other scenarios. Additionally, to have an idea about the impact of increasing queries complexity for 
the SSr, two queries were defined: one with no joins (NJ - select table.* from table) and another with 
a simple join (on their primary keys) comprising two tables (WJ - Select table.* from table, table1 
where table.id=table1.id). In this case table1 had a fixed number of 5 attributes. The attributes of all 
tables were all defined as being of type integer and not null. They could be of any other data type or 
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any combination of several data types. There was no reason to accept or refuse any possibility. All 
tables are created with a primary key on the first attribute. A formalization of a general scenario 
may be expressed as S(R,A,L) where S is the scenario, A the number of attributes, R the number of 
rows and L the type of LMS.  
For each scenario, Table 7 and Table 8 present a concise description for the algorithm used to 
collect measurements, the source code for the DACC and, finally, the total absolute overhead 
induced by each method (nAtt is for the number of attributes, nRows for the number of rows). 
Check Table 6 to remember the meanings of acronyms used in column Overheads on Table 7 and 
Table 8. 
5.2.2 Collected Results 
Figure 57, Figure 58 and Figure 59 present the graphics for all scenarios. Three types of 
information were selected to be presented: the induced % overhead by DACC, the absolute induced 
overhead by DACC (in milliseconds) and the % contribution of each component to the total % 
induced overhead (CBS for TBS, CBW for TBW and CSR for the execution phase). The importance of 
this information is: 1) the induced overhead cannot be completely understood if only the % values 
or only the absolute values are given. They complement each other. 2) The overhead analysis in 
components give an insight about its composition opening the opportunity to evaluate the 
possibility of taking measures to lessen its impact.  Graphics for components overheads do not 
present the range 150 till 2000 rows because CSR is practically the only relevant component in that 
range, as it may be easily inferred. Additionally, in these graphics, the number of rows is clustered 
by the number of attributes. 
To completely understand the presented results, some additional information about the 
collected measurements is essential: 
 Performance decreases from forward-only (Fo) to scrollable (Sc) and from read-only (Ro) 
to updatable (Up) LMS. This derives from the fact that database servers create server 
cursors, for other LMS than FoRo, with increased management complexity to control client 
operations on LMS.  
 Performance increases (number of selected rows/second) when the number of selected 
rows increases. 
 Performance decreases (number of selected rows/second) when the number of attributes 
increases. 
 Performance decreases (number of selected rows/second) when select statements include 
a join. 
 
Another relevant issue is the fact that the absolute overhead value has been formalized for each 
scenario, see Table 7 column Overheads. It does not depend on the LMS type even not on the query 
complexity: it only depends on the methods used during the execution phase. 
To discuss the collected measurements for each scenario, the scenarios were aggregated in 
three main groups: 1) SSr; 2) SSu, SSi SSd and 3) SI, SU and SD. 
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5.2.2.1 Scenario SSr 
The graphics for SSr are shown in Figure 57.  Figure 57 a), b), c) and d) show the % overhead. 
Columns are for Select expressions with no join (NJ) and lines are for Select expressions with a join 
(WJ). Each Select expression is executed on tables with 5, 10 and 20 attributes. The behaviour 
shows that the % overhead increases from ScUp->FoUp->ScRo->FoRo, when the number of rows 
increases, when the number of attributes increases and when Select expressions do not include a 
join. The % overhead is minimum for very few number of rows but it may rise till 7% for SSr (2000, 
20, FoRo) with no join. We may conclude that the percentage impact of DACC may not be negligible 
for some marginal SSr, mainly for FoRo LMS with thousands of rows, conveying the need to proceed 
with a previous assessment. Figure 57 e) shows the absolute overhead. It increases with the 
number of rows  and with  the  number  of attributes   reaching about  1.1ms for 2,000 rows and  20  
attributes. 
 
 
 
a) 
 
b) 
 
c) 
 
d) 
 
e) 
 
f) 
Figure 57. Graphics for scenario SSr. 
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Figure 57 f) shows the overhead components. In critical situations, when the overhead must be 
minimized, programmers may also use the individual components. The same instance of Business 
Sessions and Business Workers may very often be used over and over, this way avoiding its 
correspondent overhead. For example, with 5 attributes the overhead may be reduced from 90% 
for 1 row till 50% for 10 rows, which may be considered very significant. 
 
5.2.2.2 Scenarios SSi, SSu and SSd 
The graphics for these scenarios are shown in Figure 58. Figure 58 a), c) and e) show the absolute 
(columns) and the percentage overhead (lines). The lines represent the combination between each 
LMS type (only FoUp and ScUp are allowed) and each possible  number  of  attributes. The general  
behaviour  
 
 
 
a) 
 
b) 
 
c) 
 
d) 
 
e) 
 
f) 
Figure 58. Graphics for scenarios SSi, SSu and SSd. 
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shows that: 1) the percentage overhead is practically independent of the LMS type; 2) the number 
of attributes is only relevant in SSi and SSu; 3) all percentage overheads tend to be stabilized when 
the number of rows reaches a certain threshold; 4) the maximum percentage overhead is much 
lower than in SSr: maximum 0.2%, 0.16% and 0.02% for SSi, SSu and SSd, respectively; 4) as 
expected, the absolute overhead raises with the number of rows and with the number of attributes. 
In spite of its low impact, programmers may still act at the level of the overhead components, see 
Figure 58 b), d) and f). CBS and CBW together, for low number of rows, spend most of the overhead, 
indicating that the overhead, in this range, may be practically eliminated for all SSi, SSu and SSd. 
5.2.2.3 Scenarios SU, SI and SD 
The graphics for these scenarios are shown in Figure 59. In these scenarios, CRUD expressions 
(insert, update, delete)   are not  executed  through  an LMS   but   directly  on   the  database   server  
 
 
  
  
  
Figure 59. Graphic for scenarios SI, SU and SD. 
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through parameterized CRUD expressions.  Figure 59 a), c) and e) show the absolute (columns) and 
the % overheads (lines). The general behaviour is not aligned with the previous ones. The % 
overhead does not increase when the number of rows increases but converges to a constant value 
in each scenario. Collected measurements range from 0.3% till 0.03%. In critical situations, the 
maximum values may be reduced from 75% till 98% if CBS and CBW are carefully used, see  Figure 
59 b), d) and f). 
5.3 Results Evaluation 
This section is focused on evaluating the obtained results to verify how the research questions have 
 been fulfilled. The main research question is verified at the first place and then the second level 
research questions are also verified. 
5.3.1 Dynamic FGACM on business tiers 
The main research question to be answered was defined as: “is it possible to dynamically, at runtime, 
implement FGACM on business tiers and keep them updated when the policies evolve over time?” 
 
To answer this question a platform was devised. It comprises two main components: a server 
component where metadata of FGACM are stored and kept updated and a client component 
deployed in every client system responsible for implementing the FGACM at runtime. To evaluate if 
FGACM are dynamically implemented and updated at runtime a platform based on the DACA was 
built and a scenario was defined and implemented. The scenario included three users and a set of 
hierarchized roles and their associated permissions. The scenario provided a tool to allow the 
dynamic modification of assigned roles to each individual user. Whenever a role was assigned or 
unassigned, it was confirmed that FGACM are dynamically updated at runtime at the client side 
systems. The confirmation was verified in three different ways: 
1) The devised DbProof component explicitly shows for each user, through a graphic, the 
hierarchized roles and their assignment state, see Figure 54. The assignment state indicates 
for each role if a role is assigned or unassigned. It was confirmed that the assignment state 
was updated whenever a modification was enforced at the level of the metadata of FAGCM. 
2) The DbProof provides an interface where permissions (Business Entities and CRUD 
expressions) are selected to be executed, see Figure 54. It was confirmed that the success to 
execute any permission was always in accordance with the state assignment of each role. 
3) A material verification was also conducted. The material verification consists in looking 
inside the Business Logic to check its contents. The contents of Business Logic of each user 
was inspected using a common unzip tool, see Figure 55 and Figure 56. The contents of 
each Business Logic confirmed that it was in accordance with the assigned permissions. 
 
Before these multi-verifications, there no is doubt that DACA positively answers the main 
research question of this thesis. 
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5.3.2 Security 
This sub-section evaluates how the first research question of the second level is answered by the 
DACA. The research question is: “Is there any possibility to supervise the use of CRUD expressions  
effectively when protected data is being access to protected data?”. As previously shown, current 
approaches allow users to write any CRUD expression freely. The endless expressiveness of the SQL 
language opens the possibility to existence of security gaps. In order to overcome this situation, the 
DACA does not allow users to write any CRUD expression. Instead of writing CRUD expressions, 
users are only allowed to use CRUD expressions that are defined by security experts and put at 
their disposal by the DACA, see Figure 46 and Figure 47 Additionally, the DACA has the ability to 
identify the permissions granted to each user and make them dynamically available to be used. This 
way, users have no possibility to issue their own CRUD expressions. 
5.3.3 FGACM awareness 
This sub-section evaluates how the second research question of the second level is answered by the 
DACA. The research question is: “Is it possible to overcome this difficulty by providing programmers 
with a complete awareness about the established FGACM?”. Current approaches do not give any 
guidance on the established FGACP neither on the implemented FGACM.  
To answer this question, a tool was devised to specifically address this issue – Policy Extractor, 
see Figure 37. Policy Extractor reads the metadata of FGACM and automatically builds static data 
structures, see Figure 46, to be used during the development process of application tiers, see Figure 
47. The data structures convey to programmers a clear awareness about the FGACM to be 
dynamically implemented at runtime. The awareness is achieved while programmers write source 
code not at compilation time as many other research alternatives do. These assertions were verified 
and confirmed while source code for DbProof was being written.  
5.3.4  Preservation of CLI Advantages 
This sub-section evaluates how the third research question of the second level is answered by the 
DACA. The research question is: “Is it possible to keep those advantages (of CLI) on the proposed 
solution to implement FGACM?”. The use of CLI to build business tiers presents several advantages. 
The advantages may be classified in two major groups: the set of services provided by CLI and 
performance of CLI.  
CLI are used at the DACC level only and there is no other component between CLI and RDBMS. 
Thus, the answer to the research question has to be found inside the DACC. 
 
Preservation of CLI Services  
The DACC provide a wide set of services. Some of them are geared to address the dynamicity of 
FGACM but others are geared to allow application tiers to execute CRUD expressions. The latter 
services are specified through DACC and are the services to be compared with those provided 
by CLI. As previously mentioned, DACC ensures the two of the access modes provided by CLI. 
The remaining access modes were not implemented but may easily be included in a future 
version of the DACC and the DACA. The remaining main CLI services are practically mapped one 
by one into the DACC: all scrolling services are available, different instantiations contexts of 
LMS are available, transactions are available, etc. Services such as access to metadata of 
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returned relations are not addressed because in the context of the DACA they are not relevant. 
If any other additional service is considered relevant it will certainly have an easy 
implementation in the DACC. The simplest approach is to wrap the intended service/method as 
shown in Figure 60. Figure 40, Figure 41 and Figure 42 show that relevant services for the 
execution of CRUD expressions are all available in the DACA. 
 
 
 
Figure 60. Wrapping approach to provide the getMet 
  
Preservation of CLI Performance 
To prove that the performance advantage of CLI is kept, a performance assessment has been 
carried out. Results have shown that the DACC impact may be considered irrelevant for all 
scenarios but SSr. Regarding SSr, in the worst situation (2000 rows and no join), the % overhead 
is 7.0%, 3.6%, 2.5% and 2.0% for FoRo, FoUp, ScRo and ScUp, respectively. These results may 
be considered significant but a closer analysis shows that the % overhead has a deep 
dependency on many factors as it may be inferred from the graphics, namely on CRUD 
expressions complexity. A CRUD expression with a simple join led to a decay of about 50% in 
the % overhead. Thus, in real database applications, where most of the CRUD expressions are 
more complex than those herein used and tables are populated with thousands of rows, the % 
overhead will have an irrelevant impact on the overall performance. 
When compared with other approaches, it is our opinion that the overhead induced by 
DACA is very probably lower than theirs, even for those approaches that use static enforcement 
mechanisms. The authors of these approaches argue that their solutions induce no overhead at 
all, just because policies are directly translated into CRUD expressions. This argument should 
only be used if they had compared their approaches with solutions with no access control, as it 
was done in this thesis. Only comparing with solutions with no access control it is possible to 
evaluate the impact of the access control on the overall performance. Moreover, the latency of 
the DACA is minimum because the decisions and the mechanisms are both located at the client 
application level. 
5.4 Summary 
This chapter was focused on presenting the DACA proof of concept and it is organized in three 
sections: the presentation of the implemented platform, the performance assessment and, finally, 
the results evaluation. 
The implemented platform is based on the DACA and includes a database application based on 
the Microsoft Northwind database. Some users and roles were defined and implemented. 
Additionally, roles are assigned and unassigned at runtime to convey a context of evolving FGACM. 
The Security Configurator was split in two different components to ease its development process. 
All DACA components were successfully implemented. 
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The performance assessment compared a solution based on the DACA and an equivalent 
solution but without any access control mechanisms. The collected results show that the induced 
overhead for the Direct Access Mode is marginal. Even for the Indirect Access Mode, only the read 
protocol induces measurable overhead values. The overheads are measurable because the running 
conditions were favorable to the existence of overheads. In real situations, where databases include 
thousands of rows and CRUD expressions are more complex, the induced overhead will become 
residual again. 
The results evaluation proved that the DACA answered all the research questions of this thesis 
positively. 
The next chapter presents the final conclusions. 
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6 Conclusion 
This chapter is organized in four topics. First, a review about the work performed is presented. 
Second, the main contributions are highlighted. Third, a discussion about some adjacent aspects is 
taken and presented. Four, a perspective is presented for future work. 
6.1 Overview 
This thesis presents an architecture to enforce FGACP dynamically at the level of business tiers 
based on CLI, herein known as the DACA. The evolution from CLI towards DACA followed a three 
step approach: modelization of CLI, componentization of CLI and, finally, dynamic access control on 
CLI. The modelization of CLI lead to an effort to devise a model based on CLI to represent schemas 
of database objects [Pereira, '10b; Pereira, '11b]. The componentization of CLI lead to an effort to 
devise an architecture for components based on CLI [Pereira, '11a; Pereira, '11c; Pereira, '12b; 
Pereira, '13d; Pereira, '13e]. The dynamic access control on CLI leverages all previous work to 
devise the DACA [Pereira, '12d; Pereira, '12c; Pereira, '13d]. This three step approach was very 
important to successfully and separately overcome the distinct dimensions of CLI drawbacks. 
Without a model perspective and without a component perspective of CLI, the DACA, and mainly 
DACC, could hardly have been devised. The DACA comprises three main components: a server 
component where metadata about FGACM are maintained, a client component responsible for the 
implementation of dynamic FGACM and a proxy component placed between the server and the 
client components. Basically, programmers no longer have access to CLI but instead they have 
access to a component providing a similar set of services as CLI do. This component, DACC, is able 
to adapt itself dynamically, at runtime, when policies evolve over time. A proof of concept was 
designed and a performance assessment was carried out to evaluate the DACA against the research 
questions. 
 
Finally, the DACA was evaluated against the research questions. The results show that the 
DACA answers to all the research questions positively: 1) Solutions based on the DACA are able to 
implement FGACM dynamically built and updated at runtime; 2) the DACA completely controls the 
CRUD expressions that users are authorized to issue this way preventing any security gap; 3) From 
the metadata of FGACM it is possible to build data structures to convey a complete awareness of 
FGACM to programmers of application tiers and, finally, 4) the DACC rely on and keep advantages of 
CLI.  
DACA: Architecture to Implement Dynamic Access Control Mechanisms on Business Tier Components 
 
114 | P a g e  
 
6.2 Contributions 
The outcome of this thesis is divided in one main contribution and four second level contributions. 
The main contribution is the DACA. The DACA is an architecture able to address and overcome 
some aspects still not addressed by current commercial and academic proposals. The main aspect is 
the implementation of dynamic FGACM on business tiers of relational database applications based 
on CLI. Solutions based on the DACA are able to implement FGACM dynamically, at runtime, and 
keep them updated even if policies evolve over time. Additionally, some other relevant aspects have 
also been addressed and overcome by the DACA such as the exploitation and preservation of CLI 
features, increased secure mechanisms and awareness of FGACM at development time of 
application tiers. Additionally, the DACA is the result of a continuous research that started on 
modelization of CLI, followed to the componentization of CLI and only then the DACA was devised 
and designed. Modelization and componentization of CLI are also two second level contributions of 
this thesis. 
The remaining two second level contributions are also related to CLI. One is focused on a 
proposal to increase the performance of CLI whenever concurrency is needed on LMS, which is 
presented in the Annex B. Two approaches were designed. One based on standard JDBC [Pereira, 
'07b] and the other based on a new JDBC with embedded concurrent services [Gomes, '11]. The last 
contribution [Pereira, '13b], presented in the Annex C, is focused on an architecture to implement 
multi-propose components from CLI. Multi-propose components are able to address different 
organizational and different runtime needs . 
6.3 Discussion 
The DACA was evaluated against the research objectives initially defined. There are other issues 
that also deserve a brief reflection, in spite of not being key aspects of this thesis. As such, a brief 
description is presented about seven different aspects: FGACP, scalability of the DACA, 
maintainability of the DACA, autonomic computing and the DACA, configurability of the DACA, 
usability of the DACA and applicability of other technologies than CLI. 
 
FGACP 
This work is about how to implement FGACM on components relying on CLI and not about 
FGACP. The DACA is independent from the policies to be applied. In practice, FGACP can be 
defined using some of the approaches presented by other authors. The only constraint is that 
from the established FGACP, the DACA requires Business Schemas as input and the associated 
CRUD expressions. 
 
Scalability 
Unlike some approaches to implement access control mechanisms, such as those based on the 
centralized and mixed architectures, their implementation in the DACA is completely 
distributed. Each client application is responsible for two fundamental aspects: to decide upon 
granting or denying the access to protected data and to enforce the decision. There is no central 
system interfering in this process. It is completely distributed. Regarding the Policy Server, if 
for some reason, it exceeds an established threshold of loading, the Policy Server may be 
deployed using any common horizontal scalability approach. 
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Maintainability 
Business Logic and the correspondent FGACM are automatically built and updated at runtime. 
This feature clearly eliminates the need to carry out maintenance activities at the Business 
Logic and at the FGACM level. Moreover, any maintenance activity, at the level of the policies, is 
deployed and implemented automatically in all client applications. This is clearly different from 
what happens in all implementations of other authors as presented and described in sub-
section 2.4.2. 
 
Autonomic Computing 
An autonomic system is characterized by making decisions on its own. It permanently checks 
the context and, based on policies, it automatically adapts itself. The DACA is not an autonomic 
system but systems based on the DACA are easily integrated in autonomic systems. An 
autonomic system prepared to detect situations where FGACP need to be dynamically adapted, 
can use the DACA to dynamically adapt the mechanisms.  
 
Configurability 
In this thesis we presented an approach for a partial configuration process of FGACM metadata. 
The process is substantially automated if an enhanced tool similar to the one presented in 
[Pereira, '11b] is used. The new tool would create Business Schemas automatically from CRUD 
expressions and would also aggregate sibling CRUD schemas. Moreover, the tool could also 
automate the process to obtain the basic set of Business Schemas and CRUD expressions to 
access databases on a table basis as O/RM tools and LINQ do. 
 
Usability 
CLI are very poor regarding their usability. The DACA overcomes some of the most relevant 
aspects of their lack of usability: 
 Whenever CLI are being used, programmers need to master database schemas to deal 
with each retrieved attribute of each CRUD expression. With DACA, IRead, IInsert and 
IUpdate interfaces provide schema-driven getter and setter methods, avoiding the need 
to master database schemas for each CRUD expression. 
 Whenever CLI are being used, programmers need to know the instantiation context of 
LMS. With the DACA, only the valid methods are available, this way avoiding runtime 
exceptions. 
 Whenever CLI are being used, there is no easy way to link CRUD expressions and the 
applications they assist. With the DACA, the linkage is provided by schema-driven and 
type safe methods. 
 The DACA, unlike CLI, transform runtime errors into compile errors. If the name of an 
attribute is modified, then the associated Business Schemas (IRead, IUpdate and IInsert 
interfaces) are also modified. Then, when the application tier is re-compiled, the 
compiler will detect all errors where the source-code of application tiers was not 
updated. With CLI, names of attributes are encoded inside strings, this way preventing 
any disconformity from being detected at compile time. 
 
Applicability 
JDBC was the main API used to build DACC. While the Policy Server and the Policy Manager do 
not rely on any specific architecture, the DACC completely relies on the architecture of CLI. In 
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order to evaluate the possibility of using other tools than CLI to build the DACC, a successful 
attempt was achieved with ADO.NET. The implementation in ADO.NET was mainly done to 
evaluate if the main architectural aspects of the DACC are flexible enough to be used with 
different architectural paradigms. There were some technical aspects that needed some 
adjustments, but the final result is a DACC based on ADO.NET. The adjustments were mainly 
related with: 
 scrolling policies on LMS – ADO.NET uses an index to choose the selected row. 
 functionalities of LMS – scrollability and updatability concepts are restricted to 
scrollable and updatable. 
 
The only difference between the DACC used on the proof of concept and the one based on 
ADO.NET is that it was assumed that the building process of Business Entities at runtime is also 
possible in the .NET framework. Thus, the ADO.NET version defines all the Business Schemas 
and CRUD expressions presented in Table 4 at development time. The behavior of the 
component is dynamically updated whenever a role is assigned or unassigned but the 
automatic building process of Business Entities is not implemented. 
A DbProof based on ADO.NET is also available from here (url: ned.av.ia.it.pt; username: 
DACA; password: guest) and the main GUI, correspondent to the DbProof, is presented in Figure 
61. 
 
 
 
Figure 61. DbProof implemented inADO.NET. 
 
From my background, I foresee that DACC may rely on any CLI or even on any technologic 
paradigm used for building business tiers. Regarding O/RM tools, they should not be 
considered as an option because they are mostly oriented to handle database tables as entity 
classes which is too restrictive to most database applications. CRUD expressions may also be 
handled by O/RM tools but that is not their focus. Additionally, O/RM tools use CLI as the 
underlying middleware, this way behaving as an additional layer in the DACA. Regarding LINQ, 
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due to the static syntax validation of the SQL at writing time, it would be interesting to evaluate 
how to adapt DACA to rely on LKINQ instead on CLI. 
6.4 Future Work 
Future work is organized around seven main objectives. The first one aims at extending the actual 
DACC to support additional access modes of CLI. The second one aims at devising a FGACP and the 
correspondent tool to validate accesses based on the access modes of CLI. The third one aims to 
deepen the research already started to provide a thread-safe implementation of the DACC. The 
fourth one aims at deepen the research already started to provide a multi-function propose for 
components based on CLI. The fifth one is focused on extending the FGACP to the runtime values 
that are used on CRUD expressions. The sixth is focused on devising a model to allow orchestration 
of Business Entities. The seventh and last one is focused on re-designing to be based on LINQ 
instead on CLI. 
6.4.1 Extending DACC to Support Additional Access Modes 
The DACC supports the Direct Access Mode and the Indirect Access Mode of CLI. However, CLI 
support other additional access modes, such as access to stored procedures and execution of CRUD 
expression in batch mode. Thereby, extending the DACC to support the other access modes is 
considered an important step to cover all the access modes provided by CLI. The batch mode uses a 
buffer to store CRUD expressions. Whenever required, the stored CRUD expressions are processed 
as batch job. Stored procedures are software units stored in a RDBMS and available to client 
applications. Stored procedures may execute any task but are mainly used to access to stored data. 
6.4.2 Fine-grained Access Control Policies for the DACA 
The presented work does not cover FGACP. To address this aspect, future work can be organized in 
two complementary steps: model definition and FGACP definition. 
The model herein presented for the implementation of FGACM on CLI, shown in Figure 43, 
needs to be improved to be usable in real database applications. Beyond the model, an improved 
Security Configurator is needed to keep the configuration process as easy as possible. 
Regarding the FGACP definition, DACA is not dependent on any FGACP, which is considered a 
key advantage. Regarding the Direct Access Mode, this independency potentially allows the use of 
any of the proposed approaches that have as output authorized CRUD expressions. Regarding the 
Indirect Access Mode, current approaches do not provide any solution. Eventually, the use of the 
Indirect Access Mode could also be inferred from the authorized FGACP. This is an open issue 
deserving a thoroughly research to devise a complete model for FGACP to be dynamically enforced 
on CLI. 
6.4.3 Concurrent Approach of Call Level Interfaces 
CLI do not provide any mechanism to support concurrency. This may be considered another 
drawback of CLI if several threads need to access data using the same database connection. In order 
to evaluate the impact of implementing a thread-safe version of CLI, two researches were carried 
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out, both having promising results as outcome. The first research evaluated the implementation of 
thread-safe services at the level of CLI [Pereira, '10a]. The second research evaluated the 
implementation of thread-safe services at the JDBC driver level ( TDS  - Tabular Data Stream) 
[Gomes, '11] [Microsoft, '12], see Figure 10. Several threads share one LMS to execute read, update, 
insert and delete actions. 
 The collected results show that significant performance improvement is achieved for both 
approaches when compared with the traditional approach where each thread manages and 
interacts with its own database connection.  Annex B describes the results that have been achieved 
for both approaches. 
The research already undertaken needs to be continued to deepen and also to validate the 
collected results. Then, the knowledge gained from the research should be used to devise a thread-
safe implementation of the DACC. 
6.4.4 Multi-function Components 
In [Pereira, '13b] a new architecture is presented to address a new research challenge: business 
tiers components aimed at addressing different organizational and runtime needs. Organizational 
needs may include separation of roles for the development processes of business tiers and 
application tiers. Runtime needs may include the need to support new business requirements at 
runtime. Annex C describes the results that have been achieved for both approaches. 
6.4.5 Extending FGACP to the Runtime Values of CRUD expressions 
The runtime values that are used on CRUD expressions are critical because they are dynamically 
defined by users at runtime, this way enabling users to request the access to different data in each 
execution cycle. We present three examples to justify our claims. The first one is based on a native 
Select expression, the second one is based on a native Update expression and, finally, the third one 
is based on modifying the contents of a record set containing data retrieved by a Select expression 
(in these cases the modifications are also committed to the host database). The following example 
is a simple Select expression. 
 
            Select t1.* from table1 t1, table2 t2 
                   Where t1.id = t2.t1_id and 
                         t1.value > pValue 
 
The parameter (runtime value) pValue plays a key role to decide which data are retrieved from 
table1. In each individual execution cycle, the parameter may have a different value, this way 
retrieving a different set of records from table1. To overcome this source of possible security gaps, 
two approaches are used to implement the access control mechanisms: centralized approach and 
distributed approach. Regarding the centralized approach, the most common technique is the use of 
views (with [Rizvi, '04] or without query rewriting techniques). This technique conveys several 
drawbacks among which the lack of scalability is emphasized [Lopez, '02b; Valle, '02]. Regarding 
the distributed approach, two techniques were proposed: in [Chlipala, '10] is proposed a new 
predicate, identified as known, to model which information users already know, this way covering 
the points here under discussion but only superficially; in [Caires, '11] the policies are statically 
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enforced at the table columns level and not at the CRUD expressions level, leading to lack of 
flexibility. 
The following example is the second example, which is  a  simple Update expression: 
 
 Update table1 t1 
                  set t1.value=pValue 
        Where t1.id=pId 
 
Similarly to the Select expression, this Update expression also uses parameters. The parameter 
pValue updates the attribute value of table1 of a record identified by another parameter pId. Once 
again, parameters are user defined and play a key role on Update expressions to decide the data to 
be updated. The current techniques and their limitations, previously described for Select 
expressions, are also applied to Update expressions. The remaining types of CRUD expressions, 
Insert and Delete, convey similar limitations. 
The last example is a very common situation on current tools that are used to develop business 
tiers, such as JDBC [Parsian, '05], Hibernate [Christian, '04], ADO.NET [Pablo, '07] and LINQ [Erik, 
'06]. The example shows that beyond the use of CRUD expressions, databases are also modifiable by 
executing protocols on data retrieved by Select expressions. The example shows that after 
retrieving data from a database, it is kept in record sets (recordSet) and then applications are 
allowed to update their content through an update protocol. In this case the attribute 
attributeName was updated to value and then the modification was committed. This case is 
different from the two previous ones because there is no evidence of any CRUD expression and 
users are modifying data they have been previously authorized to retrieve. Even so, we cannot 
despise the need to control the runtime values being used to modify the contents of those record 
sets and, therefore, used to modify the contents of databases. Beyond the update protocol, current 
tools also provide an insert protocol where users are also allowed to use runtime values. 
 
 recordSet=executeSelectExpression(sql) 
 recordSet.update(“attributeName”, value) 
 recordsSet.commit() 
 
Currently, there isn´t any known access control technique to enforce policies at the business 
tier level and able to statically control the provenance of runtime values that are used on actions 
issued against databases. To overcome this situation a first approach has been presented [Pereira, 
'13g] where parameters are statically driven by access control policies enforced at the business tier 
level. 
6.4.6 Orchestration of Business Entities 
The DACA does support orchestration of Business Entities, this way preventing FGACM to be 
implemented also at a higher level. For example, a role may comprise a specific task where the 
execution of CRUD expressions must follow a specific sequence. 
6.4.7 The DACA Based on LINQ 
As already mentioned, the DACA may be easily based on other tools beyond the CLI. This is true if 
the tool is not LINQ. LINQ is a C# language extension aimed at editing SQL statements whose syntax 
is statically validated at editing time. This powerful feature cannot be removed from LINQ and, thus, 
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it seems to be a significant challenge to simultaneously enforce FGACP while the SQL statements 
are being edited. 
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Annex A – Logical model for metadata of FGACM 
 
This annex presents the logical model that was used in the DACA proof of concept. This model 
derives from the conceptual model presented in Figure 43. 
 
 
Sub_Subject
PK Sub_id INTEGER
U1 Sub_username CHAR(25)
U1 Sub_password CHAR(25)
App_Application
PK App_id INTEGER
U1 App_reference CHAR(25)
 App_description VARCHAR(100)
 App_BusinessSchemas VARBINARY(0)
SubApp
PK SubApp_id INTEGER
FK1,U1 SubAppSub_id INTEGER
FK2,U1 SubAppApp_id INTEGER
Rol_Role
PK Rol_id INTEGER
U1 Rol_reference CHAR(10)
 Rol_description VARCHAR(100)
FK1 RolRol_id INTEGER
AppRol
PK AppRol_id INTEGER
FK1,U1 AppRolApp_id INTEGER
FK2,U1 AppRolRol_id INTEGER
Bus_BusinessSchema
PK Bus_id INTEGER
 Bus_reference VARCHAR(100)
 Bus_url VARCHAR(100)
Crd_Crud
PK Crd_id INTEGER
U2 Crd_crud VARCHAR(1000)
U1 Crd_reference VARCHAR(100)
BusCrd
PK BudCrud_id INTEGER
FK1,U1 BusCrdBus_id INTEGER
FK2,U1 BusCrdCrd_id INTEGER
RolBus
PK RolBus_id INTEGER
FK1,U1 RolBusRol_id INTEGER
FK2,U1 RolBusBus_id INTEGER
Del_Delegation
PK Del_id INTEGER
FK1 DelSubApp_id INTEGER
FK2 DelAppRol_id INTEGER
Aut_Authorization
PK Aut_id INTEGER
 Aut_code INTEGER
FK1,U1 AutSubApp_id INTEGER
FK2,U1 AutRol_id INTEGER
Ses_Session
PK Ses_id INTEGER
FK1 SesSubApp_id INTEGER
 Ses_clientIP CHAR(16)
 Ses_clientPort INTEGER
Mgr_Manager
PK Mgr_IP CHAR(25)
 Mgr_port INTEGER
 
Figure 62. Logical model for the proof of concept. 
Next follows a description of the main tables of the logical model: tables and attributes. 
 
Mgr_Manager 
Table Mgr_Manager stores the required information to restore connections with Policy 
Managers whenever necessary. 
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Mgr_IP – Policy Managers IP. 
Mgr_port –listening port. 
 
Sub_Subject 
Table Sub_Subject stores information to identify all the legitimate users. 
 
Sub_id – surrogate primary key. 
Sub_username – legitimate users’ username. 
Sub_password – legitimate users’ password. 
 
 
App_Application 
Table App_Application stores information about the legitimate applications. 
 
App_id – surrogate primary key. 
App_reference – application reference. 
App_description – application description. 
App_BusinessSchemas – file containing all the Business Schemas for this application. The 
value 0 (zero) should be replaced by MAX or any other adequate 
value able to hold the used business schemas. 
 
Ses_Session 
Table Ses_session stores information about subjects running applications and their associated 
Policy Manager. 
 
Ses_id – surrogate primary key. 
Ses_SubApp_id – subject running an application. 
Ses_clientIP – associated Policy Manager IP. 
Ses_clientPort – associated Policy Manager port. 
 
Rol_Role 
Table Rol_Role stores definitions of roles. Roles are hierarchized. 
 
Rol_id – surrogate primary key. 
Rol_reference – role reference. 
Rol_description – role description. 
RolRol_id – parent Rol_id. 
 
Bus_BusinessSchema 
Table Bus_BusinessSchema about Business Schemas. 
 
Bus_id – surrogate primary key. 
Bus_name – name to be used when data structures are built to convey awareness of FGACM. 
Bus_url – url for the Business Schema in App_BusinessSchemas. 
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Crd_Crud 
Table Crd_Crud stores information about the supported CRUD expressions. 
 
Crd_id – surrogate primary key. 
Crd_reference – name to be used when data structures are built to convey awareness of 
FGACM. 
Crd_crud – CRUD expression. 
 
 
Aut_Authorization 
Table Aut_Authorization stores the information about authorizations to subjects running 
applications to play roles. 
 
Aut_id – surrogate primary key. 
Aut_code – authorization codes. In this case there are two possibilities: authorization 
granted or denied. 
AutSubApp_id – assignment of applications to subjects. 
AutRol_id – assignment of roles to subjects running applications. 
 
 
Del_Delegation 
Table Del_Delegation stores information about roles delegated to subjects running applications. 
 
Del_id – surrogate primary key. 
DelSubApp_id – assignment of applications to subjects. 
DelAppRol – assignment of roles to subjects running applications. 
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Annex B - Concurrency on CLI 
 
Actions on LMS are tuple and protocol oriented and, while being executed, cannot be preempted to 
start another protocol. This restriction leads to several difficulties when applications need to deal 
with several tuples and several protocols at a time. The most paradigmatic case is the impossibility 
to cope with concurrent environments where several threads need to access to the same LMS 
instance, each one pointing to a different tuple and executing its own protocol. In order to evaluate 
the possibility of implementing a thread safe version of CLI, two approaches were followed: 
wrapper approach and the embedded approach. 
 
Wrapper approach 
The wrapper approach uses standard CLI with native RDBMS protocols. Basically, the wrapper 
approach wraps LMS and exposes a set of services which are protocol-oriented to provide a 
thread-safe access to LMS. A paper has been published with the preliminary results [Pereira, 
'10a]. Some additional research has been done and published [Pereira, '13c]. The final results 
are herein presented in this annex.  
 
Embedded approach 
The embedded approach is a more ambitious approach than the wrapper approach. The 
embedded approach uses modified RDBMS protocols, in our case Tabular Data Stream (TDS)  
[Microsoft, '12], to support concurrency on LMS. The work done in [Gomes, '11] showed that 
significant improvements are achieved if concurrency is applied directly on internal LMS data 
structures, even when compared with those obtained in the wrapper approach.  
B.1 CTSA- The Wrapper Approach 
To deepen the research initiated in [Pereira, '10a] some additional work was done. The 
methodology to implement concurrency was tuned and a much more detailed performance 
assessment has been carried out. The outcome is a Concurrent Tuple Set Architecture (CTSA) to 
manage concurrency on LMS.  
 
B.1.1 CTSA Presentation 
CTSA wraps CLI and provides thread safe services to access LMS. CTSA takes LMS as the main input 
entity hides its methods and exposes a new interface, which is thread-safe and, above all, is 
designed to improve concurrency between concurrent threads. In order to characterize LMS, their 
protocols may be organized in two orthogonal groups: 
 
Scrollability 
Scrollability defines the policies to scroll on the returned tuples. There are two mutual- 
exclusive possibilities: forward-only (move one tuple forward at a time) and scrollable (move  
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backward or forward any number of tuples). 
 
Updatability 
Updatability defines the policies to interact with the tuples kept inside LMS. There are two 
mutual-exclusive possibilities: read-only (only read protocol is supported) and updatable (read, 
insert, update and delete protocols are supported). 
 
 These different types of functionalities, scrollability and updatability, raise an important 
question: is it necessary to provide concurrency for all types of LMS? Regarding scrollability, 
forward-only LMS are very restrictive because they would oblige all threads to simultaneously 
point to the same tuple which could hardly happen in real scenarios. Regarding updatability, 
concurrency makes sense for both types: read-only and updatable. Read-only LMS always provide a 
subset of the functionalities of updatable LMS and, hence, in order to address and assess the most 
general case, we chose to implement a concurrent version for scrollable and updatable LMS. CTSA 
introduces the concept of execution context as the information needed to characterize, at any time, 
the interaction between a thread and a component based on the CTSA. The execution context of 
each thread comprises the protocol that is being executed and the current selected tuple. This 
concept is very important because it is the basis for the concurrent implementation of LMS. In 
concurrent environments, each thread must have a complete control on the tuple and on the 
protocol it is executing. If this is not ensured, a running thread may be preempted by another 
thread that changes the execution context.  The first thread will never be aware about this situation 
and when it becomes the running thread it will execute its protocol in a different execution context. 
In order to keep full control on the execution context, each thread needs to access the LMS in 
exclusive mode and also to be able to assure that it runs on its own execution context. The former 
condition ensures that other threads are not allowed to change the execution context of protocols 
that are being executed. The latter condition ensures that at the beginning of any protocol, if 
necessary, every thread is able to restore its execution context. To decide upon which strategy to 
follow to implement both conditions, several possibilities were considered and tested. They may be 
classified in two distinct groups:  
 method oriented: execution context is managed method by method; 
 protocol oriented: execution context is managed at the protocol level. 
 
 Table 9 briefly shows the logic associated to each approach. To evaluate the implication of each 
approach, an assessment has been carried out. Results have shown that for the same scenarios,  
 
 
Method oriented Protocol oriented 
1. get exclusive access 
2. set execution context 
3. execute method 
4. store execution context 
5. release exclusive access 
1. get exclusive access 
2. set execution context 
3. while protocol is not over 
        execute method 
4. store execution context 
5. release exclusive access 
Table 9. Exclusive access mode approaches. 
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performance and concurrency improvement depend on the same variable but in opposite ways. 
They depend on the number of times that threads are preempted by other threads. Every time this 
occurs, a change in the  execution   contexts   must   be   performed. When   this   number   increases 
performance tends to decrease and concurrency tends to increase. When this number decreases, 
performance tends to increase and concurrency tends to decrease. Taking this into account, it 
would not be possible to carry out a detailed assessment for all scenarios. Thus, a structure was 
defined that would typify real scenarios: 
 
 
while there is next tuple { // method oriented action 
       execute a general block of code and/or a method oriented 
       execute a protocol oriented action 
       execute a general block of code and/or a method oriented action 
       execute a protocol oriented action 
        … 
} 
 
In this structure the scrolling process takes place at an outer level, which is the most common 
practice, and it is performed by a single scrolling method. In the inner level, programmers are 
encouraged to avoid the execution of general code and/or method oriented actions while any 
protocol oriented action is being performed. General code inside protocol oriented actions extends 
the locking period, this way increasing the possibility to occur a request for a switching in the 
execution context. This request would not succeed and the thread would have to wait for the 
protocol to end. This leads to two unwanted situations: decay in performance and decay in 
concurrency, derived by the unsuccessful switching in the execution context only. Thus, the 
presented structure leads to the following options for the access mode:  
 Implemented as method oriented for all actions that could be completely and undoubtedly 
accomplish with a single method; 
 Implemented as protocol oriented for the remaining actions. Thus, access mode for Delete 
and Scroll protocols were considered as method oriented and access mode for Read, Insert 
and Update protocols were considered as protocol oriented. 
 
 
+moveNext() : bool
+moveFirst() : bool
+moveAbsolute(in position : int) : bool
+isFirst() : bool
+...()
«interface»
IScroll
+beginRead()
+endRead()
+getInt(in idx : long(idl)) : long(idl)
+getString(in idx : long(idl)) : string(idl)
+...()
«interface»
IRead
+beginUpdate()
+endUpdate()
+cancelUpdate()
+setInt(in idx : long(idl), in value : string(idl))
+setString(in idx : long(idl), in value : string(idl))
+...()
«interface»
IUpdate
+beginInsert()
+endInsert()
+cancelInsert()
+setInt(in idx : long(idl), in value : string(idl))
+setString(in idx : long(idl), in value : string(idl))
+...()
«interface»
IInsert
+delete()
«interface»
IDelete
 
Figure 63. CTSA main protocols. 
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Figure 63 presents the interfaces for the five main protocols: IRead, IInsert, IUpdate, IDelete and   
IScroll. Only   the  main   methods   of   IRead, IUpdate, IInsert and IScroll protocols  have   been 
presented in order to not overcrowd the class diagrams. Exclusive access mode based on the 
protocol oriented strategy needs a start event (beginRead, beginUpdate and beginInsert) to start 
the protocol and an end event (endRead, endUpdate and endInsert) to end the protocol. Exclusive 
access mode based on the method oriented strategy does not need any additional event but the 
methods themselves. 
 
Figure 64 presents a simplified CTSA class diagram for a scrollable and updatable LMS. Each 
thread receives a new instance of a component based on the CTSA  where  all instances share the 
same LMS instance. lms is for the LMS instance, currentTuple is the index of the current selected 
tuple, protocol is the protocol being executed (if any) and lock is the object being used to grant the 
exclusive access mode to the LMS. setExecutionContext restores the execution  context for the  
access mode just started and storeExecutionContext saves the current execution context just ended. 
 
 
+CTSA(in lms : LMS, in lock : LOCK)
-setExecutionContext()
-storeExecutionContext()
-lms : LMS
-currentTuple : long(idl)
-protocol : long(idl)
-lock : LOCK
CTSA
IRead
IUpdate
IInsert
IDelete IScroll  
Figure 64. CTSA class diagram. 
B.1.3 Proof of Concept 
This section evaluates CTSA using a proof of concept implemented in Java and JDBC. The ResultSet 
interface of JDBC API is used as a representative of LMS.  
Figure 65 presents the CTSA constructor, its arguments and the initialization steps: rs is the 
LMS and lock is the object used to grant the exclusive access mode. After its instantiation, the 
execution context points to the tuple immediately before the first one, as happens with CLI (LMS 
use before first and after last tuple positions. Immediately after the execution of a Select statement, 
by default, the current selected tuple is the tuple before the first one). 
 
 
Figure 65. CTSA constructor. 
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Figure 66 partially presents the read protocol. beginRead gets the exclusive access mode for the 
read protocol and then sets the execution context for the active thread. From now on, the thread 
may read the attributes of its current selected tuple. In Figure 66 it is only shown one method 
(getInt) to read attributes of type Integer. The IRead interface comprises all other necessary 
methods to support the additional data types. The protocol ends after the execution of endRead 
method which saves the current execution context and then releases the exclusive access mode. 
From now on, other protocols may be executed. The update and insert protocols, of which exclusive 
access mode is also protocol oriented, may be easily inferred from the read protocol. Thus their 
code will not be shown. 
 
 
 
Figure 66. Partial view of IRead protocol. 
 
Figure 67 shows the method moveNext which belongs to the scrolling protocol. Exclusive access 
mode of Scroll protocol is method oriented and, thus, all methods execute a lock and an unlock 
process. It is also necessary to set the execution context before moving the cursor one tuple 
forward to ensure the correct positioning. After moving the cursor, the execution context must also 
be saved. Method next() returns a boolean, indicating if in the current position it is or it is not After 
Last tuple. 
 
 
 
Figure 67. Partial view of IScroll protocol. 
Figure 68 presents the process used to set and to store the execution context. The concepts 
Before First tuple and After Last tuple are used to define the position immediately before and 
immediately after the first and the last tuple, respectively. These concepts are common in CLI and 
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need a special treatment regarding the execution context. In JDBC the first tuple is indexed by 1. In 
storeExecutionContext, isBeforeFirst (equal to -1) and isAfterLast (equal to -2) say if the cursor is 
pointing to the position immediately before or after the first or last tuple, respectively. 
 
Figure 69 shows CTSA usage from users’ perspective. The thread receives a CTSA instance in 
the constructor and accesses its LMS through the provided protocols. moveNext belongs to the 
scrolling protocol and therefore the exclusive access is method oriented. Before reading any 
attribute, it is necessary to get the exclusive access mode and set the execution context, which is 
achieved through the method beginRead. After reading all the attributes, the exclusive access is 
released through the method endRead. 
 
 
 
Figure 68. Set and store the execution context. 
 
 
Figure 69.CTSA from users’s perspective. 
B.1.4 CTSA Performance Assessment 
Performance  assessment was carried out comparing  two entities known as the Component CTSA  
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(C-CTSA) and the Concurrent JDBC (C-JDBC). C-CTSA is responsible for evaluating components 
relying on the CTSA architecture and it is based on a component derived from the proof of concept 
here presented. C-JDBC is responsible for evaluating a concurrent approach based only on the 
standard JDBC API. The evaluation of both entities comprises a single façade: performance. The 
impossibility to assess all scenarios, led to a survey to define some scenarios that could be 
representative of common situations. To this end, we needed to identify the relevant aspects 
directly related and controlled by users of CTSA that could influence CTSA performance. Based both 
on empirical experiences and knowledge about CTSA, the aspects considered relevant were: the 
protocol being executed, the number of rows to be processed and the number of simultaneous 
running threads. Thus, three scenarios were defined for the three main types of protocols for both 
components: Select (s), Update (u) and Insert (i). Each scenario comprises a set of several numbers 
of tuples to be processed [nr] and a set of several numbers of simultaneous running threads [nt]. In 
order to formalize the entities’ representation we define E(α,p,γ) ([nt], [nr]) where α{c-ctsa,c-jdbc}, 
p is for performance façade and γ{s,u,i}. To simplify, E(α,p,γ) ([nt], [nr]) is represented by default as 
E(α,p,γ). To get a threshold for the performance of each entity, it was decided to create a favorable 
environment to C-JDBC and an unfavorable environment to C-CTSA to execute the scenarios. This 
way, the minimum performance of real scenarios should be delimited by the collected 
measurements. This issue will be addressed in more detail mainly after explaining the SQL Server 
behavior about LMS. 
The test-bed comprises two computers: PC1 - Dell Latitude E5500, Intel Duo Core P8600 
@2.40GHz, 4.00 GB RAM, Windows Vista Enterprise Service Pack 2 (32bits), Java SE 6, 
JDBC(sqljdbc4); PC2 – Asus-P5K-VM, Intel Duo Core  E6550 @2,33 GHz, 4.00 GB RAM, Windows XP 
Professional Service Pack 3, SQL Server 2008. C-JDBC and C-CTSA are executed on PC1 and SQL 
Server runs on PC2. In order to promote an ideal environment the following actions were taken: the 
running threads were given the highest priority and all non-essential processes/services were 
cancelled in both PCs; a direct and dedicated network cable connecting PC1 and PC2 has been  used   
in   exclusive   mode   and   performing   100MBits   of   bandwidth. Transactions were not used and 
auto-Commit has been always enabled (changes to LMS are automatically committed to the host 
database when protocols are ended).  A new database was created in conformance with the schema 
presented in Figure 70 to assess both entities. 
 
 
 
Figure 70. Std_Student schema. 
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 In order to avoid some overhead added by SQL Server, some default SQL Server database 
properties were changed as, Auto Update Statistics = false and Recovery Model = Simple. Some 
important aspects are out of the scope of this study. Aspects as database server performance, 
network delays and memory consumption are not individually addressed but considered as part of 
the overall environment. This   has   been   assumed   because   both   entities   share   the   same 
infrastructure. It is essential to recall SQL Server behavior, which is similar to most of other 
relevant relational database management systems, to completely understand the collected 
measurements of each scenario. When a Select statement is executed using a scrollable or an 
updatable LMS, SQL Server creates a server cursor with all the selected tuples. These tuples are 
dynamically transferred in blocks, from the server, to LMS whenever necessary. This means that at 
any time LMS may not have all the tuples but only a sub-set of all tuples. When users point to a 
tuple that is not present in the LMS, the Tabular Data Stream (TDS) [Microsoft] protocol discards 
the current LMS’s content and fetches the block containing the desired tuple. This has a deep 
implication. If threads are always requesting tuples that are not present in the LMS, SQL Server has 
to transfer the correspondent block for each requested tuple. In an extreme scenario, each 
individual action on an LMS may imply the transference of a new block of tuples. From the previous 
statements, it is expected that the number of blocks to be transferred will increase when the 
number of tuples increases and also when the probability of a thread to request tuples that are not 
present in an LMS increases. Thus, to create different environments for both entities, the following 
decisions were taken: 
C-JDBC (favorable environment):  each thread has its own LMS and will always access tuples 
sequentially from the first one till the last one. 
C-CTSA (unfavorable environment): three conditions were implemented: 1) all threads share 
the same LMS; 2) after accessing a tuple, each thread will give the opportunity to other threads to 
become the running thread by voluntarily leaving the running state - this will maximize the number 
of changes in the execution context; 3) each thread will have its own set of tuples, not shared with 
any other thread - this will maximize the number of blocks of tuples to be transferred from server 
cursors to LMS. 
Table 10 shows the algorithm for the assessment of E(c-ctsa,p,γ). The same ResultSet is shared by 
all [nt] threads. Each thread executes its scenario for a group ψ=[nr] adjacent tuples and auto-
suspends itself after accessing each tuple. The intersection of all ψ= . 
Table 11 shows the algorithm for the assessment of E(c-jdbc,p,γ). Each thread creates its own 
ResultSet (LMS) containing/inserting a group of ψ=[nr] adjacent tuples. The intersection of all 
ψ= . 
 
 
1. Delete all rows from Std_Student 
2. Fill Std_Student with [nr]*[nt] rows (zero rows for insert) 
3. Start counter 
4. Select all rows from Std_Student into one single ResultSet 
5. Create all threads. 
6. Each thread (ψ tuples) 
        6.1 for each tuple 
            6.1.1 read/update/insert (tuple) 
            6.1.2 suspend thread 
       6.2 dies 
7. Wait all threads to die 
8. Stop counter 
Table 10. Algorithm for E(c-jdbc,p,γ) assessment. 
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1. Delete all rows from Std_Student 
2. Fill Std_Student with [nr]*[nt] rows (zero rows for insert) 
3. Start counter 
4. Create all threads. 
5. Each thread: 
     5.1  select ψ tuples into its own ResultSet 
     5.2  for each tuple 
         5.2.1 read/update/insert a tuple 
     5.3  dies  
6. Wait all threads to die 
7. Stop counter 
Table 11. Algorithm for E(c-jdbc,p,γ) assessment 
To contextualize the performance assessment environment some initial measurements were 
carried out to delimit the range of [nt] and [nr] to be used. In order to emphasize concurrency 
mechanisms, priority was given to the range of [nt] in detriment of [nr]. Values for these metrics 
were collected by empirical experimentation based on an iterative process. The idea is to gather a 
set of values for [nt] and [nr] that may be used to assess and compare the performance of both 
E(α,p,γ) entities. To accomplish this, both entities, E(c-ctsa,p,γ) and E(c-jdbc,p,γ) were executed under several 
combinations of [nt] and [nr] until the collected measurements comprise a range of behaviors 
considered satisfactory to accurately assess and compare the performance of both entities. After 
several iterations it was decided that the execution environment should be defined as: 
 
[nt]={1,5,10,25,50,75,100,150,200,250,350,500} 
[nr]={5,10,25,50,75,100} 
 
In accordance with the requirements, this execution environment evaluates the performance 
by maximizing the number of simultaneous running threads in detriment of the number of tuples. 
With 500 threads and 100 tuples it was possible to accurately assess and foresee the performance 
behavior of both entities. This was the main reason for their acceptance. The intermediate collected 
measurements showed to be enough to obtain well defined charts for the behaviors of both entities. 
Just as a final note, some scenarios took some minutes to setup and to process the highest values of 
[nt] and [nr]. This knowledge was also considered to delimit the two top values (nr=100 and 
nt=500), this way avoiding any risk to successfully accomplish the collecting process of all 
necessary measurements. For the assessment, 100 raw measurements were collected for each 
E(α,p,γ)([nt],[nr]) leading to (2x3x12x6)x100=43,200 raw measurements. Intermediate 
measurements were computed from the average of the 5 best measurements of each 
E(α,p,γ)([nt],[nr]) leading to a total of 2x3x12x6=432 measurements. The final measurements used in 
the next charts represent the ratios between E(c-jdbc,p,γ) and E(c-ctsa,p,γ) for each ([nt],[nr]). In all charts 
the vertical axis is for the ratios and the horizontal axis is for the [nt]. 
 
Select scenario 
The chart for the select scenario is shown in Figure 71. From it, it is clear that the ratios decrease 
whenever the number of tuples increases and whenever the number of threads increases (for most 
nt). This derives from the fact that  E(c-jdbc,p,γ) have [nt] server cursors and each thread sequentially 
reads its own tuples from the first one till the last one. Thus, the transference of block of tuples only 
happens when a thread tries to read the next tuple that is after the last one contained in its own 
ResultSet. The probability for this to happen increases with the number of rows. Regarding E(c-ctsa,p,γ) 
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there is only one server cursor shared by all threads. The implemented Read scenario significantly 
increases the possibility of each thread to be requesting a tuple that is not present in the ResultSet 
and, therefore, to trigger a new transference of block of tuples. With other different strategies, for 
example where threads read shared sets of tuples, the block transference rate should be much 
lower leading to an increase on its performance. Another relevant issue is that the Select scenario is 
a light scenario mainly because the Select statement and Read protocol are very efficient when 
compared with the other protocols. Thus, the overhead induced by the blocks transference have a 
deeper impact in the overall performance. The impact increases with the number of tuples and the 
number of threads. Figure 72 presents a detailed view of all results. The ratio is greater or equal to 
1 in 35 situations and less than 1 in 37 situations. It also shows that the highest ratio is 3.44 (nr=5, 
nt=10) and the lowest one is 0.8 (nr=25, nt=100). These results show that despite the unfavorable 
conditions for C-CTSA, it still achieves significant results. For  example, the  relative  highest  gain  in 
performance (3.44) is much more significant than the relative highest lost in performance (0.8) and 
the average value is 1.21. 
 
 
 
Figure 71. E(c-jdbc,p,s) / E(c-ctsa,p,s) chart. 
 
Figure 72. E(c-jdbc,p,s) / E(c-ctsa,p,s) details. 
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Update scenario 
The chart for the update scenario is shown in Figure 73. The comments made to the Select scenario 
are also applied to the Update scenario, regarding the transference rate of block of tuples. The most 
significant differences are: 1) the update protocol is a heavy protocol and, thus, its overhead has a 
deep impact on both entities and in the collected measurements; 2) the E(c-jdbc,p,γ) entity has [nr] 
server cursors each one competing with the others to update the requested values while E(c-ctsa,p,γ) 
entity has only one server cursor and the competition is performed at the client side. Despite the 
unfavorable conditions for C-CTSA, in this scenario, the ratio is always significantly greater than 1. 
It increases in the range 1 < nt < 10 and for nt > 10 the ratios are practically stable for each 
individual [nr] (except for nr=5). Another relevant issue is that the ratios decrease when [nr] 
increases for every [nt]. 
 
 
 
Figure 73. E(c-jdbc,p,u) / E(c-ctsa,p,u) chart. 
Insert scenario 
The chart for the insert scenario is shown in Figure 74. The most relevant aspect is the slight but  
 
 
Figure 74. E(c-jdbc,p,i) /E(c-ctsa,p,i) chart. 
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constant ratios increase with [nt] for each [nr], except for nr=5. In the initial stage, ResultSets empty 
and tuples are sequentially inserted and committed one by one in the host database table. In this 
scenario, in opposite to the others, all E(c-ctsa,p,γ) threads insert adjacent tuples this way minimizing 
the number of blocks to be transferred. In spite of being a very heavy scenario for both entities, the 
differences between C-CSTA and C-JDBC are enough to be noticed in the ratios. It is always greater 
than 1 and higher values of [nr] cause a decreasing in the ratios. 
B.1.5 Conclusion 
An architecture for a concurrent LMS of CLI, herein known as CTSA, has been presented. A proof of 
concept has also been presented based on a standard JDBC API. In order to assess CTSA 
performance in a concurrent environment and to compare it with an equivalent environment based 
on a standard JDBC solution, a test-bed has been defined and implemented with two concurrent 
entities: C-JDBC and C-CTSA. The measurements were collected using 3 scenarios. The scenarios 
were modeled to create favorable conditions to C-JDBC and unfavorable conditions to C-CTSA. This 
approach gives a much more secure perspective about the minimum expected gain in performance 
when using real scenarios. Thus, it is expected that when used in real scenarios, the gain in 
performance should be higher than the ones here presented and clearly bounded at the lower level 
by the ratios here presented. In spite of these adverse conditions, C-CTSA always gets better scores 
for the update and for the insert scenarios. In the Select scenario, C-CTSA obtained significant 
scores in the range of lower values of [nr] and [nt]. Anyway, for higher values of [nr] and [nt] the 
minimum ratio did not go below 0.8 which is still a remarkable score, considering the unfavorable 
conditions under which the assessment of C-CTSA took place. 
 
The outcome of this research should encourage programmers of concurrent applications that 
use LMS of CLI, to implement a CTSA to improve the overall performance. Moreover, CLI providers 
should be encouraged to release CLI with embedded concurrency. Embedded concurrency should 
have the advantages of accessing the LMS’s internal data structures to optimize the implementation 
of the different protocols. Very probably their results should be much better than the ones obtained 
through components derived on the CTSA as proved from the results obtained in [Gomes, '11]. 
B.2 Embedded Approach 
The embedded approach herein presented is based on a re-writing process of some parts of the 
original source-code of the ResultSet interface in order to make them thread-safe. The final 
document is available here [Gomes, '11] and, therefore, it will not be thoroughly described here.  
Only the key aspects are herein described and emphasized. 
B.2.1 Presentation 
Whenever a scrollable or updatable LMS is instantiated, RDBMS create a database cursor. This one 
to one relationship between LMS and server cursors is not a scalable solution let alone in situations 
where many threads need to share the same data of the same Select expression. Thus, the basic idea 
is to transform the one to one relationship into a many to one relationship, that is, several LMS 
instances use the same server cursor. Another key issue is the internal operation of LMS. LMS have 
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an internal cache with a pre-defined size where the tuples are kept in memory. Whenever a client 
requests access to a tuple that is not in memory, LMS request the RDBMS to send the requested 
row. The RDBMS send a set of tuples, in accordance with the cache size, containing the requested 
tuple. This approach is efficient whenever the tuples are sequentially accessed but it is critical 
whenever the tuples are accessed randomly. The latter case means that, in an extreme scenario, 
whenever a tuple is requested, a new access to the server cursor is necessary. 
B.2.2 Architecture 
Two solutions were implemented to address two common situations of concurrency between 
threads: each thread owns its private cache (individual cache) and all threads share the same cache 
of a LMS (shared cache). 
B.2.2.1 Individual Cache 
The individual cache implementation provides several separated caches, each one containing a set 
of tuples accessible to one thread only. From the internal implementation point of view, this 
implementation does not promote concurrency but it is  thread-safe.  
 
Advantages 
The individual cache presents two main advantages. Firstly, only one thread accesses the cache 
and, therefore, no concurrent mechanisms are necessary. The second advantage derives from 
the fact that when each thread needs no more tuples than those initially cached, the number of 
accesses to the server cursor is minimized. 
 
Disadvantages 
The individual cache presents three disadvantages. The first disadvantage has its origin on the 
need to copy tuples to each individual cache. The second disadvantage derives from the first 
and it is related to the existence of duplicated tuples. The third disadvantage also derives from 
the first and it is relevant when modifications occur in caches. The modified content is not 
immediately visible in other caches. 
B.2.2.2 Shared Cache 
Unlike the individual cache, the shared cache implementation uses one cache only, which is shared  
by all threads. The shared cache has advantages and disadvantages next described: 
 
Advantages 
There are three main advantages which are the counterpart of the disadvantages of the 
individual cache implementation. 
 
Disadvantages 
Two main disadvantages are emphasized. The first one is the need to a thread-safe 
implementation of shared caches. The second disadvantage is the need for a new server cursor 
whenever a thread accesses a tuple not contained in the cache. 
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B.2.3 Performance Assessment 
The performance assessment was carried out to compare: 
 the individual and shared caches; 
 individual and shared caches against implementations based on a C-JDBC and also against 
the previous CTSA approach. 
 
 Several contexts were defined to see their impact on the overall performance. The tested 
contexts were: 
 variable number or rows; 
 variable number of threads; 
 induced processing delays to simulate real scenarios - two scenarios were tested: 
o variable induced processing delays between consecutive attribute accesses 
following the next algorithm 
Access attribute 1 
Induced processing delay 
Access attribute 2 
…. 
 
o Variable induce processing delays between consecutive row accesses following the 
next algorithm 
Next row { 
    Access attribute 1 
    Access attribute 2   
    … 
    Induced processing delay 
} 
 
 Variable fetch size (number of fetched rows from server cursor to LMS). Were tested: 10%, 
20%, 50%, 75% and 100%. 
B.3 Conclusion 
The collected results have shown that the embedded approach leads to better performance results  
than the C-JDBC approach and the C-CTSA approach, see [Gomes, '11]. Thus,  the embedded 
approach is a promising approach to implement a thread-safe LMS. The collected results would be 
even better if there was a deeper knowledge about the operation of server cursors at the time the 
work was done. As a final remark, providers of CLI should be encouraged to deploy thread-safe 
versions of their products. 
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Annex C – ABTC: Multi-purpose Adaptable Business Tier 
Components 
 
This research leverages previous work on Modelization, Componentization and Access Control of 
business tiers based on CLI Only the relevant aspects will be detailed to avoid the repetition of 
previously discussed and presented aspects. 
C.1 Introduction 
CLI are general low level API that do not provide any high level assistance to address organizational 
and runtime needs. Three examples are provided: 
 
Organizational needs 
Some organizations decouple the development process of business tiers from the development 
process of application tiers. They are developed by different actors (people playing different 
roles). Unlike these organizations, others do not follow this separation of roles. The same 
person may be elected to play both roles. 
 
Runtime needs 
In some database applications, business tiers need to be dynamically adapted at runtime to 
address runtime needs. For example, to address evolving security needs or evolving business 
needs. 
 
This gap is mainly derived from technical aspects of CLI previously addressed: 
 source-code of business and application tiers is tangled and, therefore, the roles of 
programmers cannot be decoupled; 
 CLIdo not provide any means to adapt software to support different business needs, even if 
the CRUD expression is the same. Programmers have to re-write the same CRUD expression 
and re-write similar source code for the business tier part. This situation is critical in large 
database applications with many and complex CRUD expressions; 
 CLI do not provide any access control mechanism. 
 
To overcome these drawbacks of CLI,  an architecture referred to as the Adaptable Business 
Tier Component (ABTC) is presented. 
C.2 ABTC 
This section, in a first stage, presents and describes the architecture of ABTC. In a second stage, a 
proof of concept is also presented. 
C.2.1 Adaptation Process 
The adaptation process of business tiers is basically focused on the capability to support new CRUD 
expressions. It comprises two dimensions: the capacity to automatically build, when necessary, new 
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Business Entities and the capacity to accept and manage CRUD expressions. The first dimension is 
herein known as the service composition and the second is herein known as the service allocation. 
Beyond this, to address different adaptation needs, namely organizational and runtime needs, ABTC 
needs to support two lines: dynamic (ABTC_Dynamic) and static (ABTC_Static) versions. 
ABTC_Dynamic is used when there is the need to carry out an adaptation process. ABTC_Static is 
used when the adaptation process took place at an earlier stage and, therefore, there is no need to 
be carried out again. This approach conveys the need to persist the business logics involved in the 
adaptation process, whenever they are required in later stages. Persisted business logics are kept in 
independent components herein known as Business Logic. Thus, in this adaptation context 
(ABTC_Dynamic, ABTC_Static and Business Logic), three scenarios are presented to address 
organizational and runtime requirements, see Figure 75: 
 
 
ABTC_Dynamic
BusinessLogic_2
App. Tier ABTC_Static
BusinessLogic_2
App. Tier
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Figure 75. Implemented and tested scenarios. 
 
Scenario 1 
The adaption process is carried out by database administrators (ADM), or someone on their 
behalf. ABTC_Dynamic is used to build a persistent business logic (BusinesLogic_1). Then, 
developers of application tiers (Developers) use the persisted business logic (BusinessLogic_1) 
and ABTC_Static for the development process of application tiers and also for the database 
applications to be deployed (Runtime). This approach is used when business tier developer role 
(ADM) and application tier developer role (Developer) are played by different actors. 
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Scenario 2 
The adaptation process takes place during the development process of application tiers 
(Developer). It uses ABTC_Dynamic to build a persistent business logic (BusinessLogic_2). Then, 
database applications are deployed with the persisted business logic (BusinessLogic_2) and 
ABTC_Static. This approach is used when application tier developer role (Developer) and 
business tier developer role (Developer) are played by the same actor. 
 
Scenario 3 
If necessary, business logics (BusinessLogic_3) are built during the development process of 
application tiers (Developer) but are not used afterwards. Then, the adaptation process 
(BusinessLogic_4) takes place after the deployment process of database applications and at 
runtime. This approach is used, for example, whenever the adaptation process is dynamic, 
eventually driven by security policies [Morin, '10]  or eventually to accept CRUD expressions 
defined at runtime and already supported by existent CRUD schemas. 
C.2.2 Architecture Presentation 
The architecture for ABTC is presented in this sub-section. The architecture is quite similar to the 
one presented for DACC. ABTC shares many concepts of DACA such as Business Schema, Business 
Entity, Service Composition and Service Allocation. Figure 76 presents the architecture for ABTC 
and only the differences for DACC are described.  
 
IServiceAllocation 
IServiceAllocation comprises services to manage the service allocation process. The first two 
methods are used to manage the deployment process of CRUD expressions, CRUD by CRUD. The 
third method is used to deploy a set of CRUD expressions. While CRUD expressions deployed by 
the two first methods are not persisted within business logics, CRUD expressions deployed by 
the last method are persisted and replace all persisted CRUD expressions contained within the 
business logic. 
 
IService Composition 
IServiceComposition comprises services to manage the service composition. The first two 
methods are used to manage the deployment process Business Schema by Business Schema. 
The third method is used to deploy a set of Business Schemas. In both cases, Business Services 
are persisted within Business Logics. The main difference is that Business Schemas deployed by 
the last method replace all previous Business Services within the business logic. 
 
IManager 
IManager gathers services to provide one of the two supported versions: dynamic (1) or static 
(2) versions, ABTC_Dynamic and ABTC_Static, respectively. The dynamic version, beyond 
extending IServiceAllocation and IServiceComposition, comprises an additional method to 
define the repository for the persistent Business Logic. 
 
Manager 
Manager provides two services: 
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-Manager()
+getInstance(in un : string, in pw : string, in urlDB : string, in rebuiltBL : bool) : IManager
Manager
BusinessEngine
+businessEntity(in bs : T, in crudId : int) : T
+businessEntity(in bs : T, in crudId : int, in srollability : int, in updatability : int) : T
+releaseBusinessSession()
«interface»
ISession
+addBusinessSchema(in bs : IBusinessSchema_i)
+removeBusinessSchema(in bs : IBusinessSchema_i)
+addBusinessSchemas(in set : object)
«interface»
IServiceComposition
+addCRUD(in crudId : int, in crud : string)
+removeCRUD(in crudId : int)
+addCRUDs(in set : object)
«interface»
IServiceAllocation
+getBusinessSession() : ISession
«interface»
IUser
ITransaction
+Session(in un : string, in pwd : string, in url : string)
Session
-conn : DbConn
1
*
Business Logic
#BusinessEntity_1(in conn : DbConn, in crud : string)
BusinessEntity_1
IBusinessSchema_1
#BusinessEntity_n(in conn : DbConn, in crud : string)
BusinessEntity_n
IBusinessSchema_n
...
«interface»
IManager (2)
+repository(in file : string)
«interface»
IManager (1)
Only if dynamic
version
IManager:
(1) only if dynamic version
(2) only if static version
CRUD expressions
1
*
1
*
 
Figure 76. Class diagram of ABTC. 
 a static method (getInstance) to create instances of ABTC; 
 implements one of the two versions of IManager interface. 
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Business Logic 
Business Logic  (at the bottom of the diagram)  is  an  independent  and  persistent  container  to 
 keep adapted business logics. Its content is updated through IServiceAllocation and 
IServiceComposition (only with the ABTC_Dynamic). 
 
 
ISession and Session 
ISession and Session, similarly to DACC, are responsible for managing the instantiation process 
of Business Entities. They provide three methods. The first two (businessEntity) instantiate 
Business Entities: the first one is only for Insert, Update and Delete expressions and the second 
one is only for Select expressions. They are generic methods that, among other arguments, 
accept a Business Schema and return an instance of a Business Entity that implements the 
requested Business Schema. To instantiate Business Entities, they need to be loaded into 
memory at runtime and, then, instances are created using reflection. This process ensures that 
Business Entities may be dynamically created and removed at runtime, without raising any 
runtime error. The second method opens the possibility to define functionalities of LMS at 
runtime (read-only or updatable and, forward-only or scrollable). This possibility cannot be in 
contradiction with the functionalities provided by the Business Entities being instantiated. For 
example, if a Business Entity is prepared to instantiate an updatable LMS, then the instantiated 
LMS may be used as read-only. The opposite, an LMS used as updatable but instantiated as 
read-only, raises a runtime exception. Sessions are released when not needed any more 
(releaseBusinessSession). 
C.3 Proof of Concept 
This section presents the work carried out to prove that ABTC is a reliable architecture to overcome 
the presented drawbacks of CLI. As mentioned before, two components were built: ABTC_Dynamic 
and ABTC_Static. ABTC_Dynamic implements the dynamic version and ABTC_Static implements the 
static version. 
 
Three demos are presented, one for each scenario, Figure 75, which will be herein used as the 
proof of concept. Demo1 is for scenario 1, Demo2 for scenario 2 and Demo3 for scenario 3. Demos 
are divided in two or three steps as shown in Figure 75: ADM, Developer and Runtime. Each demo 
comprises the same set of CRUD expressions and the same set of Business Schemas, presented in 
Table 12 (bottom line presents additional details to understand the table contents). 
 
Tests were carried out with the three demos to evaluate if ABTC copes with the presented 
drawbacks of CLI. From the collected results, in the three demos, it is clear that ABTC completely 
addresses the goals defined for the three scenarios. ABTC_Dynamic automatically builds Business 
Logic from Business Schemas and CRUD expressions. The Business Logic building process may be 
driven by any policy, being business needs and security policies only two different possibilities. 
ABTC_Static uses Business Logic previously built with ABTC_Dynamic. 
 These conclusions may be confirmed by accessing the public demos through the Windows 
Remote Desktop Connection (url: ned.av.it.pt; username: ABTC; password: guest). 
 
 
DACA: Architecture to Implement Dynamic Access Control Mechanisms on Business Tier Components 
 
154 | P a g e  
 
ID CRUD expressions 
Business Schemas 
LMS Closed Open 
IPrd_s ICat_s ISup_s ICat_i IOpen_s 
1 Select * from Products Y N N Y Y FR 
2 Select * from Products where ProductID=10 Y N N Y Y FR 
3 Select * from Products where SupplierID=2 Y N N Y Y FR 
4 Select * from Categories N Y N Y Y FU 
5 Select * from Categories where CategoryID=1 N Y N Y Y FR 
6 Select * from Suppliers N N Y Y Y FR 
7 
Select p.*, c.categoryName, c.Description 
            from Products p, Categories c 
           Where p.CategoryID=c.CategoryID 
N N N Y Y FR 
8 Insert into Categories values (?,?,?,?) N N N Y N  
ID: CRUD expression identification (1-allFromProducts, 2-fromProducts_productId, 
                                                             3-fromSuppliers_supplierId, 4-allFromCategories, 
                                                             5-fromCategories_categoryId, 6-allFromCategories, 
                                                             6-allFromSuppliers, 7-fromProductsCategories, 
                                                             8-InsertInCategories 
CRUD expressions: supported CRUD expressions. 
Business Schemas: supported Business Schemas. 
LMS: updatability of LMS (F: forward-only, S:scrollable, R:read-only, U:updatable) 
User Perm.: permission for each user to use CRUD expression. 
Table 12. CRUD expressions and Business Schemas for the implemented scenarios. 
A proof of concept is available through Windows Remote Desktop at: url: ned.av.it.pt, 
username: ABTC, password: guest. The three scenarios based on Figure 75 were implemented and 
Business Logic is defined from the contents of Table 12. 
 
C.4 Discussion 
In this section a discussion is taken on the following aspects: 1) ABTC beyond JDBC; 2) IRead 
interface and 3) additional advantages of ABTC over CLI. 
 
The proof of concept here presented is based on Java, JDBC and SQL Server 2008. An ABTC has 
also been built with C#, ADO.NET and SQL Server 2008. The component was manually built. The 
achieved success proved that the presented architecture is flexible enough to be used with different 
technologies. From our previous experience with O/RM tools, namely Java Persistence API, it is our 
belief that the architecture may also be used. However, it is so easy to be used with CLI that it would 
only bring disadvantages if used with O/RM, namely because of their induced overhead. 
 
IRead interface is defined from schemas returned by Select expressions. Very often, these 
schemas derive directly from database schemas. This situation may raise several difficulties when a 
Select expression joins two or more tables having attributes with the same name, as it happens with 
Northwind. In this situation it is recommended to rename one of the attributes using ALIAS. Alias 
are useful, they increase the possibility of differentiating equal projected names from different 
tables. To avoid or minimize the usage of ALIAS, in order to minimize maintenance activities on 
IRead, we suggest the use of unique names for each attribute. If necessary, this may be achieved by 
using a technique based on a unique identification prefix for each table name and, then, using the 
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prefix to build attributes names in order to identify the source of each attribute. Example: 
Prd_Products.Prd_ProductId (table Products and one attribute ProductId). 
 
In spite of not being key aspects of this research, we stress some additional CLI drawbacks 
which are also partially overcome by the reference architecture: 
 With CLI, programmers need to master database schemas to deal with each retrieved 
attribute of each CRUD expression. With ABTC, IRead and IWrite interfaces provide schema-
driven getter and setter methods, avoiding the need to master database schemas for each 
CRUD expression. 
 With CLI, there is no easy way to link CRUD expressions and the applications they assist. 
With ABTC, the linkage is provided by schema-driven and type safe methods. 
 ABTC, unlike CLI, transform runtime errors into compile errors. If the name of an attribute 
is modified (IRead is modified), new Business Services are built. Then, when the application 
tier is re-compiled, the compiler will detect all errors where the source-code of application 
tiers was not updated. With CLI, names of attributes are encoded inside strings, this way 
preventing any disconformity from being detected at compile time. 
C.5 Conclusion 
CLI are used to build business tier components whenever performance is a key requirement. 
Regardless this advantage, they present some important drawbacks. To overcome the drawbacks, a 
multi-purpose architecture for ABTC is presented. Two versions of ABTC were defined to address 
different organizational and runtime needs. Three scenarios were defined and implemented as the 
proof of concept. It proved, among other issues, that ABTC address different organizational and 
contextual runtime needs. The adaptation process of ABTC is flexible to meet a wide set of different 
needs. The adaptation process relies on a two phase approach: the service composition, which 
takes place at runtime to dynamically build typed objects, and the service allocation, which also 
takes place at runtime to deploy CRUD expressions. This approach promotes the definition of 
different scenarios to address different needs. We have implemented three scenarios to address 
some organizational and contextual runtime needs. Other scenarios could be implemented, as for 
example, to address security needs. Basically, to address security needs, the deployment process of 
CRUD Schemas and CRUD expressions should be driven by access control policies.   To promote the 
reuse of computation, Business Services manage not one but several CRUD expressions (closed and 
open approach).  
